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After signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson 
predicted that as his Democratic Party fully embraced racial equality, whites would flock 
to Republicans across the South, including in his beloved native Texas.  LBJ’s 
expectation proved accurate.  From the 1960s to the 1980s, the power of the Texas 
Democratic Party declined as the national party took stances on issues such as civil 
rights, the role of government, culture, and foreign policy that alienated many Texans and 
contributed to the growth of the Texas Republican Party.  The national Democratic 
Party’s leftward shift became too much to bear for most conservative Texans, who found 
the Republican Party, especially when led by the charming Ronald Reagan, more 
appealing.  Constant division within the state Democratic Party further weakened its 
electoral success and led many conservatives to convert to the GOP.  Texas itself 
changed dramatically during these years, as job opportunities and warm weather attracted 
Americans from all parts of the country to Texas.  By the 1980s, the formerly rural, 
Democratic-dominated Texas had become an urbanized, two-party super-state, on its way 
to becoming a bastion of Republican political power. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, a major legislative triumph of Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
presidency, outlawed racial segregation in public venues.  LBJ employed the totality of 
his political acumen to ensure congressional passage of the bill.  On July 2, 1964, 
Johnson signed the legislation into law.  Bill Moyers, a key White House aide, expected 
to find Johnson in good spirits that evening following the signing ceremony, but instead 
the president appeared somber.  LBJ predicted to Moyers: “It is an important gain, but I 
think we just delivered the South to the Republican Party for a long time to come.”1 
 Johnson’s foreboding proved accurate.  By the late 1960s, the Republican Party 
began making inroads in the once solidly Democratic South.  The Reagan Revolution of 
1980 demonstrated that the GOP had established itself in Dixie.  In 1994, Congressional 
Republicans’ Contract with America swept many southern Democrats out of Washington 
and solidified the GOP’s dominance of the South.  These national developments trickled 
down to state and local governments in the South, as southern Democrats abandoned the 
party of Jefferson and Jackson for the party of Ronald Reagan and Newt Gingrich.  The 
                                                 
1Bill D. Moyers, “What a Real President Was Like,” Washington Post, November 
13, 1988; and Nick Kotz, Judgment Days: Lyndon Baines Johnson, Martin Luther King 
Jr., and the Laws that Changed America (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 
154.  
  2 
political realignment of the late twentieth century remains one of the more remarkable 
developments in U.S. political history. 
 LBJ’s political liberalism profoundly affected his home state of Texas.  For most 
of the twentieth century, Texas’s dominant politicians were powerful Democrats with 
names such as John Nance Garner, Sam Rayburn, and, of course, Lyndon Johnson.  By 
the end of the twentieth century and into the new millennium, Republicans named Phil 
Gramm, Tom DeLay, and George W. Bush dominated the Lone Star State and shaped 
national politics.  What caused this dramatic political change in Texas?  Was it the 
Democrats’ embrace of civil rights, as LBJ worried?  Was it Johnson’s Great Society 
liberalism?  Was it his foreign policies?  Did Texas really change at all, or was it the 
national political parties themselves that changed?       
 
Historiography of LBJ and His Legacy for Texas 
Biographies of Lyndon Johnson focus primarily on larger themes related to LBJ, 
political liberalism, and the South and Southwest.  Historian Robert Dallek’s two volume 
biography, Lyndon Johnson and His Times, presents LBJ as a complicated figure 
symbolizing the possibilities and limitations of twentieth century America.2  Dallek 
provides a sweeping narrative of Johnson’s triumphs and failures, in both the presidency 
and over the course of his times.  Although the Vietnam War dogs LBJ’s reputation, the 
author perceives Johnson’s role of bringing the South into the mainstream of national life 
                                                 
2Robert Dallek, Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1908-1960 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon 
Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
  3 
as a significant success for the president and the region.  He believes LBJ’s continuation 
of New Deal liberalism through the Great Society and fervent support of civil rights 
forced the South to abandon its archaic racial mindset.  For Dallek, this remains 
Johnson’s greatest legacy. 
 Historian Randall B. Woods’s LBJ: Architect of American Ambition similarly 
does not address the political climate of Texas after Johnson’s policies, but provides 
valuable analysis of the state’s political and social history before the 1960s.3  Woods 
presents Texas as a diverse land of contrasts.  Conservatism persisted as the historic 
political sentiment of Texas, as the majority of its residents consistently adhered to a 
belief in the limited role of government.  The Civil War and Reconstruction period soiled 
the Republican Party’s image in most Texans’ minds, leading to Democratic Party 
dominance of the state.  Wealthy oil barons, landowners, and business executives 
controlled the conservative wing of the Democratic Party, which held most of Texas’s 
political offices.  In contrast to this conservatism, Woods acknowledges a progressive 
wing of the Democratic Party, consisting of teachers, lawyers, ministers, and workers.  
The two factions engaged in intra-party struggles to control the Lone Star State’s politics.  
LBJ identified with aspects of both groups, and throughout his career sought to balance 
their differing interests.  Continuing this theme of contrasts, Woods notes Texas’s racial 
and ethnic diversity, grinding poverty amongst lavish wealth, and urban and rural 
spheres.  He notes: “Texas and Lyndon Johnson are inseparable.  Both have been 
                                                 
3Randall B. Woods, LBJ: Architect of American Ambition (New York: Free Press, 
2006).  
  4 
caricatured beyond recognition by historians.”4  The author believes that Johnson’s 
background as a Texan and a southerner enabled the president to win passage of historic 
civil rights legislation.  With LBJ leading the civil rights fight, Texas and the South could 
not claim outsiders forced racial change upon the region.  He was one of their own.  
However, Woods notes that by the end of his time in the White House, Johnson lost the 
support of many of his fellow Texans and southerners due to backlash against civil rights 
and Black Power, economic instability, and the Vietnam War.     
 Robert A. Caro has completed four books in his epic five-volume biography 
called The Years of Lyndon Johnson.5  For Caro, power—both its acquisition and 
employment—serves as the key theme for LBJ’s life.  Beautifully written, Caro’s works 
remain the most widely-read books on Johnson.  However, several family members and 
White House alumni have criticized Caro’s portrayal of LBJ as insatiable in his lust for 
power.  The Path to Power (1982) and Means of Ascent (1990) especially became 
controversial for their depiction of Johnson as ruthless and amoral in his political rise.  
However, Caro’s recent writings show Johnson as a more nuanced figure.  Master of the 
Senate (2002) characterizes LBJ as the greatest Senate majority leader in American 
history, cajoling Congress in 1957 to pass the first civil rights legislation since 
Reconstruction.  As the Senate leader, Johnson began his quest to rid the South of racial 
                                                 
4Ibid., 5. 
 
5Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power (New York: 
Knopf, 1982); Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent (New 
York: Knopf, 1990); Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate 
(New York: Knopf, 2002); and Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The 
Passage of Power (New York: Knopf, 2012). 
  5 
bigotry.  The Passage of Power (2012) details LBJ’s unhappy years as vice president and 
his dramatic ascension to the power of the presidency.  Caro narrates that once in the 
White House, LBJ utilized his political brilliance to help pass the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and launch the Great Society, representing the apex of his political career.  Readers 
look forward to Caro’s final volume on LBJ. 
 Historian William E. Leuchtenburg examines Johnson’s complicated relationship 
with the South in his 2005 work The White House Looks South.6  The historian presents 
Texas as a unique state possessing both southern and western attributes, which LBJ 
exploited depending on political circumstances.  Leuchtenburg explained, however, that 
Johnson identified most closely with Texas itself: “Whatever else Johnson might be, 
everyone acknowledged that he was a Texan—which might make him southern or 
western or both or neither.”7  Besides vacationing at his ranch and sometimes dressing 
the part of a cowboy, LBJ embraced Texas history, frequently speaking of the Alamo, 
Goliad, and San Jacinto battles in mythological terms.  Yet the author argues that 
Johnson’s image as a southerner rarely escaped the public mind, especially when it came 
to civil rights.  When he first became president, civil rights leaders and liberals worried 
about LBJ’s commitment to their cause.  When he embraced racial justice, southerners 
excoriated Johnson as a traitor to his native region.  Leuchtenburg maintains that many 
                                                 
6William E. Leuchtenburg, The White House Looks South: Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
2005). 
 
7Ibid., 239. 
  6 
Texans and southerners never forgave the president and loathed him to his dying day for 
his support of civil rights. 
 In the Epilogue to The White House Looks South, the author assesses the 
contemporary state of the region, especially noting its transformation from a Democratic 
to Republican Party stronghold.  While the southern GOP benefitted from northern 
Republicans who moved south in the last three decades of the twentieth century, white 
backlash against Democratic civil rights initiatives served as the primary reason for the 
region’s political realignment, according to Leuchtenburg.  The Republican Party pursued 
a southern strategy to attract disaffected whites in the South, and met with success.  
Leuchtenburg argues that while racism remains a national problem, it is most intense in 
the South.  The great irony of Johnson’s civil rights initiatives became the political 
conquest of the South by Republicans, as the president predicted.8 
                                                 
8Dallek and Woods’s works remain the most comprehensive and balanced 
biographies of LBJ, yet other notable books focus on more specific aspects of Johnson’s 
life and career.  See Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: 
St. Martin’s Griffin, 1976); Paul K. Conkin, Big Daddy from the Pedernales: Lyndon 
Baines Johnson (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1986); Bruce J. Schulman, Lyndon B. 
Johnson and American Liberalism: A Brief Biography with Documents (Boston: Bedford 
Books of St. Martin’s Press, 1995); Hal K. Rothman, LBJ’s Texas White House: “Our 
Heart’s Home” (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001); Sean J. Savage, 
JFK, LBJ, and the Democratic Party (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2004); and Ricky Floyd Dobbs, “Lyndon, We Hardly Remember Ye: LBJ in the Memory 
of Modern Texas,” in Gregg Cantrell and Elizabeth Hayes Turner, eds., Lone Star Pasts: 
Memory and History in Texas (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 
220-41.  For LBJ and civil rights, see Robert Mann, The Walls of Jericho: Lyndon 
Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, Richard Russell, and the Struggle for Civil Rights (New 
York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1996); Julie L. Pycior, LBJ & Mexican Americans: 
The Paradox of Power (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997); Nick Kotz, Judgment 
Days: Lyndon Baines Johnson, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Laws That Changed 
America (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005); and David C. Carter, The 
  7 
Historiography of 1960s Liberalism 
 Scholarly work on twentieth century liberalism would benefit from a study of 
Texas and the South’s political realignment.  Allen J. Matusow’s1984 book The 
Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s remains a critical study of 
American liberalism.9  The author focuses on the successes and failures of the liberal 
policies pursued by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations during the 1960s.  
Matusow’s chief contribution to the historiography is in his examination of economic 
policy during these years.  Keynesian economics, based on regulation of the country’s 
money supply and a fiscal policy promoting deficit spending and taxation, existed as a 
central aspect of liberal policy in the 1960s.  Matusow notes that from 1950 to 1970 the 
American Gross National Product steadily grew each year.  Such good economic times 
encouraged liberals to believe that the country’s problems, especially poverty and racism, 
could be solved.  Matusow proclaims Johnson’s landslide 1964 election as the high 
triumph of liberalism.  While many liberals had mixed feelings about LBJ personally, 
they took his historic election as an emphatic endorsement of American liberalism.  The 
author presents the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Medicare, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Music Has Gone Out of the Movement: Civil Rights and the Johnson Administration, 
1965-1968 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).  For LBJ and foreign 
policy, see George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1994); H. W. Brands, The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon 
Johnson and the Limits of American Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); 
and Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995). 
 
9Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 
1960s (New York: Harper & Row, 1984). 
  8 
and Medicaid as the finest moments of the Johnson presidency, and of liberalism itself in 
the 1960s.  However, the liberal euphoria did not last long.  Civil rights moved into a new 
stage marked by urban unrest and black nationalism, which fueled white backlash.  War 
on Poverty and Great Society welfare programs frequently became mired by bureaucratic 
inertia and incompetence.  A reliance on Keynesian economics produced unbalanced 
federal budgets and inflation.  And above all else, the war in Vietnam drained human and 
financial resources while polarizing the nation.  By the late 1960s, liberalism in the 
United States was dead, according to Matusow. 
Irwin Unger explores the legacy of the Great Society in his 1996 book The Best of 
Intentions: The Triumphs and Failures of the Great Society Under Kennedy, Johnson, 
and Nixon.  As his title suggests, Unger presents a more positive account of the Great 
Society, commending its shapers for their efforts to improve the quality of life in the 
United States.  Yet such praise does not prevent him from noting the disappointments of 
liberalism.  He argues that progressive reforms aimed at the educated middle class, such 
as consumer protection laws, highway beautification, and endowments for the arts and 
humanities, proved the most enduring.  However, the author primarily focuses on “the 
big, expensive programs that called forth the greatest White House effort and limelight,” 
namely Medicare, federal aid to education, and the War on Poverty.10   
 The Best of Intentions especially focuses on the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson.  
Unger proposes that John F. Kennedy’s New Frontier met with limited success, as this 
                                                 
10Irwin Unger, The Best of Intentions: The Triumphs and Failures of the Great 
Society Under Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 10. 
  9 
president found more interest in foreign policy, but it created a foundation for Johnson’s 
Great Society.  LBJ achieved historic victories in liberal reform during his early years in 
the White House, but by the end of his presidency problems in bureaucratic 
mismanagement, not to mention Vietnam, undermined his programs.  The author explains 
that after the 1966 midterm elections, when Democrats experienced significant losses, 
Johnson focused on preserving his Great Society policies rather than expanding them.  
However, his withdrawal from the presidential campaign of 1968 fostered some new 
victories for liberalism, particularly in the Fair Housing Act.  Unger provides a chapter on 
the Great Society’s tenure during Richard Nixon’s presidency.  Nixon emphasized 
decentralization of government programs, giving more power to individual states.  
Furthermore, his preference for the grand international stage, lack of interest in domestic 
policies, and problems with Watergate, plus the entrenchment of Democrats in the federal 
bureaucracy, ensured the survival of Great Society reforms. 
 H. W. Brands argues for the importance of foreign policy in liberalism’s decline 
with his 2001 book The Strange Death of American Liberalism.11  Brands contends that 
historically Americans have been more predisposed to limited rather than active 
government, and therefore mid-twentieth century liberalism was an anomaly rather than 
the norm.  The few times Americans have accepted a larger role for their government 
typically has been in times of international tension and war.  Brands thus sees it as no 
coincidence that the liberal reform of the Great Society era occurred during the tense 
                                                 
11H. W. Brands, The Strange Death of American Liberalism (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2001). 
  10 
years of the Cold War.  Engaged in an ideological struggle against Soviet communism, 
Americans determined to prove the superiority of their way of life, and became more 
willing to trust liberals’ efforts to ameliorate society’s ills, such as poverty and racism.  
When the Cold War consensus collapsed in Vietnam, and Watergate and subsequent 
Congressional investigations proved the duplicity of many of the nation’s top officials, 
Americans lost confidence in their government and desired it again to possess a more 
limited role.  The Reagan revolution and eventual ending of the Cold War completed this 
return to conservatism.  Brands’s work reminds historians of foreign policy’s critical role 
in shaping domestic politics in the United States. 
Political scientist Sidney M. Milkis analyzes the Johnson White House in his 
essay “Lyndon Johnson, the Great Society, and the ‘Twilight’ of the Modern 
Presidency.”12  Similar to Dallek and Woods, Milkis presents LBJ’s Great Society as the 
heir to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal.  Milkis argues that Johnson viewed civil rights 
as the main policy left unfinished by the New Deal, and as critical to the success of his 
Great Society goals.  Contrary to Leuchtenburg, Milkis claims that even before LBJ 
entered the White House, the Democratic Party no longer solidly held the South, as 
Republican presidential candidates Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon received 
significant support from the region in the 1952, 1956, and 1960 elections.  Because of 
this development, the author explains, Johnson recognized that the Democratic Party 
needed the African American vote to remain competitive and thus had distinct political 
                                                 
12In Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur, eds., The Great Society and the 
High Tide of Liberalism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005). 
  11 
considerations for embracing civil rights.  Johnson also knew the political risks for 
Democrats’ support of civil rights.  Milkis describes the backlash against LBJ and liberal 
Democrats as beginning in the 1966 midterm elections, as segregationist Democrats won 
gubernatorial nominations in Georgia, Alabama, Arkansas, and Maryland.  Furthermore, 
conservative Republicans made impressive showings that year in congressional and state 
elections, notably with Ronald Reagan’s election as governor of California.   
 Milkis illustrates additional changes in the Democratic Party during the 1960s 
which significantly affected its future.  Aside from splitting on civil rights, Democrats 
bitterly divided themselves over the Vietnam War.  Moreover, LBJ worried that as some 
civil rights leaders became increasingly militant and antiwar, disillusioned moderate 
Americans would become more conservative and look to the Republican Party for new 
leadership.  Another important change in the party came about as a result of the 
integrated Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party’s request to attend the national 
convention in 1964.  As part of a compromise with the group, Johnson promised that in 
future conventions the national party would demand integrated state delegations.  Full 
integration of delegations occurred in 1968, solidifying African American allegiance to 
the party, but angering segregationist Democrats.  Milkis contends that the growing 
influence of the New Left, with its emphasis on community action and distrust of 
executive power, further divided the Democratic Party. 
  12 
 Scholars Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward examine the political 
ramifications of the Great Society in their article “The Politics of the Great Society.”13  
They too note the Democratic Party’s support of civil rights as an important cause of 
southern political realignment, but highlight the Republican Party’s efforts to attract 
southerners.  The G.O.P. took advantage of the backlash against civil rights and the Great 
Society by appealing to an emerging conservatism in the country.  Republicans especially 
pursued a southern strategy to recruit support in Dixie.  Richard Nixon and his 
Republican presidential successors, particularly Ronald Reagan, cut funding for Great 
Society programs and lambasted welfare policies.  They often made thinly-veiled racist 
remarks about welfare recipients and the poor in attempts to galvanize conservative white 
support in the South.  These policies antagonized African Americans and pushed the 
Republican Party further toward the right. 
 Similarly, political scientist Jerome M. Mileur provides several reasons for the 
Democratic Party’s decline in the South in his essay “The Great Society and the Demise 
of New Deal Liberalism.”14  He begins by describing the United States’s significant 
population shifts during the mid-twentieth century.  During these years large numbers of 
Americans moved from the North and Midwest to the South, Southwest, and West.  
Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition had received major support from northern urban 
areas, and by the 1960s changing demographics meant that the Democratic Party needed 
to keep and expand its support in the growing regions.  The Republican Party possessed 
                                                 
13Ibid. 
 
14Ibid. 
  13 
strength in the West and Southwest, and population shifts boded well for its future.  
Republicans viewed the conservative South as a region of great political potential.  
Backlash against civil rights and the Great Society broke the Democratic coalition in the 
South and hurt the party’s support throughout the country, culminating in Richard 
Nixon’s 1968 election.  The GOP embraced conservative politics in the ensuing years, 
solidifying its control of the South.  Mileur believes a critical aspect of the New Right 
became conservatism toward civil rights, and this development led many white 
southerners to reject the Democrats.  The author also notes that the growing diversity of 
groups in the Democratic Party (such as minorities, feminists, antiwar activists, and the 
New Left) alienated southern conservatives.  Republicans aggressively pursued a 
southern strategy by proclaiming adherence to traditional values that rejected what they 
perceived as the excesses of liberalism.15 
                                                 
15For more scholarship on the fate of 1960s liberalism see also Steve Fraser and 
Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1989); Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in 
American Culture, Society, and Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo Press, 2002); 
Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur, eds., The Great Society and the High Tide of 
Liberalism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005); Philip Jenkins, Decade 
of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties and the Making of Eighties America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006); Rick Perlstein, Nixonland: The Rise of a President and 
the Fracturing of America (New York: Scribner, 2008); Sean Wilentz, The Age of 
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Historiography of Late-Twentieth Century Southern Politics and Conservatism 
 Many valuable secondary sources evaluate the political shifts in the South during 
the latter part of the twentieth century.  Journalist Wayne Greenhaw suggests that 
Republican conservatism became attractive to southerners in his 1982 book Elephants in 
the Cottonfields: Ronald Reagan and the New Republican South.16  Writing in the early 
years of the Reagan presidency, Greenhaw attributes Republican success in the South to 
the attractiveness of Ronald Reagan as a candidate.  Reagan’s warm personality and 
charisma appealed to southerners.  Greenhaw describes the South as a conservative 
region, and argues that Reagan became a master at lecturing about traditional values such 
as family and religion.  Reagan began speaking throughout the South in the 1960s, and 
his conservatism won supporters.  The author explains that Reagan particularly contrasted 
with Lyndon Johnson in the southern mind, as LBJ’s civil rights policies brought 
punishment in whites’ views and Reagan’s simple rhetoric hearkened back to a halcyon 
time.  Furthermore, Reagan’s image as a gentleman contrasted with Johnson’s crasser, 
back-slapping personality.  Greenhaw writes: “LBJ represented black in their [southern] 
eyes while RR [Ronald Reagan] was white; whether it was race, land, ideas, economics, 
or general appearance.”17 
 Greenhaw notes civil rights as a significant factor in Republican insurgence in the 
South, but describes it as a larger part of southern rejection of Democratic liberalism.  
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Many white southerners disdained Great Society spending policies which contributed to 
the enlargement of a welfare state.  By the early 1980s, the GOP capitalized on 
conservatives’ anxieties about a large federal government and high taxes.  The 
Republican Party of the Reagan years moved sharply to the right, influenced by economic 
conservatives, Christian fundamentalists, and military hawks, all groups who maintained 
critical southern support.   
 The author describes Texas’s growing embrace of the Republican Party during the 
twentieth century.  LBJ’s civil rights support played a large role, but Greenhaw reminds 
readers that Democratic divisions went back to 1948, when Dixiecrats left the party over 
the question of racial justice.  While Texas stayed with the Democrats that year, 
Dixiecrats received some support in the state.  LBJ’s fight with segregationist Governor 
Allan Shivers in the 1950s for control of the state party further divided Texas Democrats, 
and the state twice voted for Republican Dwight Eisenhower for president.  While 
Johnson carried his home state in 1964, Republican Barry Goldwater possessed 
enthusiastic supporters in Texas, previewing an emerging New Right.  The author claims 
that during the 1970s Texas Republicans became better organized and, contrasting with 
other southern states, sought to recruit support among conservative minority business 
people.  The election of Bill Clements in 1978 as Texas’s first Republican governor since 
Reconstruction illustrated that the GOP no longer played second fiddle to the Democrats 
in the Lone Star State. 
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Political scientist Alexander P. Lamis researched southern political changes and 
devoted significant attention to Texas in his 1988 book The Two-Party South.18  Lamis 
argues that the primary purpose of the one-party South prior to the civil rights era 
involved maintaining white supremacy in the region.  Two political parties would allow 
African Americans clout as whites appealed for their votes.  Containing southern politics 
in the Democratic Party ensured white control.  The author explains that civil rights 
destroyed Democratic dominance of the South, beginning in the late 1940s with President 
Harry Truman’s gradual support and the 1948 Dixiecrat revolt, and culminating in LBJ’s 
efforts to pass civil rights legislation in 1964 and 1965.  Lamis illustrates that with the 
success of the civil rights movement, the purpose of the one-party South, to ensure 
segregation, failed, and thus Democratic dominance no longer became necessary.  White 
segregationists renounced their Democratic allegiances.  The author claims that by the 
1970s, racial tensions, while still existent, abated as most southerners grudgingly 
accepted the results of the civil rights movement.  The Democratic Party held an uneasy 
southern coalition of whites and blacks to elect native son Jimmy Carter president in 
1976, but Carter’s ineffective leadership and the rise of Ronald Reagan broke apart this 
group.  By the 1980s, Republicans possessed a serious presence in the South. 
 Following his explanation of these developments in the South, Lamis makes 
curious remarks about the uniqueness of Texas.  The state’s geographic and demographic 
size ensured distinction from other southern states.  Lamis argues that Texas’s small 
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number of African Americans, in comparison to the rest of the South, led to racial issues 
being less paramount in the Lone Star State.  He suggests that economics existed as the 
primary focus for the Democratic Party.  Texas Democrats divided between conservative 
and liberal wings, with the conservatives maintaining greatest power.  Lamis believes the 
size and growing urbanization of Texas caused the state to be more concerned with 
national rather than regional politics by the 1970s.  Conservative Democrats became 
increasingly frustrated with the liberal economic policies of the national party, and 
moved to the growing Texas Republican Party.  Lamis provides a commendable reminder 
that issues such as economics played a role in political realignment, but he mistakenly 
downplays the role of civil rights, as Texas long possessed its share of racial tensions.   
 Political scientists Earl Black and Merle Black detail multiple reasons for 
southern political realignment in their 2002 book The Rise of Southern Republicans.19  
They note the significance of white backlash against civil rights laws, but like Greenhaw 
and Lamis also stress that economics and religion encouraged the white South to move 
toward the Republican Party.  By the 1980s, most white southerners accepted integration 
but supported the GOP’s conservative stance on other racial issues, including affirmative 
action and busing.  Furthermore, the party’s stringent fiscal proposals and growing 
influence from religious conservatives appealed to many whites in the South.  The 
authors propose that two critical events strengthened the Republican Party’s presence in 
Dixie.  In 1964, more white southerners voted for Barry Goldwater than Lyndon Johnson, 
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beginning a trend of voting for Republican presidential candidates in the region that 
continues to the present day.  Secondly, in the 1980s more southern whites identified as 
Republicans than Democrats for the first time in history, due to Ronald Reagan’s success 
as president.  The authors contend that Reagan’s appeal enabled these citizens finally to 
abandon their loyalty to the Democratic Party, which in turn translated into Republican 
successes in southern congressional elections during the 1990s.  Yet interestingly Black 
and Black explain that both political groups are minority parties in the South, unable to 
maintain a clear majority of the electorate.  They suggest that independent southerners 
determine the outcomes of elections from year to year by which party they choose to 
support. 
Joseph Crespino creates a case study of Mississippi in the 1960s-1980s with his 
2007 book In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative 
Counterrevolution.20  Crespino’s work revisits the southern strategy thesis by stressing 
additional factors, such as changing demographics and economics, and their relation to 
race, that current historiography overlooks.  The author argues that white Mississippians 
gradually accepted integration but looked to the emerging conservative movement as a 
vehicle for resisting further black civil rights.  They supported national conservatives’ 
efforts to retain tax-exempt status for private schools (many blatantly founded to prevent 
integration) through a rhetoric lambasting secular liberalism for supposedly undermining 
Christian traditionalism.  Opposition to busing became another conservative cause in the 
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1970s.  Crespino extols us not to perceive Mississippi as an isolated backwater, but rather 
emblematic of the United States’s conservative turn in the late-twentieth century.  We 
cannot deny the tremendous advances in equality made as a result of the civil rights 
movement, but the author raises the troubling question of whether the rest of the nation 
actually became more like Mississippi and the South, reacting against civil rights and 
embracing conservatism.  Furthermore, the demographic boom in Sunbelt states like 
Mississippi brought non-southern Americans to the region, who likewise tended to adopt 
conservatism by the 1980s.  
Joseph E. Lowndes similarly expands upon the backlash thesis in his 2008 book 
From the New Deal to the New Right: Race and the Southern Origins of Modern 
Conservatism.21  He suggests that rather than the Republican Party winning southern 
dominance, the South itself conquered the GOP.  Besides exploring the roles of political 
figures such as Barry Goldwater, George Wallace, and Richard Nixon, Lowndes analyzes 
how segregationist intellectuals, conservative publications like the National Review, 
fiction, and film welded racism with the New Right.  Racial backlash against the civil 
rights movement played a crucial role in this development, but the author also seeks to 
explain how conservatives linked racism with antistatism, law and order, and family 
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values.  The author argues that conservatism triumphed in late twentieth century America 
because of the nationalization of such southern characteristics.22   
                                                 
22For more scholarship on the rise of conservatism in the late-twentieth century 
United States, see Mary C. Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative 
Capture of the GOP (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Dan T. 
Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative 
Counterrevolution, 1963-1994 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996); 
Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New 
Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics, 2nd ed. (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2000); Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins 
of the New American Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Rick Perlstein, 
Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 2001); Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in 
American Culture, Society, and Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo Press, 2002); 
Thomas Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the Heart of 
America (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004); David Lublin, The Republican South: 
Democratization and Partisan Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2004); Donald T. Critchlow, Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman’s 
Crusade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: 
Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005); Philip Jenkins, Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties and the Making of 
Eighties America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Matthew D. Lassiter, The 
Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006); Michael McHugh, The Second Gilded Age: The Great Reaction in the 
United States, 1973-2001 (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2006); Natasha 
Zaretsky, No Direction Home: The American Family and the Fear of National Decline, 
1968-1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Rick Perlstein, 
Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (New York: Scribner, 
2008); Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York: Harper, 
2008); Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer, eds., Rightward Bound: Making America 
Conservative in the 1970s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Steven P. 
Miller, Billy Graham and the Rise of the Republican South (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009); Bethany Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making 
of Christian Free Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009); David 
T. Courtwright, No Right Turn: Conservative Politics in a Liberal America (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010); Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United 
States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2010); Daniel K. Williams, God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Glenn Feldman, ed., Painting Dixie Red: When, 
Where, Why, and How the South Became Republican (Gainesville: University Press of 
  21 
Historiography of Texas’s Political Transformation 
What little research historians have conducted about the fate of the Democratic 
Party in Texas remains commendable.  In 1949, government scholar and native Texan, V. 
O. Key, Jr., completed a massive study of southern politics, detailing his analysis state by 
state.  Key stressed the uniqueness of Texas, arguing the state more western than 
southern, due to fewer African American citizens, as well as having a politics dominated 
by economic interests.  Key noted: “The Lone Star State is concerned about money and 
how to make it, about oil and sulfur and gas, about cattle and dust storms and irrigation, 
about cotton and banking and Mexicans.”  The large number of Mexican Americans, 
particularly in South and West Texas, also contributed to Texas’s distinction, as political 
jefes, or bosses, forcefully told them how to vote.  The author discussed the heated battles 
between conservative and liberal factions in the state Democratic Party, which typically 
boiled down to economic issues, although polarizing personalities sometimes played a 
role, such as in the careers of Governors James E. Ferguson and W. Lee O’Daniel.  
Additionally, controversy over national Democratic candidates, most notably seen with 
the Texas Regulars bolting the party in opposition to Franklin Roosevelt’s desire for a 
fourth term in 1944, illustrated the potential of voters becoming presidential Republicans 
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while maintaining local and state allegiance to the Democratic Party.  Key concluded that 
such factors could portend an eventual two-party state in Texas.23 
Historian Roger M. Olien studies the growth of the G.O.P. in Texas in his 1982 
work From Token to Triumph: The Texas Republicans Since 1920.24  Olien primarily 
focuses on the details of specific elections during the twentieth century and makes few 
comments as to why Republicans encountered success in the state.  He notes Dwight 
Eisenhower’s winning of Texas in 1952 as a key turning point for the party.  In 1968, 
former governors Coke Stevenson and Allan Shivers, as well as strident anticommunist 
Martin Dies, joined Democrats for Nixon and lent their conservative prestige to the 
Republican cause.  Olien also concludes that an influx of northern and midwestern 
Republicans moving to Texas cities during the mid-twentieth century aided the GOP’s 
growth in the state.  The Republican Party’s increasingly conservative stance on national 
and state issues caused like-minded Democrats to leave the party.  Texas Republicans 
became better organized by the 1970s and attracted such disillusioned Democrats.   
John R. Knaggs details the growth of the Texas Republican Party in his 1986 
work Two-Party Texas: The John Tower Era, 1961-1984.25  Knaggs argues that Senator 
John Tower’s greatest legacy remains his centrality in creating two-party competition in 
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Texas politics.  The author admits his book’s biases, clearly seen by its readers, as 
Knaggs himself served as a key supporter of Tower and the Texas Republicans during 
these studied years.  Yet despite these weaknesses, Two-Party Texas contains valuable 
reference material.  Knaggs’s contention that liberal Democrats, hoping to purge 
conservatives from their party, encouraged Republican efforts to establish a viable two-
party system helps us further understand Texas’s recent political trends, as does his 
discussion of 1972 court rulings establishing the one-man, one-vote redistricting patterns.  
Two-Party Texas brings a Republican perspective of the party’s growth in the Lone Star 
State.   
Sociologist Chandler Davidson contemplates the conclusions of V. O. Key, Jr., 
and examines their relevance to Texas politics in the 1980s in his work Race and Class in 
Texas Politics.26  While Key surmised that class and economic issues would lead to a 
two-party system in Texas, Davidson concludes that in actuality race became the more 
critical impetus for the state’s political realignment.  Many Texans resented the gains 
made by African Americans during the 1960s and 1970s and embraced the racial 
backlash and southern strategy pursued by the Republican Party.  The author also 
highlights the significance of Christian fundamentalism in attracting Texans to the GOP.  
Furthermore, Davidson discusses the liberal conquest of the Texas Democratic Party at 
the 1976 state convention and the increasing racial diversity of the group, which pushed 
many conservatives to the Republicans.  Race and Class in Texas Politics is a 
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commendable sociological study of the Lone Star State, emphasizing the primary role of 
race in its politics.   
Kenneth Bridges argues that the gubernatorial election of 1978 marked a critical 
turning point in Texas’s political history in his 2008 book Twilight of the Texas 
Democrats: The 1978 Governor’s Race.  In this important year Republicans finally 
overcame a century of Democratic control of the Texas governor’s mansion as William 
Clements defeated John Hill.  The author notes multiple reasons for such a political upset, 
including changing demographic trends in Texas and divisions within the Democratic 
Party.  John Hill, Texas attorney general, failed to unify a Democratic Party almost 
hopelessly divided.  Hill, a moderate, challenged the incumbent conservative governor, 
Dolph Briscoe, Jr., for the Democrats’ 1978 gubernatorial nomination, and won a bitter 
contest.  The author explains that many Briscoe Democrats refused to support Hill and 
instead aided Clements.  The episode served as yet another example of the historic 
divisions among conservative, moderate, and liberal Democrats in Texas.  On the 
national stage, President Jimmy Carter had become widely unpopular in Texas as a result 
of his economic and oil regulation policies, which placed Hill in the difficult position of 
having to distance himself from the Democrat in the White House.  Bridges also notes 
significant economic and demographic changes among the citizenry, proposing that by 
1978 Texas existed “as a modern, urban industrial state.”27  Since World War II, industry 
and manufacturing had replaced agriculture as the Lone Star State’s leading economic 
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factor, causing increased urbanization.  The population of Texas grew tremendously in 
the mid-twentieth century, and newcomers from outside the state brought their 
Republican political allegiances with them.  Republicans historically possessed more 
clout in Texas cities, while Democrats dominated the countryside.  Urbanization in the 
state strengthened the Republicans at the expense of rural Democrats.  Bridges points out 
that Republicans steadily had been narrowing the gap with Democrats in gubernatorial 
elections since the 1960s, illustrating the effects of Democratic disunity and Texas’s 
demographic changes. 
William S. Clayson conducts a case study of the effects of 1960s liberal policy on 
Texas in his 2010 book Freedom is Not Enough: The War on Poverty and the Civil 
Rights Movement in Texas.28  While his book primarily is an organizational history of 
groups such as the Community Action Program, Clayson comments on the state’s 
political changes since the 1960s.  He perceives Texas as both a southern and a western 
state due to its significant population of African Americans and Mexican Americans.  
Like previous scholars, Clayson sees suburbanization and the emergence of the Sunbelt 
as critical for the burgeoning Texas Republican Party, which exploited racial resentments 
to attract conservatives.  The author presents the state Democratic Party as plagued by 
factions during the late 1960s and 1970s, as militant Tejano and black activists 
questioned its goals and white conservatives increasingly viewed the War on Poverty as 
synonymous with the civil rights movement.  Texas Republicans recruited some 
                                                 
28William S. Clayson, Freedom is Not Enough: The War on Poverty and the 
Civil Rights Movement in Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010). 
  26 
Hispanics by playing upon their tensions with African Americans, and won the support of 
conservative Democrats who had grown weary of civil rights struggles supported by their 
national party.  Like Davidson, Clayson contends that race served as the crucial factor in 
changing Texas’s political dynamics.   
The most complete analysis to date of recent Texas political history is Sean P. 
Cunningham’s 2010 book Cowboy Conservatism: Texas and the Rise of the Modern 
Right.  Cunningham focuses on how Texans’ perceptions of the two major political 
parties changed from the early 1960s through Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980.  The 
author argues that the GOP ultimately won Texan votes by promoting “cowboy 
conservatism,” or “the image of a conservative philosophy, personified in Ronald 
Reagan, championing ‘law and order,’ ‘plain folks Americanism,’ and ‘God-fearing 
patriotism.’”29  Cowboy Conservatism studies many of the important events of these 
years, such as the uprisings of the 1960s, Sharpstown and Watergate scandals, various 
presidential elections, economic uncertainties, and growth of the religious right.  Notable 
individuals appear, including Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, John Tower, Jimmy 
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Carter, and most prominently, Ronald Reagan.  Cunningham initiates an important 
dialogue which I hope to continue and to expand in this dissertation.30 
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Argument and Conclusions 
 The previous discussion regarding the historiography of Texas’s political shift 
from Democratic to Republican Party dominance in the late twentieth century 
demonstrates the need for further research into this subject.  Scholars generally have 
argued that civil rights served as the primary factor in ending southern Democratic Party 
rule.  Clearly, a variety of developments, from civil rights to economic policies to 
demographic shifts to cultural issues to foreign affairs to individual candidates’ 
personalities, caused political changes in Texas.  Were civil rights the overriding issue in 
Texas though?  What role did other events, both during and after the LBJ years, play in 
the fate of the Texas Democratic Party?  How unique is Texas—is it southern, western, 
both, or neither?  Exploring these questions could illuminate the political histories of 
Texas, the larger South and Southwest, and the United States.   
 Political scientists and journalists wrote most of the previously discussed works 
on Texas political history, and I believe this story would benefit from being told with a 
historian’s point of view.  The historian could analyze Texas from political, social, 
cultural, and economic perspectives to provide a more complete picture of the subject.  
An understudied issue in Texas’s political change is the role of foreign policy issues in 
politics.  How did LBJ’s handling of the Vietnam War affect Texas politics?  Was the 
strident anticommunism of Ronald Reagan designed to appeal to white southerners, who 
are historically more militaristic than other Americans?  Furthermore, what did the new, 
more egalitarian, Texas Democratic Party look like?  What did this mean for the Lone 
Star State?  How much did Texans really change at all, beyond their political labels?   
  29 
 The following dissertation seeks to answer these questions and to tell the story of 
Texas politics since the 1960s.  I argue that the direction of the national Democratic 
Party, on issues such as civil rights, the role of government, culture, and foreign policy 
led to a transformation of the Texas Democratic Party and contributed to the growth of 
the Texas Republican Party.  Furthermore, old divisions within the state Democratic 
Party weakened its power, and by the 1980s, no longer could be overcome.   
Many years ago, LBJ predicted the downfall of the Democratic Party in the South, 
believing civil rights the potential cause.  He was accurate about his party’s future in the 
region, and in his native Texas, but the reasons for this development remained less clear.  
Civil rights played a major role.  Many Texans initially resented Johnson’s civil rights 
legislation, but ultimately most whites accepted equal public accommodations and ballot 
access by the 1970s.  However, urban unrest, affirmative action, and busing proved even 
more challenging for conservative Texans, many of whom believed the national 
Democratic Party had become too involved in the struggle for racial equality.  Sadly, 
underlying racism persisted among many white Texans. 
 Other factors emerged to contribute to the defeat of Democrats.  The Johnson 
administration’s Great Society programs alienated conservative Democrats hostile to 
expanding the size of government.  For many Texans, government seemed to bloat on 
their tax dollars more each year, even after Johnson had long left the White House.  
Additionally, by the 1970s, controversial cultural issues such as abortion, the feminist 
movement, gay rights, crime and punishment, and the role of religion in society pushed 
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Texans to the Republican Party, which offered more traditional positions on such heated 
topics.   
LBJ fervently believed in the necessity of his civil rights and Great Society 
policies, and recognized their potential political risks.  He did not foresee, though, that 
the Vietnam War, the central foreign policy crisis of his presidency, also would cause 
conservative Americans, particularly southerners and Texans, to renounce their 
Democratic Party loyalties.  Johnson’s Vietnam policies bitterly divided his party and the 
country, and in the years following his exit from the White House, Democrats became 
increasingly hostile to aggressive foreign policy, especially that pursued by LBJ’s 
Republican successors Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan.  The Democrats’ dovishness 
angered many Texans, who found themselves more supportive of the GOP’s goals in 
international relations. 
The national Democratic Party’s embrace of civil rights, liberal government, 
controversial cultural issues, and a less aggressive foreign policy proved anathema for 
many Texans by the 1970s and 1980s.  The factionalism that had plagued the state 
Democratic Party for so long finally became too much for conservatives to bear, 
especially once moderates and liberals controlled the Texas party machinery.  Most 
joined the rapidly growing state Republican Party and supported its more like-minded 
conservative platform.   
Furthermore, Texas experienced remarkable economic and demographic changes 
during these years.  The Texas economy boomed as the state received incentives and 
defense contracts from the federal government, in no small part due to President Johnson 
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and his supportive Texas Congressional delegation.  State officials in Austin similarly 
labored to attract businesses to the Lone Star State.  From the 1960s through the 1980s, 
Texas completed its postwar transition from a rural and agricultural-based region to a 
highly urbanized and economically diverse super-state wielding a powerful influence on 
national affairs.  The Lone Star State emerged as a critical part of the expanding United 
States Sun Belt, as job opportunities and warm weather brought thousands of new 
Americans to Texas.  Many of these new Texans were Republicans who had no loyalties 
to the state Democratic Party.  In this era Texas changed not only politically, but also 
economically and culturally. 
Johnson’s civil rights, Great Society, and Vietnam policies thus caused a 
transformation in modern American politics.  Many white southerners and conservatives 
across the country aligned themselves with the Republican Party.  Concurrently however, 
Democratic support of civil rights strengthened the allegiance of African Americans and 
other minorities to Johnson’s party.  Americans increasingly perceived Republicans as 
the party of conservatism and Democrats as the party of liberalism.  Conservative 
Democrats and liberal Republicans became rare, almost relics of their parties’ pasts.  LBJ 
understood the dynamics of politics better than most, and he expected his policies to 
cause problems for his party, especially in the South.  Even he would be surprised though 
had he lived to see the transformation in American politics resulting from his 
administration’s turbulent years in power.  Johnson’s home state of Texas, where 
historically politics has been passionate, discouraging, and at times, larger than life, 
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provides an enthralling case study for contemplating American politics in the late 
twentieth century.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
“Upward to the Great Society”: 
LBJ, Texas, and the White House, 1960-1965 
 
 
 In a 1964 study of Texas politics, three scholars from the University of Texas 
noted the transitions emerging in the state before their very own eyes.  “Republicanism 
on the rise, the Confederate tradition fading, minority groups increasingly restless, cattle 
and oil challenged by industry and commerce, urbanization—it is a dynamic and 
dramatic development, politically as well as socially and economically.”  They predicted 
that the continued factionalism of the state Democratic Party would aid the growth of 
Texas’s Republican Party, especially if liberals won control of its machinery.  Such an 
event would push conservatives to the GOP in droves, they contended.1 
 As the above study illustrates, the 1960s were a time of major changes in Texas, 
politically, economically, and socially.  The decade marked the apogee of the Texas 
Democratic Party and its power.  Governor John Connally and his rising star protégé Ben 
Barnes rode large in Austin at the statehouse, and most importantly, Texas had its first 
native son in the White House in Lyndon Baines Johnson, an individual who dominated 
national politics like few presidents before or since.   
 
                                                 
1James R. Soukup, Clifton McCleskey, and Harry Holloway, Party and Factional 
Division in Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964), xviii, 66. 
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LBJ as Vice President, and the Rise of John Tower 
 Johnson had wielded vast power as Senate majority leader during the 1950s, and 
hoped to be the Democratic nominee for president in the 1960 election.  However, 
Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts won the nomination and asked LBJ to serve 
as his running mate.  Many Texans expressed shock when LBJ accepted Kennedy’s offer.  
Some felt that Johnson should not settle for the number two position, while others had 
trouble reconciling themselves to backing Kennedy as president, given the Massachusetts 
senator’s more liberal political views and his Roman Catholic faith.  LBJ’s protégé and 
close ally John Connally remembered the reaction among several Texans, particularly 
during and immediately after the national convention: “I saw friends who had been 
Johnson supporters forever but were now livid with rage, and cursed him as a double-
dealer, a liar, and a hypocrite.”2  Ben Barnes later contemplated: “The very idea of it was 
so divisive, in fact, that some have argued that the downfall of the Texas Democratic 
Party can be traced to that moment.”3 
 Yet Kennedy’s selection of Johnson proved a prudent move in ultimately unifying 
the Democratic Party toward a victorious election.  Especially critical, LBJ helped 
Kennedy carry Texas’s electoral votes.  Years later, Connally remained convinced that 
Johnson’s presence on the ticket won Kennedy the presidency.  “There is no doubt in my 
mind that the Democrats would have lost in 1960 without Lyndon Johnson. . . .  Texas 
                                                 
2John Connally, In History’s Shadow: An American Odyssey (New York: 
Hyperion, 1993), 166.  
 
3Ben Barnes, Barn Burning, Barn Building: Tales of a Political Life, from LBJ 
through George W. Bush and Beyond (Albany, Tex.: Bright Sky Press, 2006), 41. 
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was, and is, essentially a conservative state.  General Eisenhower carried it twice.  It had 
become fashionable to vote Republican nationally and Democratic locally.  A great many 
Texans had been for Nixon for President and Johnson for senator—and their favorite 
senator had tipped the scales against their Presidential favorite.”4 
 In his memoirs Barnes writes of his feelings the day following the Kennedy-
Johnson ticket’s victory.  “It was a clear November morning in Texas, and the state’s 
Democratic Party was set to begin its extraordinary run of power throughout the next 
decade.  Lyndon Johnson was the vice president-elect, Democrats had huge majorities in 
both houses of the Texas legislature, and Sam Rayburn was still Speaker of the House.”  
However, Barnes could not help but feel some regret for failing to recognize nascent 
changes occurring on the Texas political scene.  In 2006 he reflected: “Holding the party 
together, and keeping it strong, should have been one of the main goals for Texas 
Democrats during these years.  But at that time, with such a weak Republican presence in 
Texas, it just didn’t seem like there was much of anything to worry about.  In hindsight, 
though, the Democrats’ eventual loss of Texas started with this small chipping-away at 
party unity in the late ‘50s and early ‘60s.”5 
Indeed, this development began in a moment of Democratic triumph, as Lyndon 
Johnson’s election to the vice presidency meant his Senate seat would become open.  LBJ 
simultaneously had run for election as vice president and for a new Senate term in 1960, 
which he won rather handily.  Once inaugurated as vice president in early 1961, Johnson 
                                                 
4John Connally, In History’s Shadow, 167. 
 
5Ben Barnes, Barn Burning, Barn Building, 42-43. 
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resigned his Senate seat.  According to Texas law, the governor would appoint a 
temporary senator until a new election would be held to choose a permanent replacement 
for the unexpired term.  Few Texans could have guessed that this development would 
lead to their first Republican senator since Reconstruction and mark the dawn of a two-
party system in the Lone Star State. 
 A five-foot-six, a thirty-five year old government professor from Wichita Falls, 
John Tower had challenged LBJ in the 1960 general election, criticizing him for running 
for two offices at once.  He made an impressive showing, garnering almost 42 percent of 
the vote.  After Johnson’s election to the vice presidency, Tower continued his campaign, 
knowing that he soon would have another opportunity to run for the open Senate seat.   
 Texas Governor Price Daniel appointed William “Dollar Bill” Blakley to hold the 
Senate seat until the special election.  A millionaire from Dallas, Blakley had served 
without distinction in such a temporary position in 1957.  He held staunchly conservative 
views, and upon taking Texas’s open Senate seat in 1961, viciously attacked Robert 
Weaver, an African American Kennedy administration nominee, at a confirmation 
hearing.  Liberal Texas Democrats loathed that another Texas governor had sent Blakley 
to the Senate, a man they viewed as a racist tied to the conservative establishment.6   
The Blakley-Tower race for the U.S. Senate highlighted what had become a 
recurring problem for Texas Democrats that would only grow worse in the ensuing years: 
deep divisions within the party.  H. M. Baggarly served as editor of the weekly Tulia 
                                                 
6David Richards, Once Upon a Time in Texas: A Liberal in the Lone Star State 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002), 223. 
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Herald and wrote frequent columns on Texas politics.  A staunch supporter of the 
national Democratic Party, Baggarly often found himself at odds with his fellow residents 
of Tulia, a town of about four thousand located between Amarillo and Lubbock.  
Nevertheless, he retained a strong reputation as a respected editorialist.  In the contest to 
fill LBJ’s vacated Senate seat, Baggarly supported the moderate Congressman Jim 
Wright, who ultimately failed to make the runoff, and argued that “the only difference 
between Tower and Blakley is Tower’s honesty in admitting his Republicanism and 
running as a Republican.”7 
In the special election to fill the vice president’s vacated Senate seat, many Texas 
liberals refused to support the Democrat Blakley, whose rabid conservatism they found 
insulting.  Blakley and Tower made the runoff, defeating more moderate and liberal 
candidates.  Progressives dreamed that their conservative Party brethren would eventually 
join the GOP, creating a Texas of conservative Republicans and liberal (or national) 
Democrats.  The Texas Observer, the iconoclastic magazine of liberals, urged its readers 
to support Republican John Tower instead of Blakley in the runoff, arguing that a GOP 
victory would help speed the process of Texas becoming a truly two-party state.  “Only in 
rare circumstances can the will of Texas liberal Democrats be expressed through the state 
Democratic Party.  The reason is quite clear: the party is controlled by provincial 
Dixiecrat conservatives in ‘conservative’ years, or by accommodating ‘moderates,’ well 
doused in oil, in moderate years.”  The editors of the Observer continued: “Conservative 
                                                 
7H. M. Baggarly, “The Country Editor,” March 30, 1961, in Eugene W. Jones, 
ed., The Texas Country Democrat: H. M. Baggarly Surveys Two Decades of Texas 
Politics (San Angelo, Tex.: Anchor Publishing, 1970), 188-90. 
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Democrats primarily concerned with exercising power within the state will never leave 
the Democratic Party as long as they control it, no matter how unsympathetic they remain 
toward the Trumans and Stevensons and Kennedys and toward the aims and objectives of 
the modern Democratic Party.”  The editorial thus concluded: “Liberals want to free their 
party from the dead weight of the Dixiecrats, of whom Blakley is an unerring symbol; 
Republicans want to reorient Texas conservatism into a source of greater state prestige.  
At the intersection of these two basic objectives lies a vote for John Tower.”8 
Ben Barnes later criticized such practices by Democrats.  “This was the essential 
mistake the Texas Democratic Party made during these years: Every so often, they’d start 
to devour each other in fits of spite, allowing the Republicans to gain vital footholds in 
the state.”  Barnes especially stressed the significance of Tower’s election: “Tower was 
only one man, and this was only one election, but you can’t overstate what his victory 
meant to Republicans in Texas.  Up to that point, the history of the Texas Republican 
Party was a long tale of futility and woe. . . .  Yet now, with Tower’s victory, the 
Republicans had pried open the door.”9 
Tower himself tied Blakley to the Kennedy administration, which had become 
unpopular in Texas.  Even though Blakley was no friend of the Kennedy administration, 
his position as a Democrat aligned him with the White House in the minds of many 
Texans.  Tower recalled in his memoirs: “Our strategy involved holding my conservative 
                                                 
8“A Vote for Tower,” Texas Observer, May 20, 1961, in Char Miller, ed., Fifty 
Years of the Texas Observer (San Antonio, Tex.: Trinity University Press, 2004), 161-63. 
 
9Ben Barnes, Barn Burning, Barn Building, 49-50. 
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base while continuing to paint Blakley—who was just as conservative as I was—as an 
ally of the Kennedys.  This forced Blakley to run against his own president, and that in 
turn alienated moderate and liberal Democrats.”10 
Tower beat Blakley by just over ten thousand votes.  Pundits and newspapers 
labeled his victory a “fluke.”  Tower later reflected: “As far as they were concerned I was 
a political accident, a fluke that had resulted from a confluence of mistakes, 
misjudgments, and mishaps.”  However, the new senator had no illusions about the 
closeness of his victory.  “I knew that although we had won the special election, the 
Republican Party was still a beleaguered minority.  There was a lot of work to be done in 
order to turn a temporary coalition of Republican loyalists, disaffected conservative 
Democrats, and maverick liberals into a permanent alliance.  Years of effort would be 
needed before this peculiar mixture jelled.”11 
While H. M. Baggarly had encouraged his readers to “go fishing,” or sit out, the 
runoff between Blakley and Tower, he found Tower “the lesser of two evils,” and hoped 
his election would convince Texas Democrats to nominate moderate, rather than right-
wing, candidates in the future.  He exclaimed: “The campaign to elect a successor to 
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Little, Brown and Company, 1991), 20. 
 
11Ibid., 23-24. 
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Lyndon Johnson in the U.S. Senate has been another nightmare on the Texas political 
scene. . . .  Tower has only the stupidity of Texas Democrats to credit for his victory.”12 
Meanwhile, in Washington, Lyndon Johnson served as a loyal vice president to 
JFK, but found the position difficult after years of enjoying absolute power as Senate 
majority leader.  Being second indeed was a challenge, and he did not always get along 
well with some of Kennedy’s aides.  Nevertheless, as vice president, LBJ devotedly 
supported the president, even when some of his stances encountered criticism in Texas.  
For instance, Johnson counseled Kennedy on how to approach southerners on the 
question of civil rights.  He told Theodore C. Sorensen, one of the president’s key aides, 
that JFK should raise the morality of the civil rights cause with southerners.  LBJ 
explained to Sorensen that if Kennedy “goes down there and looks them in the eyes and 
states the moral issue and the Christian issue, and he does it face to face, these 
southerners at least respect his courage.  They feel that they’re on the losing side of an 
issue of conscience.”13 
The most serious political problem, however, which plagued Texas Democrats in 
the early 1960s, remained division within the party.  The vice president and Senator 
Ralph Yarborough, the champion of Texas liberals, had feuded since the 1950s, and the 
two repeatedly clashed over the issue of patronage.  As second in line to the presidency, 
LBJ argued that he should have prerogative over choosing which Texans would fill 
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federal judgeships and other administration positions.  Yarborough, as Texas’s senior 
senator, emphatically objected.  That Johnson had led the conservative to moderate wing 
of the state party, while Yarborough had spoken for the liberal side, increased tensions 
further.  In early 1962, Baggarly lamented the continued divisions in the state Democratic 
Party, and particularly urged LBJ and Yarborough “to bury the hatchet.”  He urged both 
conservatives and liberals to support the state party’s candidates once the primaries were 
over.  He warned: “Texas Democrats must learn to live with their differences. . . .  To be 
disunited is to invite the radicals, the Birchers, the way outers, the ultras of the 
Republican Party to take over.”14 
In 1962, Texans elected John Connally as governor.  Connally, a conservative 
Democrat, had worked for LBJ for years before becoming secretary of the navy in 1961.  
Johnson and Connally long had been close friends and professional allies, and the new 
Texas governor seemed to possess all the political acumen of his mentor.  Connally also 
clashed as much, if not more, with Ralph Yarborough.  The Connally-Yarborough feud 
would represent and define the deep disunity that embroiled the Texas Democratic Party 
into the 1970s. 
In the meantime, John Tower quickly made a name for himself in Washington as 
a stalwart spokesperson for conservatism.  Texas Republicans looked to Tower as a 
hopeful sign that their party had a future in the Lone Star State.  Tower modeled himself 
after his close friend Barry Goldwater, the unapologetically conservative senator from 
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Arizona.  Goldwater even wrote the introduction to Tower’s 1962 book A Program for 
Conservatives, based on the Texas senator’s speeches and critiques of the Kennedy 
administration.15 
 Tower’s rise encouraged Texas Republicans, and pundits took notice.  At the end 
of 1962, Lawrence Goodwyn, an editor for the Texas Observer who would later become 
one of the preeminent historians of American Populism, noted emerging Republicanism 
in Texas at grassroots levels.  “The emergence of well trained and energetic Republican 
precinct organizations in medium-sized cities, small towns, and even rural areas will keep 
newly arrived Republicans glued to the GOP for state races—in contrast to the old 
conservative custom of voting Democratic in the spring and Republican in presidential 
elections.  Together with the increasing muscle of the liberals, this really kills the old-line 
conservative Democratic state machine.”16 
In another helpful development for Republicans, Texans’ feelings toward the 
national administration remained tenuous throughout the Kennedy presidency, especially 
due to JFK’s growing support of the civil rights movement.  Kennedy’s approval rating 
among Texans declined from 76 percent in February 1962 to 50 percent in September 
1963.  The president had called for Congress to pass sweeping civil rights legislation 
during the summer of 1963.  Some 42 percent of Texans disapproved of the president’s 
performance by this later date.  However, approximately eight out of ten Mexican 
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Americans and nine out of ten African Americans in Texas supported JFK, while only 35 
percent of Anglo Texans did.  The poll also noted: “A central figure in the civil rights 
controversy has been the president’s brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy.  Only 32 
percent approve of the way he is handling his job, 51 percent disapprove.”17    
Lyndon Johnson similarly saw his approval ratings fall in his home state, a 
consequence of serving as number two in the Kennedy White House.  The Dallas 
Morning News later studied this development: “Johnson’s popularity in Texas had 
declined while he was vice president, right along with President Kennedy’s. . . .  In 
February, 1962, approval of the way Johnson was handling the vice-presidency stood at 
68 percent.  By the following December it had fallen to 59 percent; it remained at 59 in 
May, 1963, and had dipped to 50 percent last September [1963].”18  By the fall of 1963, 
LBJ’s popularity in Texas was at its low-point, and real questions persisted as to whether 
or not the Kennedy-Johnson ticket could carry Texas in the 1964 election.  The political 
infighting in the Texas Democratic Party between the Johnson-Connally and Yarborough 
wings only exacerbated the precarious political situation in Texas.  With eyes looking 
toward the next year’s election, Kennedy and these Texas Democrats planned a trip in 
November 1963 that forever changed the state party and the nation itself. 
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The Trauma of the Kennedy Assassination 
 
 Dallas in the early 1960s held a reputation as a bastion of right-wing extremism.  
Some of the city’s most prominent, and vocal, citizens encouraged this characteristic.  
The ultraconservative oilman H. L. Hunt disseminated his views through radio and 
various publications, while staunch anticommunist General Edwin A. Walker railed 
against subversives at home and abroad.  The notoriously conservative Dallas Morning 
News attacked racial integration and the Kennedy administration on a regular basis.  
David Richards, a liberal lawyer who lived in Dallas during these years, recalled that 
billboards across the city screamed “Get the U.S. Out of the U.N.,” and “Impeach Earl 
Warren.”  Days before the 1960 election, a mob led by Bruce Alger, Dallas’s Republican 
Congressman, surrounded and harassed Lyndon and Lady Bird Johnson outside a 
downtown hotel, and in September 1963, a crowd shouted down Adlai Stevenson as the 
ambassador spoke at a United Nations event.  The incident disturbed Stevenson so much 
that he warned the president not to visit Dallas on his upcoming trip to Texas.19   
 Nonetheless, JFK, in the name of party unity, determined to travel to Dallas on his 
Texas trip in November 1963, which also included stops in San Antonio, Houston, Fort 
Worth, and finally, Austin.  Liz Carpenter, a key aide to Lady Bird Johnson, 
remembered: “Dallas had been, I think, in the minds of everyone, a questionable spot.  If 
we made a good show there, it really meant that all of the Goldwater talk was nothing, 
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because it was the most anti-Johnson, the most anti-Democratic, and the most anti-
everything city in Texas.”20 
 Thus the trip began, with President and Mrs. Kennedy traveling around the state 
with Vice President Johnson, Governor Connally, and Senator Yarborough.  Texans 
warmly welcomed the president in San Antonio, Houston, and Forth Worth.  Jackie 
Kennedy’s charm and style especially enthralled Texans.  The enthusiastic receptions 
encouraged JFK, who remarked to LBJ: “We’re going to carry two states next year if we 
don’t carry any others: Massachusetts and Texas.”21  Underneath all these outward signs 
of success, however, tensions exploded behind the scenes among the Texas Democrats.  
At times, Johnson, Connally, and Yarborough seemed angry with each other.  Jackie 
Kennedy recalled her husband’s frustration with Connally: “I know he was annoyed with 
him then. . . .  He said that John Connally wanted to show that he was independent and 
could run on his own.  He was making friends with a lot of ‘Republican fat cats’—and he 
wanted to show that he didn’t need Lyndon Johnson.  Part of the trouble of the trip was 
him trying to show that he had his own constituency.”  Connally long had bristled when 
called by the nickname “LBJ,” or “Lyndon’s Boy John.”  Even more problematic for the 
trip though, Yarborough appeared to reach his breaking point in dealing with Johnson and 
Connally.  He refused to ride in the same car with LBJ in San Antonio or Houston.  The 
                                                 
20Merle Miller, Lyndon, 382. 
 
21Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-
1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 1. 
  46 
next day, on the morning of November 22, 1963, an infuriated Kennedy told Connally: 
“By God, he’ll ride with Lyndon today—or he’ll walk.”22 
 Enthusiastic crowds greeted the presidential motorcade as it drove through 
downtown Dallas.  However, earlier that day the Dallas Morning News printed a full-
page advertisement by the locally-based American Fact-Finding Committee, a right-wing 
organization that called itself “an unaffiliated and non-partisan group of citizens who 
wish truth.”  Particularly ominous in light of the later events of the day, the Committee 
screamed in print: 
Welcome Mr. Kennedy to Dallas.  A city so disgraced by a recent liberal 
smear attempt that its citizens have just elected two more conservative Americans 
to public office.  A city that is an economic “boom town,” not because of federal 
handouts, but through conservative economic and business practices.  A city that 
will continue to grow and prosper despite efforts by you and your administration 
to penalize it for its non-conformity to “New Frontierism.”  A city that rejected 
your philosophy and policies in 1960 and will do so again in 1964—even more 
emphatically than before. 
 
The advertisement continued with a litany of charges that JFK had acquiesced to 
communism and had “scrapped the Monroe Doctrine in favor of the ‘Spirit of 
Moscow.’”23 
 At approximately 12:30 PM, shots rang out as the presidential motorcade passed 
through downtown Dallas.  Kennedy and Connally had been hit, and the Secret Service 
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rushed everyone to Parkland Hospital.  Within an hour, aides informed LBJ, hidden in a 
private room in the hospital, that Kennedy had died, and he was now the president of the 
United States.  Johnson recalled the trauma of these hours: “I knew from the moment 
President Kennedy died that I must assume the awesome responsibility of uniting the 
country and moving toward the goals that he had set for us.  Like everyone else, I 
continued to be stunned.  My President—the man with whom I had worked and had been 
proud to serve—had been killed, and killed in my own state.  It was almost unbearable.”24 
Indeed, the fact that JFK’s murder occurred in Texas brought shame to the Lone 
Star State.  Liz Carpenter recalled telling Lady Bird Johnson that day: “It’s a terrible 
thing to say but the salvation of Texas is that the governor was hit,” and the new first lady 
reluctantly concurred.25  Dallas, with its penchant for right-wing conservatism, 
encountered harsh criticism for years.  John Tower remembered: “Dallas was denounced 
as a city of hatred; conservative nuts were blamed for inflaming murderous passions; and 
John Kennedy’s prominent political opponents were accused of indirect complicity in the 
murder.”26   
Lyndon Johnson thus ascended to the presidency under the most tragic of 
circumstances, and determined to comfort a shocked nation, while also establishing his 
own executive clout.  The new president addressed a joint session of Congress and the 
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entire nation on November 27, 1963, days after Kennedy’s murder.  Johnson invoked 
Kennedy’s inauguration speech when the late president challenged Americans with “let 
us begin.”  LBJ pleaded with the country, “let us continue.”  He especially called for 
Congress to make the late president’s civil rights legislation the law of the land: “No 
memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor President Kennedy’s memory 
than the earliest possible passage of the civil rights bill for which he fought so long.”  
Johnson full-heartedly committed himself to continuing JFK’s domestic and foreign 
policies.27 
 
President Johnson Takes Control and Launches the Great Society 
In actuality LBJ hoped not only to continue, but to surpass, the goals of his 
predecessor.  Johnson had entered Congress in 1937 as a strong admirer and supporter of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal.  He genuinely believed in the power of the 
federal government to help its citizens.  However, as a congressman and senator from 
Texas, Johnson had tempered his progressive flair, wary of upsetting voters back home.  
Now, as president, LBJ held a national constituency and would not be hampered by such 
political considerations.  Throughout his presidency, Johnson viewed himself as 
Roosevelt’s true heir as he attempted to expand liberal reform in the United States.  He 
worked to build upon and exceed the accomplishments of his Democratic presidential 
predecessors.   
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 Giving the commencement address to the graduating class at the University of 
Michigan on May 22, 1964, the president coined the term for his administration’s 
policies.  He challenged the students that “in your time we have the opportunity to move 
not only toward the rich society and the powerful society, but upward to the Great 
Society.”  Johnson explained: “The Great Society rests on abundance and liberty for all.  
It demands an end to poverty and racial injustice, to which we are totally committed in 
our time.”28 
 LBJ dreamed of building a Great Society in the United States, and upon entering 
the presidency immediately began working toward this goal.  In early January of 1964, in 
his annual state of the union message, the president pronounced: “This administration 
today, here and now, declares unconditional war on poverty in America. . . .  It will not 
be a short or easy struggle . . . but we shall not rest until that war is won.”29  The War on 
Poverty became a critical component of the Great Society.   
 Johnson’s Great Society goals further included a strong commitment to civil 
rights.  LBJ determined his first task as president would be to ensure that Kennedy’s civil 
rights bill, stalled in Congress, attained passage.  The president spent the spring of 1964 
working his political magic with members of Congress, using the totality of his skills to 
encourage and cajole them to pass strong civil rights legislation.  On July 2, 1964, LBJ 
signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law.  One of the hallmarks of the Johnson 
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presidency and most consequential laws in American history, the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 prohibited racial segregation in public spaces across the United States.30 
Upon entering office, Johnson immediately began looking toward the 1964 
election, where he could win his own full term as president.  A poll in December 1963 
showed that Texans supported LBJ overwhelmingly as their favorite candidate for 
president in the 1964 election.  Once Johnson became president, his popularity rebounded 
from its decline during his time as vice president.  Texans took enormous pride in having 
their first native son president, and this no doubt helped LBJ’s polls.  Additionally, 
Johnson received strong commendations from people across the United States for his 
handling of his difficult transition into office after the Kennedy assassination.  
Encouraging for the president, he possessed strong backing from both conservatives and 
liberals in the Lone Star State.31 
Earle B. Mayfield, Jr., a prominent Dallas Democrat, sent a memo to the new 
president in late 1963.  He proclaimed: “The most important political event that will ever 
occur in Texas will be the election of Lyndon Johnson as President of the United States.”  
Stressing the importance of Democratic unity in Texas, Mayfield surmised: “This 
harmonious climate cannot be achieved by democrats (by whatever brand) stirring up 
democrats to run against democrats.  The liberals took a walk on Blakely [sic], which 
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resulted in Tower’s freak election.”  Mayfield optimistically concluded: “The democratic 
political climate in Texas, at the present time, is the smoothest it has been in 20 years.  
Everything should be done NOW to keep it this way, especially for LBJ—if for no other 
reason.  Feuding and fighting among ourselves is not the way to elect LBJ President in 
Texas.  All other personal ambitions should be cast aside.”32   
Recognizing that his election in 1964 necessitated Democratic Party unity, LBJ 
even labored to repair his relationship with Ralph Yarborough.  H. S. Hank Brown, 
president of the Texas AFL-CIO wrote a letter to LBJ praising his attempts at 
reconciliation with Ralph Yarborough.  “Please accept my congratulations on your visit 
to Senator and Mrs. Yarborough’s open house last Sunday afternoon.  We sincerely 
appreciate your efforts in trying to solidify the various democratic groups here in Texas 
and we believe some progress has been made toward this goal.”  Brown commended 
LBJ’s poverty program and promised AFL-CIO support.33 
The Harris County Democrats adopted a resolution on January 12, 1964, 
mourning the death of Kennedy and expressing confidence in Johnson and Yarborough.  
The group urged the reelection of both LBJ and Yarborough.  “We applaud the vigorous 
and forthright stand and work of President Johnson for the attainment of peace in the 
world with security for all, for the enactment of the civil rights program as a memorial to 
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our fallen Chief, and for his prompt and bold declaration of war against poverty in 
America and everywhere.”34 
 However, some Texans expressed concern with LBJ’s early domestic policies.  A 
Houston man, H. A. Smith, Jr., while declaring his pride in having a Texan in the White 
House, warned Johnson about the possible political costs of civil rights and the war on 
poverty.  Smith disagreed with the proposed civil rights bill’s call for integrating public 
accommodations, as well as the Fair Employment Act.  He continued: “Your Poverty Bill 
appears aimed at more help for the Negro.  Your present course of action, and especially 
the addition of Robert Kennedy as Vice President will cost you the South, in the next 
election.”  Smith concluded: “I hope you can alter this course so that we can retain a 
Texan as President of these United States.  I’m all for you—but let’s think as Texans 
think.”35  Indeed, civil rights posed potential political issues for LBJ, especially in his 
home state.  Released in January 1964, the Texas Poll showed that Texans believed that 
race relations would be the major problem of the new year.36 
 In early 1964, LBJ faced a challenge to Texas Democratic Party unity with 
Yarborough’s reelection campaign to the U.S. Senate.  Pressured by leaders in the 
national party, Johnson threw his support to Yarborough early in the political season, 
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fearful that a failure to do so would infuriate northern liberals and threaten his own 
presidential nomination bid.  The president made clear to his fellow Texans in the party 
that a conservative challenge to Yarborough would not be welcomed.  He vowed to use 
all his political strength to undermine any candidate who ran against the incumbent 
senator.  Such actions angered many Lone Star Democrats, especially John Connally, 
who had recovered from his nearly fatal wounds.37   
 Connally, while generally approving of Johnson’s performance thus far as 
president, was not hesitant to express any disagreements.  In his first telephone 
conversation with LBJ since being discharged from Parkland Hospital, the governor 
implied his hostility to civil rights.  Connally interrupted the president, who had been 
bragging about the strength of the stock market, by exclaiming: “I was just going to 
suggest, for God’s sake, meet with the businessmen.  You [have] been getting a little too 
much emphasis on meeting with the civil rights boys every day.”38  Connally remained at 
best a lukewarm supporter of civil rights, much to the consternation of LBJ.  As 
mentioned, Johnson’s support of Yarborough for reelection particularly infuriated 
Connally, who wanted a conservative to challenge him in the Democratic primary.  
Johnson lamented to Yarborough: “You’re going to come singing near the river and get 
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your prayer book out when they bury me because I’ll need a lot of help.  They’re awful 
mad at me down there.”39 
 Conservative Texans echoed Connally’s criticisms.  Mary Rather of Hillsboro, 
Texas, wrote LBJ in February: “People are bewildered by the rift between you and John. . 
. .  Ralph Yarborough is going to have a hard time being re-elected.  He has been a 
whining, unmanly complainer for too long.”  She further commented: “After the Civil 
Rights bill passes, I wish the matter could die down for a while.”40 
 In late March 1964, a poll examined Texans’ opinions on a variety of political 
issues.  The poll found the following conclusions:  
1. High personal popularity of President Johnson.   
2. Congress: The tendency is for voters to suggest slow down on civil 
rights, firmer policies with respect to foreign nations, more effort to create jobs 
and reduce unemployment. 
3. In regard to the civil rights bill, Texas opinion upholds equal rights for 
Negroes in voting and employment but not in public accommodations.  Anglo-
American voters turn thumbs down on public accommodations rights by a two-to-
one margin; but they favor voting rights by five-to-one and job rights by almost 
three-to-one. 
 
Furthermore, according to the poll, 73 percent of Texas voters approved of Johnson’s 
performance as president, while only 16 percent disapproved.41 
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On April 16, 1964, White House aide Horace Busby provided LBJ with an 
analysis of his current stand among Texas voters.  Polling, with most popular subject by 
rank, showed that Texans “most-liked” the president’s “(1) Pushing [a] tax cut through 
Congress, (2) Strong leadership attributes and attractive personal qualities, (3) War on 
Poverty [,] (4) Economy moves, and (5) Civil Rights position.”42  Civil rights, 
particularly access to public accommodations, troubled some white Texans, although 
most favored equality in voting and economic opportunity.  LBJ remained very popular 
among Texans, according to Busby. 
 Underlying divisions persisted amongst Texas Democrats, despite the different 
factions’ approval of Johnson’s performance as president.  On April 17, 1964, White 
House aide Clifton C. Carter sent Juanita Roberts, the president’s personal secretary, a 
copy of the Democratic Coalition’s newsletter.  Representing the liberal wing of the 
Texas Democratic Party, the Coalition spokesperson exclaimed: “The turncoats in the 
Democratic party who vote in the Democratic primary in May, and betray us by voting 
Republican in November, must not be permitted to write the party platform and to control 
the party machinery.  Their domination would be an embarrassment and a handicap to the 
President.”  The writer emphasized that the state party must support LBJ and his 
programs, further warning against so-called Democrats who “have a long history of 
turning on a candidate when they don’t agree with his program.”  He confessed: “This 
                                                 
42Memo, Horace Busby to the President, April 16, 1964, Ex PL/ST 43, WHCF, 
Box 69, LBJ Library. 
  56 
year, we national Democrats stand the best chance in history of writing the party platform 
and selecting the party officials.”43 
 Pastor James F. Bailey of the First Baptist Church of Port Lavaca, Texas, wrote to 
fellow Baptist and White House aide Bill Moyers on May 15, 1964, of his concern 
regarding conservative support for LBJ in the state party.  “There seems to be no question 
that Mr. Johnson has the support of most of the loyal Democrats in this area.  But some of 
us are afraid that the conservative element within the party will vote Republican in 
November, because of the President’s progressive and humanitarian programs.  We hope 
to hold them to the party line.”44  Again, the conservative-liberal split in the state party, 
while tempered by LBJ being in the White House, remained volatile.   
 Civil rights remained a complicated issue in Texas.  An attorney from Marshall 
explained to the president following the signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: “Many 
are unhappy about the new civil rights bill which went into effect yesterday.  All of the 
soda fountains and several restaurants here closed immediately.  It is thought that are 
[sic] only hotel will probably be forced to close.  Perhaps the many benefits that will 
result from your wise administration will compensate to some extent for our misfortunes 
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but I am expressing it mildly when I say many of us are very unhappy.”45  The man spoke 
for many East Texas whites, and illustrated the political risks that LBJ took with his 
support of the moral issue of civil rights. 
 
The Election of 1964 
 Seeking his own full term in 1964, LBJ faced Senator Barry Goldwater of 
Arizona, the Republican Party nominee.  Goldwater subscribed to a stridently 
conservative political point of view.  He stressed his opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and argued for an aggressive combating of communism throughout the world in 
these tense Cold War days.  In his acceptance speech at the Republican National 
Convention, Goldwater infamously proclaimed: “Extremism in the defense of liberty is 
no vice.”46  Goldwater’s politics appealed to many Texans, especially those who had 
been supporters of John Tower.  Voters also would elect all statewide offices in 1964.  
Additionally, Ralph Yarborough sought reelection to the U.S. Senate against George H. 
W. Bush, a young Republican oilman from Houston. 
 Johnson recognized the necessity of winning his home state of Texas.  He resisted 
national pressure to select Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy as his running mate, a 
man whom most Texans, including the president, disliked.  Many Texans perceived the 
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brother of the late president as the Kennedy-Johnson administration’s loudest voice in 
support of the civil rights movement.  Instead LBJ chose Senator Hubert Humphrey of 
Minnesota, a less polarizing figure, but one who had played a critical role in steering the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 through Congress.  
Johnson’s Texas supporters encouraged him to make the ticket truly his own.  
Writing from a small town in the Texas Panhandle, one woman exclaimed: “Do not try to 
ride the Kennedy influence into and through the Democratic Convention.  Stand for the 
principles that our party have [sic] always been for.  Run on your own strength and merit.  
This you must do if [you] expect to hold the majority of white and southern votes.  We 
definitely feel that you have sold us down the river and that the racial issue has become 
what it is today because of the influence of John F. Kennedy and Robert Kennedy. . . .  
Mr. Goldwater has a courage which you have not displayed.  It will not be so hard to 
support him. . . .  If, between now and Nov. you are not able to change the Democratic 
party into something people like us can support, I feel I can assure you that you will lose 
many votes to Mr. Goldwater that you, by all rights, should have.”  She concluded in a 
sentiment growing among some Texans: “The Republican Party in its convention 
demonstrated a change to something more nearly to what the Democratic Party once 
was.”47 
 Ben Kaplan, of the Houston-based Kaplan-Chamberlain advertising and public 
relations firm, wrote Jerry Werksman, of the National Democratic Executive Committee, 
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an assessment of the campaign in late July.  He believed LBJ held a solid advantage over 
Goldwater due to the positive state of the economy and the president’s moderate course 
in foreign affairs.  However, Kaplan warned of a backlash on civil rights: “I’ve told you 
that nearly half the members of the White Citizens Council in Houston are unionists.  
Note, if you will, sentiments expressed by members of the big unions in the midwest and 
industrial east, as reflected in polls, and you will see I’m not talking about a purely local 
situation.”48 
 In the midst of a campaign season, LBJ increasingly found international affairs, 
especially in Vietnam, troubling.  Johnson perceived the Vietnam conflict as a member of 
the generation which had experienced World War II.  He believed that World War II 
illustrated the necessity of defeating enemy aggression early before it expanded.  Like 
other Cold Warriors, LBJ believed that containing communism was the most effective 
method of undermining the Soviet Union’s power and influence.  Although he possessed 
private concerns about the potential for victory in Vietnam, the president determined to 
prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.  When Johnson entered office, the 
United States already had sixteen thousand troops supporting South Vietnam in its war 
with communist North Vietnam.  In August 1964, American naval ships allegedly came 
under attack while patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin off the shores of North Vietnam.  At 
Johnson’s request, Congress overwhelmingly passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution giving 
the president authority to do what he deemed necessary to prevent future attacks by North 
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Vietnam.  LBJ utilized the Tonkin Gulf Resolution as the legal basis for escalating the 
Vietnam War throughout his presidency.49 
 Johnson’s response to the Gulf of Tonkin incident won widespread approval with 
voters.  A poll by the Harris Survey in the Los Angeles Times indicated that 85 percent of 
Americans supported the president’s declaration of air strikes against North Vietnamese 
naval bases.  “In July before the turn of events, the Johnson administration was criticized 
by 58 percent of Americans for the way Vietnam was being handled.  Today, the 
American people have sharply revised this estimate to a 72 percent vote of confidence in 
the President’s approach to Vietnam.”  The poll also noted that the American people 
“favor taking the war to North Vietnam by a majority of 2 to 1,” and overwhelmingly 
believed that Johnson would conduct the war better than Goldwater, at 71 to 29 percent.50 
 While most Texans and Americans supported LBJ’s approach to foreign policy, 
which seemed pragmatic in comparison to Goldwater’s bellicosity, the far right in the 
Lone Star State rallied behind the Arizona senator.  They particularly liked his vocal 
anticommunism and hostility toward civil rights.  J. Evetts Haley, a rancher from the 
Midland area and historian of the American West, especially gained notoriety as a 
virulent critic of LBJ and strong supporter of Goldwater.  Haley had been an ardent 
segregationist and critic of big government for years, all the way back to the time of 
Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal.  In time for the 1964 election, he wrote A Texan Looks at 
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Lyndon: A Study in Illegitimate Power, a vicious diatribe against LBJ that presented the 
president as unscrupulous in his lust for power.  Although historians and political 
commentators widely panned the book as completely inaccurate, right-wing groups like 
the John Birch Society distributed throughout the country some 7.3 million copies of A 
Texan Looks at Lyndon.  Many LBJ supporters thought the president should sue Haley 
for libel.  One small Texas newspaper contended that “the loudest-mouthed, bitterest 
individual among those who are trying to drown the president’s reputation in a flood of 
vitriol is J. Evetts Haley.”  LBJ’s progressive policies and Goldwater’s candidacy 
threatened increased polarization of American politics.51 
Other Texans voiced their displeasure with the direction of the national 
Democratic Party, especially when the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, a racially 
integrated group of civil rights activists, sought entrance to the national convention in 
place of the all-white official Mississippi delegation.  After watching the Democratic 
Convention, a woman from Houston wrote LBJ aide Jack Valenti.  She proclaimed: “We 
were shocked at the display the ‘Freedom Party in Miss’ showed to the nation night 
before last, and also shocked at the fact that some ultra-liberals helped them.”  She 
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warned: “We are lifelong Democrats, and expect to remain so, but we are conservative 
Democrats, and, as you well know, there are many of us.”52   
Civil rights continued to trouble some Texans.  Writing to the president in late 
August, Mrs. Jackie Carpenter, who worked in the advertising department of a large Fort 
Worth bank, expressed concern with her coworkers’ affinity toward Goldwater.  In her 
analysis, “the reason being that they are certain Mr. Goldwater will stop all this Civil 
Rights business.  They say that when he gets into office we will have no more trouble 
because the colored people will be back in ‘their place.’”  She argued: “The Civil Rights 
issue is ‘the’ issue.  There is no doubt about it.”53  Johnson, however, believed that 
beating Goldwater in Texas, while a challenge, would not prove too formidable.  Talking 
with Governor Connally about Goldwater, LBJ surmised: “Texas is pretty belligerent, but 
I don’t believe they want a fellow with an A-bomb that’s ready to turn it loose like he 
is.”54 
Overall, during his first year in office, although some Texans expressed criticisms 
on such issues, Lyndon Johnson received rave reviews from his native state regarding his 
performance as president.  Certainly, Texans’ pride in having their first native son in the 
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White House heightened this praise.  Newspapers across Texas confidently endorsed 
LBJ’s candidacy for a full term as president.55 
Ralph Yarborough’s opponent in the general election was George Bush, a 
Houston oilman and son of a former Connecticut senator.  A Republican in a strongly-
Democratic state, facing an uphill climb to unseat Yarborough, Bush cast himself as a 
strong conservative who appealed to voters in both parties.  He opposed the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and federal aid to education as overreach by the national government, but 
stressed the importance of a strong military to meet Cold War threats.  Bush further 
called for a constitutional amendment that would allow prayer in public schools, 
proclaiming: “We need God more in our daily lives today than at any time in history.”  In 
a politically risky move, Bush advertised his friendship and alliance with Barry 
Goldwater, LBJ’s opponent in the upcoming presidential election.56 
LBJ himself, though, worried about Bush’s appeal to Texans.  The constant 
bickering between Connally and Yarborough frustrated him.  In a telephone conversation 
with auto union leader Walter Reuther, the president exclaimed: “I don’t know if I can 
keep them from biting at each other’s throats because they’re like two big pussycats.”  
Johnson contemplated: “I’ve got to have Connally to carry the state myself. . . .  Of 
course, Yarborough is a very weak candidate.  Civil rights and union labor and the Negro 
thing is not the way to get elected in a state that elects Connally by 72 percent. . . .  He’s 
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handicapped in Texas.”57  Additionally, LBJ pressured Connally to involve himself 
deeply in the presidential election and to embrace civil rights.  He told the Texas 
governor: “I want you definitely speaking and to be identified with this campaign as my 
counselor and confidant for a lot of reasons.  And it may cost you something down here 
[in Texas], but it’s not going to cost you anything in America ten years from now.”  
Johnson foresaw Connally becoming an important national political figure, and perhaps 
one day, a president.58 
In late September, a polling consultant wrote LBJ aide Horace Busby about the 
state of the election in Texas.  He believed that Johnson would carry Texas, while 
Connally easily would be reelected.  Yarborough, however, faced a tougher race. 
Evidence from the Texas survey . . . indicates a faltering of the Goldwater 
drive as more voters begin to wonder about his stands.  The race issue . . . is offset 
in Texas by growing acceptance of the Civil Rights Law, public accommodations 
section along with voting and job opportunity provisions.  There appears to be 
widespread realization in Texas that maintenance of law and order is a prime 
consideration of the President in the handling of the racial problem.  The foremost 
issue in minds of Texas voters seems to be promotion of peace through 
responsible leadership, and this of course works to the advantage of the Johnson-
Humphrey ticket. 
Potentially, the issue of moral laxness and corruption in government 
which Goldwater is trying to project holds promise of moving voters toward the 
Republican ticket.  However, this does not seem to be having much effect as yet 
on the presidential race.  The image of the President in action, supported by 
general knowledge of his extraordinary leadership since last November, makes it 
extremely difficult for the opposition to sell its claims. 
In the race for U.S. Senator, the Republicans are meeting with much more 
success in the use of the corruption issue.  Yarborough’s alleged involvement 
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with Billie Sol Estes, combined with a widespread feeling that the Senator is too 
liberal and promotes extravagant use of public funds, makes him vulnerable.59 
 
Although a minority, liberals in Texas remained vocal in expressing their views to 
the president, illustrating the careful balance LBJ had to maintain between the two wings 
of his party.  In October, Jeffrey Shero, acting chairman of the Students for a Democratic 
Society chapter at the University of Texas, submitted to the president a petition signed by 
twelve hundred people urging the federal government to protect civil rights activists and 
African Americans in Mississippi’s Freedom Summer movement and to investigate local 
police authorities in the wake of the slaying of three civil rights workers.60  Liberals also 
sent numerous telegrams and letters begging LBJ to do more for Yarborough as the 
election drew near, since Connally and most newspapers did not give him support.  In 
response, the White House reiterated its support of Yarborough and noted the president’s 
recent campaign appearance with the senator in Texas.61 
Ultimately, LBJ defeated Goldwater in a smashing landslide.  He won 61 percent 
of the popular vote and forty-four states.  Texas easily went with its native son, and even 
Dallas gave him strong support.  Goldwater only carried his home state of Arizona and 
five states in the Deep South hostile to the Civil Rights Act.  Additionally, Johnson’s 
Democratic Party increased its strong majorities in the U.S. Congress and Texas 
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Legislature, and Ralph Yarborough won another term in the Senate, defeating George H. 
W. Bush.   
John Tower reflected on LBJ’s smashing victory: “The result was one of the 
worst political blowouts in American history.  The Texas Republican Party was in 
shambles.  All of our statewide candidates went down to defeat.  Bruce Alger and Ed 
Foreman lost their U.S. House seats.  Ten of the eleven Republican legislative seats were 
lost, with the Dallas delegation being totally wiped out.  Only a handful of local 
officeholders pulled through.”62  The Democratic Party, both in Texas and nationwide, 
seemed to be at its apogee after the 1964 election. 
 
LBJ Uses His Political Capital 
 Years after the Johnson presidency ended, Wilbur J. Cohen, who served as LBJ’s 
secretary of health, education, and welfare, remembered a meeting the president called 
with various cabinet officials shortly after his inauguration to a full term in January 1965.  
Cohen and other administration members expected the meeting to last only a few 
minutes, but Johnson kept them for over an hour.  LBJ, possessing great political acumen, 
had serious issues to address.  Cohen recalled: 
He [LBJ] said, “Look, I’ve just been elected and right now we’ll have a 
honeymoon with Congress.  With the additional congressmen that have been 
elected, I’ll have a good chance to get my program through. . . . 
“But after I make my recommendations, I’m going to start to lose the 
power and authority I have because that’s what happened to President Woodrow 
Wilson, to President Roosevelt and to Truman and to Kennedy. . . .  Every day 
that I’m in office and every day that I push my program, I’ll be losing part of my 
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ability to be influential, because that’s in the nature of what the president does.  
He uses his capital.  Something is going to come up, either something like 
Vietnam or something else where I will begin to lose all that I have now. 
“So I want you guys to get off your asses and do everything possible to get 
everything in my program passed as soon as possible, before the aura and the halo 
that surround me disappear.”63 
 
Marvin Watson, a close White House aide, similarly remembered how LBJ stressed this 
necessity: “He believed with all his heart that it was his responsibility, his mission, his 
opportunity, and his privilege to seize the moment granted to him and take full advantage 
of the huge Democratic majorities.”64  Johnson, an astute political observer, could foresee 
his popularity possibly decreasing, which would inhibit his opportunities for future 
legislative success. 
LBJ thus admonished his administration officials that they would have to work 
quickly to attain as much legislative success as possible, while the president possessed 
significant political capital.  And work quickly the Johnson administration did.  The 
Eighty-Ninth Congress passed a historic amount of Great Society legislation, at the 
president’s prodding, in 1965.  LBJ signed into law federal aid to elementary, secondary, 
and higher education, and Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for the poor.  The War 
on Poverty continued in its efforts to eradicate financial hopelessness.  Policies 
supporting the arts and environmental beautification became Great Society laws, as did 
immigration reform.  In August of 1965, LBJ signed a second major civil rights bill, the 
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Voting Rights Act of 1965, which provided federal enforcement to guarantee the rights of 
all Americans, regardless of race, to vote.65 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965, like the civil rights legislation of the previous 
year, is one of the most important laws in American history.  Civil rights leader Martin 
Luther King, Jr., urged LBJ: “It’s so important to get Negroes registered to vote in large 
numbers in the South.  It would be this coalition of the Negro vote and the moderate 
white vote that will really make the new South.”  Johnson agreed, hoping new black 
voters would offset those whites who were abandoning the Democratic Party because of 
civil rights.  LBJ expressed pride in the Voting Rights Act: “The greatest achievement of 
my administration . . . was the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  But I think this will 
be bigger, because it’ll do things that even that ’64 act couldn’t do.”66 
Hubert Humphrey recalled LBJ’s determination to secure voting rights for 
African Americans and his belief that the franchise would be a critical force in the 
struggle for black equality.  By voting, African Americans could remove racist 
individuals from office.  Johnson explained to him: “When the Negroes get that, they’ll 
have every politician, north and south, east and west, kissing their ass, begging for their 
support.”  LBJ’s vice president further marveled on how the president used the “Johnson 
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treatment” to lobby legislators for their votes for his program: “Johnson knew how to 
woo people.  He was a born political lover. . . .  He knew how to massage the senators.”67 
Despite these record accomplishments, problems in Vietnam persisted.  LBJ 
inherited from his predecessors a commitment to supporting the government of South 
Vietnam against attacks from communist North Vietnam.  He was convinced that if South 
Vietnam fell to communism, the rest of Southeast Asia would be in peril.  In the context 
of the Cold War, the president perceived this possible development as a threat to the 
United States’s national security.  As the situation in South Vietnam deteriorated, in the 
summer of 1965 Johnson began heavy escalation of the numbers of American soldiers in 
Southeast Asia.  With more U.S. troops in Vietnam came increased casualties.  As the 
war continued and grew more bloody throughout the fall of 1965 and early 1966, the 
president worried about waning American patience with the conflict.68 
Years later in retirement LBJ explained to his biographer Doris Kearns his 
torment about how Vietnam would affect his presidency: 
I knew from the start that I was bound to be crucified either way I moved.  
If I left the woman I really loved—the Great Society—in order to get involved 
with that bitch of a war on the other side of the world, then I would lose 
everything at home.  All my programs. . . .  But if I left that war and let the 
Communists take over South Vietnam, then I would be seen as a coward and my 
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nation would be seen as an appeaser and we would both find it impossible to 
accomplish anything for anybody anywhere on the entire globe.69 
  
Meanwhile, on the state level, John Connally and Ben Barnes determined to 
ensure Texas would continue its transformation into a powerful super-state.  Barnes, now 
speaker of the state house, explained: “What I really wanted was a chance to work with 
John Connally to help push Texas toward the future. . . .  It was high time we looked 
ahead, to what was coming next.  Texas needed a new Constitution; a new focus on 
education, technology, and tourism; and new tax structures to help keep the state 
strong.”70 
However, the Texas governor at times found himself at odds with the White 
House.  Unafraid to assert his independence, Connally rejected aspects of the Great 
Society.  Sargent Shriver, who directed the administration’s poverty program, noted in a 
memo to President Johnson: “Unhappily the first veto exercised by any governor of any 
project in the war against poverty has been exercised by the Governor of Texas, John 
Connally.”  The governor vetoed a Neighborhood Youth Corps project sponsored by the 
Texas Farmers Union because in his view the salaries of the program’s administrators 
would be excessive, and some school districts did not want to participate.71 
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 Like Bill Moyers, Ben Barnes remembered LBJ’s pride yet concurrent foreboding 
about his administration’s civil rights legislation.  Barnes recalled: “As he told me one 
afternoon at the White House . . . ‘Ben, I’m proud of these Civil Rights bills, but they’re 
going to hurt the party in the long run.’  Over time, Johnson was proved right, as 
Southern conservatives, long a Democratic bedrock, slowly began deserting the party on 
the heels of advances in civil rights.  This was the beginning of the massive shift that 
eventually put the South in solidly Republican hands.”72 
Toward the close of the first session of the 89th Congress, the Beaumont 
Enterprise reported about the Texas Congressional delegation’s voting record on Great 
Society policies.  “The average House member from Texas backed Johnson on only about 
one-half (53 percent) of 12 selected Great Society votes and on about two-thirds (66 
percent) of the 66 roll call votes on which the President took a public position.”  
Furthermore, “the President’s most consistent support came from the unionized, 
industrial Gulf Coast and from other more moderate urban areas.  His strongest 
opposition came from strong conservative rural areas (mostly in West Texas), from the 
commercial section of Houston and from Rep. at-Large Joe R. Pool.”  Jack Brooks of 
Beaumont and Henry B. Gonzalez of San Antonio ranked as LBJ’s strongest supporters, 
while O. C. Fisher of West Texas and John Dowdy of East Texas gave the president’s 
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program the least amount of affirmative votes.  Such roll call votes illustrated how LBJ’s 
Great Society divided the Texas Congressional delegation.73   
 The Dallas Times-Herald reported on September 15, 1965 a recent speech by Joe 
Pool criticizing the 89th Congress.  The Texas Congressman-at large harangued: 
“Conservative voters throughout the United States need to elect forty or fifty conservative 
congressmen to stop the flow of socialistic legislation that is being passed each day in 
Congress.  It makes no difference if they are Democrats or Republicans so long as they 
are again[st] give away programs.”74 
 Johnson’s fear that his political popularity would decrease with time proved 
accurate by late 1965.  Frank A. Driskill wrote a detailed letter to LBJ aide Jake Jacobson 
in October to discuss his recent visits with Texans as he traveled across the state.  A 
growing sentiment of frustration with the Johnson administration among Texans alarmed 
him: 
My travels have taken me to all parts of the state during the past few 
months and while I have made every effort to keep politics out of my 
conversations, my background is such that this is not possible.  I have been 
especially interested in many of the remarks because some of the most outspoken 
have always voted the Democratic ticket, no matter who was on it.  Civil Rights is 
causing this reaction and it is not likely to improve—in fact, it is likely to get 
worse as bloodshed increases which it most certainly will unless drastic steps are 
taken.  Those who understand the East Texas mind can certainly believe this. 
There are mixed reactions on the foreign situation.  A large majority favor 
the President’s stand in Vietnam and feel he is correct in his determination to see 
it through to a successful conclusion.  On the other hand, the draft situation is 
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building up a resentment that is certain to reflect in the Congressional races next 
year.  People down here are not too happy with Congress anyway.  There is a 
feeling that the President and the Supreme Court are running things.  As of now, 
the feeling is—“let’s get some new ones—maybe they will have some backbone. . 
. .” 
The poverty program in general is far from being a bright spot in the 
scheme of things.  There are those who feel that the whole philosophy is wrong 
and that it is impossible to help people unless they first want to help themselves. . 
. . 
I have already mentioned Civil Rights.  There is a general feeling that a 
monster has been created, that ten percent of the population is running the country 
and eventually there will be open conflict between the two races. 
There is a feeling of disappointment in the present administration.  Many 
had high hopes that when the President was elected on his own he would, with all 
of his skill and finesse, gradually return to a more middle of the road policy.  
They voted for him, many for the first time, on this belief but openly say they 
won’t make that mistake again. . . . 
The general feeling is that if Congressional elections and a Presidential 
election were to be held now, we would see many new faces from top to bottom.  
There are those who say the administration is in deep trouble in our state.75 
 
 A poll commissioned by U.S. Rep. Jim Wright of Fort Worth exploring a 
potential Senate run in 1966 similarly revealed how Texans felt about politics in late 
1965.  “There is widely prevalent criticism of the National Administration, most 
particularly in respect to domestic policies and programs.  However, Texas opinion is 
heavily saturated with goodwill toward the President.”  Likely Democratic voters 
discussed their ideal candidate for the U.S. Senate: “Upholding states’ rights, opposing 
federal interference is equally if not more important than being ‘a good Democrat’ and 
substantially more valued than the appearance of giving strong support to the President in 
building ‘the Great Society.’”  The poll continued: “There is obviously a relative lack of 
enthusiasm for ‘the Great Society’ as it is being projected from Washington.  However, 
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there is no such lack of enthusiasm for the personal leadership of President Johnson.  The 
way Johnson has performed as President, balancing diverse interests and at the same time 
acting decisively to meet problems, domestic and foreign, has won overwhelming general 
approval.”  Texans expressed support for LBJ’s Vietnam policy, although some wanted 
even firmer action.  Civil rights remained the most controversial domestic program for 
LBJ, and threatened Democrats’ future electoral prospects.76 
 
 Thus Lyndon Johnson ended the first two years of his presidency with historic 
legislative accomplishments.  He remained personally popular among Texans in late 
1965.  However, the sweeping changes and dynamic individual presence LBJ brought as 
the leader of the Democratic Party threatened to exacerbate old tensions and inflame new 
controversies.  How events would play out in the late sixties would critically affect the 
Texas and national Democratic Parties.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
“There’s a Great Revulsion Taking Place”: 
LBJ, Texas, and the White House, 1966 
 
 
 In October 1966, an uneasy Lyndon Johnson vented to his Secretary of Labor, 
Willard Wirtz.  The telephone conversation consisted of a recurring theme for the 
president during 1966: how to provide adequate funding and maintain public support for 
both the Great Society and the Vietnam War.  “I can’t deny a soldier, and it’s hell for me 
to carry on both of them.”  LBJ particularly could see how problematic the conflict in 
Southeast Asia was for his presidency: “We’re going to have a backlash on that that’s 
going to be worse than the backlash on the Negro if we’re not awfully careful, because 
they’re telling me that.”1 
In his early years in the White House, Lyndon Johnson won historic legislative 
victories in civil rights, poverty, education, and other liberal reforms.  However, he 
continuously feared that Americans would tire of his Great Society policies.  LBJ knew 
increased government spending and pushing hard for African Americans’ civil rights 
would alienate certain sectors of the American population.  While in 1966 he was 
entering the third year of his presidency, the Kennedy-Johnson administration was 
beginning its sixth, and Americans might be ready for a change.  Building a Great 
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Society at home while fighting communism abroad was challenging, and the president 
knew he risked a backlash against his aggressive goals. 
Throughout 1966, the Johnson administration endured growing domestic and 
international crises.  At home, racial unrest increased dramatically.  Urban race riots and 
the emerging Black Power movement terrified whites and divided African Americans.  
Furthermore, many citizens criticized spending on Great Society programs as excessive.  
Abroad, American casualties mounted in Vietnam, and many citizens, both private and 
prominent, began doubting the merits of LBJ’s foreign policy.  Furthermore, the year 
1966 offered voters the opportunity to express their worries in Congressional and 
statewide elections, in a possible prelude to the 1968 presidential campaign.  Only two 
years after winning a historic landslide election, Johnson’s Democratic Party lost 
significant seats in Congress in an expression of voter dissatisfaction.  Additionally, 
Democrats continued to be plagued by disunity both in Texas and at the national level, 
further hurting the party’s electoral prospects. 
 
Guns and Butter 
 “Got lots of problems and a lot of decisions,” President Johnson confessed to 
civil rights leader Roy Wilkins in early 1966.  Politicians were returning to Washington 
following the winter holidays, and battles over how to fund both the Great Society and 
the Vietnam War appeared imminent.  Leaders in both the Democratic and Republican 
Parties were well aware that 1966 was a midterm election year.  To the president’s 
dismay, Republican Congressional leaders, such as Everett Dirksen and Gerald Ford, 
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were questioning the logistics of spending large sums of money on both the domestic and 
foreign policies of the Johnson administration.  Even Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, 
LBJ’s longtime friend and mentor, voiced his concern.  Johnson explained to Wilkins: 
“They’re all going after the Great Society. . . . They’re going to say that we got to fight a 
war so we can’t do any of these other things.”2 
Despite these rising concerns, the president assured Wilkins of his belief in the 
administration’s policies.  “My general position is going to be that we are rich enough 
and powerful enough that we can do both.”  Early in 1966, President Johnson committed 
to pursuing both his goals at home and abroad, what supporters and critics would term as 
having both “guns and butter.” Wilkins voiced his support for LBJ, and Johnson exuded 
confidence in his ability to manage his government, bragging: “I’m fighting a war, and 
doing a hell of a lot more on all the fronts!”3 
Only a few days later, Johnson illustrated this “guns and butter” approach to the 
nation in his annual State of the Union address.  LBJ was determined to convince 
Americans that he could fight the war in Vietnam without sacrificing social reform at 
home.  Early in his message the president declared: “We will not permit those who fire 
upon us in Vietnam to win a victory over the desires and the intentions of all the 
American people.  This Nation is mighty enough, its society is healthy enough, its people 
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are strong enough, to pursue our goals in the rest of the world while still building a Great 
Society here at home.”4 
Lady Bird Johnson sensed the tension present in the government and realized the 
new year would hold many challenges.  In her diary she described the State of the Union 
evening: “The audience was cold and lethargic. . . . There was almost no participation by 
the Republicans.  After all, this is 1966 and an election year. . . . There was nothing that 
reassured me it would be an easy year or a good year from listening to the State of the 
Union Message or from looking at the Congress in front of me.”5 
 
Democratic Disharmony 
Meanwhile, disunity continued to plague the Texas Democratic Party as its 
conservative and liberal wings repeatedly clashed over issues such as civil rights and 
Vietnam.  By 1966, the honeymoon period created by LBJ’s 1964 landslide clearly had 
ended.  Moreover, John Connally and Ralph Yarborough continued their decade-long 
political and personal feud, which only exacerbated tensions within the state party.  Early 
in 1966, the Young Democratic Club of Dallas County sent a resolution to the president 
calling for unity among Texas Democrats.  The group explained: “We, as Young 
Democrats, are concerned that such a sad division among Democrats has manifested 
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itself within the state.  The most alarming division seems to be the ‘black and white’ 
issue which is developing between some of the supporters of our governor and some of 
the supporters of our senator.”6 
The national party also experienced growing division over Johnson’s policies.  
The Vietnam War increasingly worried many Democrats.  Senator J. William Fulbright 
of Arkansas, the skeptical chairperson of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, began 
holding hearings on the conflict.  LBJ feared that the Fulbright hearings would increase 
public opposition to the war.  He discussed this matter with his administration’s 
Congressional liaison Larry O’Brien, worrying that Democratic disunity in Congress 
would prevent Great Society legislation from being passed.  Johnson termed Fulbright’s 
actions as “a very, very disastrous break” for the future of his proposed legislation.  He 
instructed O’Brien to “have some pretty serious discussions” with the Democratic 
Congressional leadership about party unity and warn them about their prospects for the 
upcoming midterm elections.  “If this crowd’s going to run around with that television [in 
reference to the Fulbright hearings], you’re going to beat every goddamn man we’ve 
got.”  Appalled with his fellow Democrats’ disorganization, LBJ lamented, “It’s just the 
damnedest mess, and you’ve got no leadership.”7 
A later conversation at the end of February between President Johnson and 
O’Brien portrayed the anxiety LBJ experienced with his Congressional critics.  
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“Fulbright’s raising hell.”  Johnson explained that his approval ratings with Vietnam had 
decreased from 63 to 49 percent, and blamed anti-war Democrats who “knocked 14 
percent off of Johnson’s moderate course to go over with the hawks.”  He feared that 
“doves” on the left were making “hawks” on the right uneasy about the war, “driving me 
nearer a harder course than I would normally take.”  The president worried that voters 
were turning against Democrats and might embrace Republicans in the November 
elections.8 
Days later Hubert Humphrey met for about three hours with Fulbright and other 
senators concerned with the Vietnam War, such as Albert Gore, Sr.  The vice president 
called Johnson and described his efforts to defend administration policy.  For Humphrey, 
the meeting was unpleasant.  He pondered: “I don’t know what’s eating these fellows.  I 
just think they’ve got themselves bound up into a little cabal there. . . . They’re just 
sitting around there just like a bunch of old women.”  Neither Johnson nor Humphrey 
could comprehend their fellow Democrats’ insubordination regarding the war in 
Southeast Asia.  The vice president complained, “I just can’t believe that any senator, any 
congressman, any informed citizen could have a shadow of a doubt about it.”  
Concluding their conversation, Humphrey cryptically added, “God, they’ve got one.”9 
As the months went by in 1966, President Johnson grew more anxious about the 
year’s approaching elections.  Senator Joe Clark of Pennsylvania predicted the 
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Democratic Party would lose seventy-five seats in November.  In a conversation with 
Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, LBJ lambasted the continual problem of 
Democratic disunity.  He especially criticized his nemesis Robert Kennedy: “Bobby is 
behind this revolt up there on Vietnam.”  The president predicted a voter backlash against 
his party later that year.  “What these liberals are going to do . . . they’re going to clean 
out a bunch of good liberal freshmen here by all this disharmony and this division, and 
it’s not going to help them.”  Johnson believed the election results in 1966 might continue 
into 1968 when “the nomination [for president] is not going to be worth a damn to them 
if they get it.”  Filled with apprehension about Vietnam and future elections, he groaned, 
“I don’t understand why they can’t see that.”10 
 
Black Power and Division in the Civil Rights Movement 
While the Vietnam War ever more divided the Democratic Party, and the nation, 
in 1966 the civil rights movement split over the issue of Black Power.  In addition to 
violent race riots which seemed to plague the nation’s cities each summer, Black Power 
frightened white Americans and worried older African Americans.  A younger generation 
of black Americans seemed determined to reject all forms of political, economic, social, 
and cultural exploitation.  Malcolm X, a Black Muslim minister who was assassinated in 
early 1965, had previously awoken many African American youth to a new militancy.  
He had called on African Americans to seize their rights “by any means necessary,” and 
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criticized middle-class black leaders as being too conservative when allying with white 
political figures.  Malcolm X had further lambasted white progressive leaders, such as 
President Johnson: “If he wasn’t good in Texas, he sure can’t be good in Washington, D. 
C.  Because Texas is a lynch state. . . . And these Negro leaders have the audacity to go 
and have some coffee in the White House with a Texan, a Southern cracker—that’s all he 
is—and then come out and tell you and me that he’s going to be better for us because, 
since he’s from the South, he knows how to deal with the Southerners.”  Malcolm X 
believed the salvation of African Americans would occur through black empowerment, 
not the benevolence of whites.  “This government has failed the Negro.  This so-called 
democracy has failed the Negro.  And all these white liberals have definitely failed the 
Negro.”11 
By 1966, Malcolm X’s legacy had inspired young black activists such as Stokely 
Carmichael, the chairperson of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).  
Carmichael coined the term “Black Power” in this year and spoke charismatically of 
black liberation.12  Black Power divided the civil rights movement between nonviolent 
and militant factions, and terrified the white community.  When asked about Black 
Power, LBJ responded emphatically: “I am not interested in black power or white power.  
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What I am concerned with is democratic power, with a small d.”13  Johnson, white 
liberals, and traditional civil rights leaders feared a white backlash against Black Power 
that would be directed toward all African Americans. 
 
Conservatives on the Rise in Texas  
 John Tower and other Texas Republicans saw such increased angst among the 
white citizenry as conducive to future Republican electoral successes in the Lone Star 
State.  Much had changed since the 1964 Democratic landslide just two years earlier.  In 
1966, Texas Republicans believed it imperative to reelect Tower for their party’s long-
term viability in the state, and they thought they had a fighting chance to do just this.   
Preparing for his reelection, Tower urged his fellow Texans to return him to 
Congress.  A pamphlet by the Tower campaign made this case by declaring: “The 
presence of Senator John Tower in Washington gives Texas the distinct advantage of 
having its voice heard in the highest leadership councils of both parties.”  Knowing that 
most Texans considered themselves Democrats, Tower portrayed himself as above the 
partisan fray, instead noting his conservatism.  The literature stressed the senator’s efforts 
in both domestic and international affairs.  In Congress, “Tower was an effective 
organizer and leader of the dedicated group of Senators who had the determination to 
stand up and fight to defend Section 14B of the Taft-Hartley law; a defense that 
ultimately preserved our state’s Right-to-Work law.  Clearly and forcefully, Senator 
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Tower presented the view of the majority of Texans . . . that a man must retain the right 
and the free choice to either join or not to join a labor organization.”  In 1965, Tower had 
secured a seat on the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee, which gave him 
significant publicity as the Vietnam War escalated.  The campaign pamphlet recalled an 
earlier speech by Tower in April upon his return from a trip to Southeast Asia when the 
senator explained: “I continue to support our President’s announced determination to 
preserve the independence of South Vietnam, and I hope all Texans similarly support 
him.  We are the free world’s leader in confronting Red aggression and in working 
toward a world of peace and stability. . . .  It is a struggle in which America is soundly in 
the right.”14  Tower stressed his backing of LBJ’s policies in Vietnam, of which most 
Texans approved, seeing the conflict in Southeast Asia as a critical front in the Cold War.  
Johnson, as a native son, remained personally popular in Texas, and Tower carefully 
highlighted an important area in which he agreed with the president. 
 Among Texas Democrats, the Connally-Barnes wing of the party remained in 
power in Austin.  Connally again would be the party’s gubernatorial nominee in 1966, 
and Barnes solidified his grasp on the Texas House speakership.  Preston Smith, a state 
senator from Lubbock, and arguably even more conservative than Connally, won the 
Democratic nomination for Lieutenant Governor.  Texas Attorney General Waggoner 
Carr, a longtime Connally ally, earned the opportunity to battle Tower for his Senate seat.  
Only the Tower-Carr race appeared challenging for Texas Democrats, as the other 
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candidates faced weak Republican opposition.  In a memorandum after the primaries in 
the spring of 1966, lawyer Preston A. Weatherred of Dallas noted: “Texas state 
government, with John Connally as Governor, Preston Smith as Lieutenant Governor, 
Ben Barnes as Speaker of the House, and Crawford Martin as Attorney General, will 
remain firmly conservative and the votes will be forthcoming to carry forward a 
progressive program. . . .”  He congratulated a coalition consisting of Democrats, 
Republicans, and independents “who voted in the Democratic Primaries and who are 
determined to keep Texas an oasis of sound, sane, and solvent government.”15  
Democrats and Republicans in Texas focused their attention on the Tower-Carr 
race.  As noted, Republicans especially viewed this election as critical for the long-term 
prospects of their party in the Lone Star State.  Since his election to the Senate in 1961, 
Tower had courted support among Mexican Americans in Texas in the belief that earning 
a significant share of their votes could be the difference between victory and defeat.  The 
GOP believed that Latino Texans’ allegiances to the Democratic Party could be swayed 
in its favor.  Connally in particular had become unpopular among many Mexican 
Americans by 1966 because of his hostility toward LBJ’s civil rights and poverty 
legislation.  Tower and Texas Republicans in campaign advertisements portrayed 
Democrats as taking the Latino vote for granted, pandering for the community’s support 
but doing nothing for them once in office.  Tower and his operatives hoped that a 
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younger generation of Texas Hispanics would see opportunities for their own 
advancement in the GOP.16 
 In the midst of the campaign season, Connally, Barnes, and Carr committed a 
politically myopic act which fully inflamed tensions between Texas Latinos and the 
conservative Democratic establishment.  In protest of harsh working and living 
conditions in rural South Texas, a group of migrant workers and labor organizers had 
begun a march from the Rio Grande Valley to Austin, where they hoped to meet with the 
governor on Labor Day to address their concerns.  Walking some four hundred miles in 
the hot Texas summer, the marchers garnered significant media attention.  Connally had 
no desire to hold a meeting with the group in Austin, where he feared sympathizers from 
around the state would gather and create a sensational demonstration.  Yet failing to 
receive the exhausted marchers as guests could prove equally embarrassing.  Even though 
the protestors annoyed the governor, he did not want to come across as insensitive.  
Therefore, Connally, Barnes, and Carr decided to intercept the marchers on August 31 in 
New Braunfels, where they believed they could hear their demands and create less of a 
scene.   
The result was a public relations disaster for Texas Democrats, especially among 
the Mexican American community.  Barnes later reflected regretfully: “Somehow, none 
of us realized that pulling up beside a ragtag group of tired, hot, dirt-poor marchers in a 
shiny, black, bulletproof Lincoln Continental might send the wrong message.  We must 
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have looked like the fat-cat bankers come to toss a penny at the hungry masses.”  Texas 
newspapers captured this striking image in photographs printed across the state.  The 
Democratic leaders confidently argued they had provided sufficient support to the 
Mexican American community through education initiatives like Head Start and more 
funding for schools, and concurrently warned the group not to continue the trek to Austin.  
Connally sternly and impatiently proclaimed that he would not be in the city on Labor 
Day, and even if he were to be, he would not meet with the marchers.  The flagrant 
arrogance of the Democratic politicians infuriated the group and its supporters.  Texas 
AFL-CIO leader Hank Brown bluntly described Connally, Barnes, and Carr: “They made 
an ass of themselves.”  After the New Braunfels meeting, Father Antonio Gonzales, a key 
leader of the march, surmised: “I would say the great majority [of Latinos] will vote for 
Tower, not because they like Tower’s position, but because they would like to have a 
two-party system, and as a protest against Connally.”17  Tower and the Texas GOP thus 
benefitted from Carr’s association with Connally and ill-advised confrontation with the 
marchers. 
  
A Summer of Anxiety and Tragedy in Texas 
 During the summer of 1966, as racial unrest simmered in the nation’s cities and 
demonstrations against the ever-widening war in Vietnam grew more intense, a mood of 
unease spread across the country.  Texas itself was not immune to such anxiety, despite 
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having one of its own in the White House.  Actually, many Texans lamented that the 
president had not been tough enough against Black Power advocates and Vietnam 
protestors.  In August, John McKee, president and managing director of the Dallas Crime 
Commission, wrote LBJ to express his concern about rising demonstrations throughout 
the United States.  “There is evidence of a great moral decline.  We also have such 
individuals as card-burning draftdodgers [sic], the pseudo-intellectuals who contribute 
nothing to a free society, and those who are opposed to the war in Vietnam.  Many of 
these individuals and/or groups abuse the privilege of freedom of speech, as well as the 
prestige of our President and our nation.”  He continued: “I have seen firsthand the 
undecided, the abusive, and those who are contributing to the internal problem of moral 
decay.  I believe that these individuals actually constitute a minority—small, but highly 
vocal groups—and that the great majority of our American people are solidly back of you 
as President, and of our country. . . .  It is my personal belief that you have been much too 
considerate of such groups.  It is time to take off the kid gloves.”18 
 Further troubling, a Texas Poll released in mid-September suggested that white 
Texans’ acceptance of black gains from the civil rights movement had slowed, 
particularly in the wake of the emerging Black Power movement and recent urban riots: 
Between 1963 and 1964, similar statewide studies had shown that the 
Negro had gained dramatically in many areas of racial integration.  Within that 
twelve-months’ period, for instance, acceptance turned from a minority to a 
majority in public transportation, use of restaurants, school integration, and 
church attendance.  As many as one-seventh of all white Anglos had changed 
their views in favor of equality on some of these situations. 
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The new study, completed in August, shows that this trend has stopped or 
at best is now slowed down to an almost imperceptible advance. 
The second survey followed passage of the Civil Rights Act, which made 
it illegal to practice opposition in many areas of integration.  The new survey 
follows increased militancy—in some cases accompanied by violence—among 
some elements of the civil rights movement. 
 
The poll highlighted that most white Texans continued to oppose sharing public 
swimming pools, attending social gatherings, and living next door to African Americans.  
East Texans in particular opposed these aspects of integration.19 
 Regarding international affairs, most Texans continued to believe in the necessity 
of confronting communism in Southeast Asia.  A poll released in mid-September showed 
continued support among Texans for the war in Vietnam, even as skepticism grew 
nationally.  In fact, 55 percent of Texans surveyed believed that the U.S. “should go all 
out to win the war,” while only 19 percent supported the present Johnson administration 
policy and merely 14 percent favored withdrawal.  Strikingly, while a growing number of 
Americans had begun to question the war as a worthwhile national priority, a majority of 
Texans hoped the administration would employ more military force in Vietnam.20 
No event in Texas during the summer of 1966 seemed to symbolize the anxiety 
permeating through the state and national mood more than Charles Whitman’s bloody 
rampage at the University of Texas on the first day of August.  Whitman, a former marine 
who attended UT, stabbed his wife and mother to death before barricading himself in the 
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observation deck of the University of Texas Tower where he conducted an hour and a 
half long shooting spree.  Before Austin police officers killed him, Whitman murdered 
fourteen people while wounding another thirty-two individuals.  The cover of Life 
magazine showed a ghastly image of the Tower seen through windows littered with bullet 
holes.  People across the state and nation wondered how such a terrible mass murder 
could occur in their day and age.  Bill Helmer, on campus at the time of the massacre, 
wrote in the Texas Observer three weeks later: “The man on that Tower was no berserk 
killer.  He was more a mad craftsman.  Charles Whitman carried out his work 
methodically, soberly, and with extraordinary skill not found in an impassioned murderer.  
Alone on that parapet, viewing the world below him through the cross hairs of a 
telescopic sight, he single-handedly turned a quiet campus into a battlefield littered with 
dead and wounded.”21 
 
Connally’s Political Shrewdness 
 As such troubles plagued Texas and the country, John Connally’s political stature 
continued to grow.  In September the Wall Street Journal argued that Connally’s skilled 
leadership and shrewdness had prevented Texas from becoming a true two-party state.  
“He has slowed Texas’ drift toward becoming a Northern-style two-party state, with a 
liberal Democratic Party and a conservative Republican Party, and has preserved at least 
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a while longer the firm control of the conservative Democrats.”  A White House aide 
from Texas exclaimed: “He’s halted the trend far more effectively than anyone else could 
have.  He’s set back the liberals and the Republicans a decade.”  A liberal Democrat from 
Houston surmised: “The big-money people have always felt it silly to get involved in two 
parties if they could run the state through one.  I very regretfully have to admit that John 
Connally has used his power and popularity most effectively to enable the establishment 
to keep doing this a few more years.”  Texans of all political stripes believed Connally 
would be reelected easily to a third term in November.   
 The article discussed Connally’s political acumen.  “As governor, Mr. Connally 
has built his consensus partly be keeping conservatives happy with his stands on national 
issues, opposing Medicare, federal aid to education and ‘right to work’ repeal.  On the 
state level, he has stood firm against a minimum wage law, and aided by a sales tax 
started by his predecessor and by the long economic boom, has gotten by with only 
modest tax increases of his own.”  However, Connally understood how to appeal to some 
liberals.  “Mr. Connally has been liberal enough to win many rank-and-file voters of 
moderate or generally liberal leanings.  He has increased state support of education, 
strengthened health programs, raised welfare levels and teacher pay and enlarged water 
development programs.  New and expanding industries have kept employment high, 
helping the governor with poorer voters.”  The article also noted that Connally had 
strengthened the power of the Texas governor and had worked well with Ben Barnes, 
whom he viewed as a potential successor. 
  92 
However, the article described how Democratic disunity could hurt Waggoner 
Carr’s attempt to unseat John Tower, mirroring what happened in 1961 when the Texas 
Republican first won election to the Senate.  Many liberal Democrats again planned to 
vote for Tower.  “They not only dislike Mr. Carr’s conservatism but also believe that the 
best way to advance their own cause for the longer term is to strengthen the Republican 
Party.  Their analysis, which Republicans agree with, is that a stronger GOP would attract 
conservative Democrats into the Republican primaries, leaving the liberals stronger in the 
Democratic primaries.”  One liberal Democrat argued: “A vote for Tower is really a vote 
to save the Democratic Party in Texas.”22   
 In a late September article of The Wall Street Journal, Alan L. Otten described 
supposedly frequent tension between LBJ and Connally, two old friends and political 
partners.  “As President, Lyndon Johnson is constantly proposing liberal legislation and 
making liberal appointments that Gov. Connally deplores.  As governor, John Connally 
has wielded his considerable influence with Texas Congressmen and with governors and 
other national political leaders to fight these proposals and appointments.  Moreover, he 
frequently takes conservative stands on Texas issues—stands the President doesn’t 
particularly like.”  Otten explained that Connally lobbied members of the Texas 
Congressional delegation to vote against White House proposals to ban state right-to-
work laws.  Additionally, Connally used his influence in Congressional redistricting to 
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make new districts more hostile to liberal members.  Clearly, the Texas governor was his 
own man, protecting his personal political interests in the Lone Star State.23 
 
LBJ’s Growing Worries 
 As the midterm elections drew nearer, LBJ became increasingly concerned with 
how voters would treat his party in the wake of mounting domestic and international 
crises.  In late September the president and his Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara 
discussed recent race riots in San Francisco and their fear of contemporary white attitudes 
toward the civil rights movement.  LBJ grieved: “These old dogs won’t hunt anymore.  
They’re just driving themselves out of the ballpark—the Negroes—with these things.”  
McNamara concurred with the president regarding the rioting, confessing, “My first 
thought this morning was this was a real blow at Brown [v. Board of Education].”  
Johnson continued: 
What we’re doing . . . there’s a great revulsion taking place and it’s going 
to be a pretty solid front against us in the South, which when put with the 
Republicans, gives them control.  And I’m not sure that the North is not going to 
be about as bitter. . . . So we’re in trouble on this civil rights thing.  I don’t know 
how to—they’re writing amendments now in the reports saying we’re going too 
fast, and I don’t see a damn thing I can—it’s unthinkable to me that eleven or 
twelve years you can’t carry out the law of the land [Brown v. Board of 
Education]. 
 
McNamara then referred to a recent poll he viewed stating that 52 percent of Americans 
believed President Johnson was moving too fast on civil rights.  LBJ complained he was 
trapped in the middle, with most whites convinced he was doing too much and many 
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African Americans feeling the president needed to move more swiftly in the quest for 
racial justice.  McNamara dimly predicted, “Both are going to erupt.”24 
 “By God, we’ve got riots in all the major cities and it’s knocked our polls down 
15 percent,” an exasperated LBJ complained to his longtime lawyer, and current Supreme 
Court Justice, Abe Fortas.  LBJ feared that a conservative backlash against his civil rights 
policies was imminent.  “I just talked to [White House aide] Cliff Carter this morning and 
he said it’s more than Vietnam, it’s more than inflation, it’s more than all of them put 
together.”  Johnson snarled: “Every white man just says by God he don’t [sic] want his 
car turned over and he don’t want some Negro throwing a brick at him.”  He lamented: 
“We’ve got to do something to shake them up, like say convict that damn [Stokely] 
Carmichael, and uphold it.”  According to the president, Carmichael “scared everyone 
else to death.”25 
 Later that same day Johnson visited with former President Dwight Eisenhower by 
telephone.  The two men primarily discussed the war in Vietnam.  Eisenhower assured 
Johnson of his wholehearted support in the complicated affair, terming the war “the most 
nasty and unpredictable thing we’ve ever been in.”  Johnson complained about former 
Vice President Richard Nixon, who recently had been criticizing LBJ’s efforts in 
Vietnam.  LBJ viewed Nixon as a political opportunist attempting to score points for the 
Republicans in the upcoming elections.  Eisenhower, who at best held lukewarm feelings 
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for his former vice president, made no attempt to defend Nixon.  Johnson saw no 
consistency in Nixon’s attacks, further reinforcing his viewpoint of him as a political 
hack: “He changes [positions] each day or two.”26 
 As the days in October went by, Johnson continued to fret over disunity in his 
Democratic Party with regard to Vietnam.  He appealed to Senate Majority Leader Mike 
Mansfield for party cohesion in Congress, especially singling out Senators William 
Fulbright and Vance Hartke.  “Fulbright—he’s mad about the goddamned war . . . and 
that’s caused us to lose our whole foreign policy.”  The president continued: “Hartke—
who’s got two boys he’s afraid are going to be drafted—he raises hell with me every day.  
He’s just gone nuts because he’s scared to death.”  Continued criticism by Senate doves 
tormented LBJ and for him foreshadowed future electoral defeats of the Democratic 
Party.27 
 The president urged his administration officials to publicize notable developments 
in his policies.  He ordered aide Henry Fowler to request daily positive reports from 
cabinet officers to balance negative attacks by Republicans.  LBJ lamented to his 
assistant: “[House Republican Leader] Jerry Ford puts out more everyday about what’s 
bad than all my eleven cabinet officers do about what’s good.  This Fulbright, he’s 
raising hell about our missiles . . . and [anti-war Senator Wayne] Morse is hitting at us, 
and Jerry Ford [also].”  Johnson expressed concern that an unstable economy and 
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growing resentment of the military draft for the Vietnam War would endanger 
Democratic prospects for success in the approaching fall elections.28 
 Ever the opportunistic politician, Johnson courted his chief Congressional critic 
William Fulbright, appealing for Democratic and American unity.  The president 
confessed that he expected a setback in the midterm elections for Democrats.  He 
discussed North Vietnam’s belief that the elections would be a referendum on his 
Southeast Asia policy and lead to his ouster from office.  LBJ elaborated that Hanoi, as 
well as the Chinese government, entertained the notion that “the masses will rise up and 
throw the murderer Johnson out of office in November.”  Johnson, increasingly hostile to 
the media, blamed American newspapers for implying to U.S. enemies that this 
development would occur as a result of the Congressional elections.  The president tacitly 
suggested to his critic that an increased number of Republicans in Congress might mean 
more support for his Vietnam policy.  “The Republicans have been all out on Vietnam—
every damn one of them.  We never lost a Republican vote in either House.”  Johnson 
skillfully attempted to warn Fulbright that Democratic disharmony could lead to more 
Republicans in Congress, who would perhaps call for even further drastic action in 
Vietnam.29   
 LBJ embarked on a trip to Asia during late October 1966, the highlight of which 
was the Manila Conference from October 23-25.  At Manila, the U.S. met with leaders of 
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South Vietnam, South Korea, and other Asian and Pacific allies to express solidarity in 
the Vietnam War.  The major goal of the trip was to show Americans the progress of 
democracy in Asia.  Bill Moyers meticulously planned the trip as a public relations boost, 
and large supportive crowds turned out to see the American president on his stops 
throughout Southeast Asia.  The Manila Conference reinvigorated Johnson’s support for 
South Vietnam and increased some public confidence in his foreign policies.30 
 Upon the president’s return from his Asia trip, he visited by phone with William 
S. White, a journalist sympathetic to the administration.  The two men discussed press 
coverage of the Manila Conference, with Williams believing it had been positive overall.  
LBJ determined to pursue his Vietnam policy regardless of his anxiety about the 
approaching November elections.  Johnson asserted to his journalist friend that he would 
not be campaigning for fellow Democrats.  He explained: “I’m not running, and they’re 
trying to make this a big race with me, and what the hell if I lost fifty seats.  They’ve 
been losing fifty every year since 1890, and if I lost them, what would I have?  They’d 
have 190.  I’d still have a goddamn majority of sixty men.”  Johnson, his mood swinging 
wildly between foreboding and acceptance of defeat for his Democrats, began in the days 
leading to the elections stressing that historically president’s parties lost seats in midterm 
years.  LBJ sought to shift blame away from himself.  However, Johnson acknowledged: 
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“Anyway, if I got the hell beat out of some of these extreme liberals, it would help me.  It 
wouldn’t hurt me.”31 
In talking with House Speaker John McCormack about the recent Manila 
Conference, the president lambasted the American media for not giving it enough 
attention.  “The papers never have printed it [positive developments of the Manila 
Conference], because they’re mean Republicans.”  Johnson could not understand recent 
criticism by Republican leaders of the conference: “[House Republican Leader Gerald] 
Ford says . . . we had a great deal of division.  We never had a bit of division.  I don’t 
know where he got it.  He’s got a mean political statement.”  The president encouraged 
the Speaker of the House to illustrate the positive qualities of his Asian trip to campaign 
audiences.32 
 Richard Nixon vocally criticized the Manila Conference and LBJ’s Vietnam 
policy in the days prior to the midterm elections.  The New York Times printed the text of 
a speech made by Nixon while campaigning for Republican candidates.  Calling the war 
in Vietnam “one of the central issues of our time,” Nixon asserted: “The administration’s 
current policy resigns America and the free Asian nations to a war which could last five 
years and cost more casualties than Korea.”  Nixon disparaged the plans of the Manila 
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Conference, alleging they “raised some grave policy questions which should be answered 
by President Johnson before the American people go to the polls on November 8.”33  
 Nixon’s remarks infuriated LBJ.  He complained to Hubert Humphrey: “That son 
of a bitch—did you see New York Times, what he said about us, this morning?”34  While 
Johnson and William Fulbright were beginning to see their relationship strained over 
Vietnam, they found unity in their disdain for Nixon.  The president grumbled to the 
senator: “He [Nixon] has questioned and denounced us and assailed us.  One day he 
wants to escalate the war and the next day he wants to deescalate it. . . . He has no 
conception of what’s going on about it.  He knows nothing about the Manila 
Conference.”  LBJ, seeking to win one of his chief Congressional critics to his side, asked 
Fulbright to paint Nixon in public as wanting a permanent presence in Vietnam.  The 
senator was reluctant however, explaining: “The fellow [Nixon]—nobody’s paying much 
attention to him.  After you commented on him, the son of a bitch immediately becomes 
news.  I’m a little afraid of building him up.”  Johnson loathed Nixon’s recent actions: 
“He had the meanest speech in Memphis you ever saw, that we had to deescalate the war, 
that we’re killing men because we . . . wouldn’t turn them loose. . . .  It’s just the old 
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traitor stuff that he pulled on Truman and Rayburn.  He called them traitors, you 
remember, back in Korea.”35 
 
The 1966 Midterm Elections 
 Five days prior to the election, Joe Belden of the Texas Poll predicted that voter 
turnout would determine the result of the Senate race, with a lighter turnout favoring 
Tower.  “Senator Tower, although the incumbent, began the race as the underdog, if for 
no other reason than the fact that he is a Republican.  Carr has had the built-in advantage 
of Democratic strength—in Texas more than six out of ten voters think of themselves as 
Democrats, while a little over a tenth say they are Republicans.”36   
 Another election night profile previewed the 1966 races and analyzed how 
different regions of Texas typically voted.  The report, as Belden had surmised, 
emphasized that a lower voter turnout would help Tower.  Also, liberal Democrats hoped 
for Tower’s reelection, since “this would help their long range goal of making Texas a 
truly two-party state with the Republicans conservative and the Democrats liberal.  (Such 
an occurrence does not appear right over the horizon, however.)”  Ralph Yarborough, 
while acknowledging he would vote for Carr, did little else to help him in the campaign, 
due to his longstanding feud with Connally.  Disunity again plagued Texas Democrats.  
The report continued: 
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Republican appeal traditionally has been strongest in the Panhandle and 
the western-southern sections of the state (especially in southwest Texas).  There 
is also considerable strength in the Dallas-Fort Worth area and in Houston, and to 
a lesser extent in the South Plains and the Smith-Rusk oasis of East Texas. 
Democratic strength is centered in the rolling plains of west central Texas, 
scattered counties in the northwest, lower east Texas proper, and in a handful of 
counties on the Western side of the Rio Grande Plain. . . . 
The key Republican areas in the state are Dallas County, Harris County 
(Houston), and Bexar County (San Antonio).  Combined, these three account for 
one-third of the statewide vote.  The vast growth of a white collar population in 
all three areas in the last two decades has been one of the chief factors in changing 
Texas from a strictly-one party state to a sometime two-party state.37 
 
 David Richards recalled how many liberal Democrats refused to support Carr and 
cast their votes for Tower.  Richards explained: “The arguments were many, including 
revenge against reactionaries and building the Republican Party.  Moreover, Carr’s 
election would only diminish Ralph Yarborough’s patronage powers during the Johnson 
administration.”  He reflected upon the significance of the 1966 contest: “It was this 
election more than any other that crystalized the notion of the kamikaze liberals of Texas.  
We’d rather go down in flames than be trapped supporting reactionary Democratic 
candidates.”38 
 Ultimately, election day, November 8, 1966, was a defeat for the Johnson 
administration, with a voter backlash against the Democratic Party.  The Republican 
Party increased its numbers by 47 in the House and 3 in the Senate.  Democrats 
maintained control of Congress, but with a reduced margin: 248 to 187 in the House of 
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Representatives and 64 to 36 in the Senate.  In addition, the Republicans won 8 new 
governorships, including California by conservative Hollywood actor Ronald Reagan.  
Each party now controlled 25 governors’ mansions.39  The nation had expressed its 
dissatisfaction with Vietnam, civil rights, and the Great Society, in a rude awakening for 
LBJ. 
 Conservatives in particular expressed confidence in their understanding of the 
reasons for the Republicans’ electoral successes in 1966.  Richard Nixon stated days prior 
to the election: “Now that we’ve come part of the way with LBJ, we want no part of the 
rest of the way.”  In his memoirs, Nixon later recalled: “We had been the recipients of a 
massive anti-Johnson windfall.”  He believed that “the fatal flaw of his Great Society was 
precisely its inclination to establish massive federal programs.  The price tag was 
astronomical.”  Nixon also claimed: “Johnson had not leveled with the American people 
and told them why we were fighting in Vietnam or how deeply American troops were 
actually involved.”40 
 A closer look at the election results provided LBJ with cause for concern.  The 
Democratic majority’s lead in the House of Representatives shrank from 155 to 61.  In 
actuality, this margin was even smaller for the Johnson administration, due to an 
estimated fifty southern conservative Democrats who often did not support Great Society 
policies.  LBJ and House Democratic leaders would have to maintain strict control over 
                                                 
39Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant, 338-39. 
 
40Perry D. Hall, ed., The Quotable Richard M. Nixon (New York: Droke House, 
1967), 92; and Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset 
& Dunlap, 1978), 267-77. 
  103 
party members in the next Congressional term if they hoped to pass any significant Great 
Society legislation.  The most critical Republican gains appear to have been in state 
governorships, with the GOP picking up eight.  Frustrating for LBJ, reelected Governor 
George Romney of Michigan and Governor-elect Ronald Reagan of California 
immediately generated political buzz from their supporters about running for president in 
1968, as did Richard Nixon, who had spent time campaigning for Republicans.  
Following the election, Nixon termed the results “the sharpest rebuff of a president in a 
generation.”41 
 Furthermore, beginning to fulfill Johnson’s prescient predictions to Bill Moyers 
and Ben Barnes, the Republican Party made inroads in the once solidly Democratic 
South.  Republicans added 5 southern House seats, giving them a total of 23 
representatives from states which once belonged to the Confederacy.  Included in this 
number was George H. W. Bush of LBJ’s home state of Texas, who won a seat 
representing a wealthy area of Houston.  Segregationist Senator Strom Thurmond of 
South Carolina, who was once a Democrat but left for the Republican Party, was 
reelected.  Republican gubernatorial candidates won in Arkansas and Florida for the first 
time since Reconstruction.  Lastly, in a critical victory for Texas Republicans, John 
Tower defeated Waggoner Carr by almost two hundred thousand votes to retain his 
Senate seat.  Tower clearly benefitted from many Texans’ worries about the state of 
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national affairs, as well as Latino voters’ disdain for Carr.  Tower won almost 35 percent 
of Mexican Americans’ ballots, a historic number for a Republican candidate in Texas.42 
 
After the Midterms 
“We’re bruised and battered, but not down,” the always optimistic Hubert 
Humphrey confided to Johnson the day after the midterm elections.  The president 
initially said little, obviously disappointed, but soon attempted to understand and put the 
best spin possible on the defeat.  He started: “Well, I think that—it’s not as good as we’d 
like it, but it’s something we’ve got to reconcile ourselves to, and I think it’s pretty easily 
understood and rather easily explained.”  LBJ discussed reasons for the Democrats’ 
defeat: “I think when . . . some of our fool liberals [in Congress] start talking about how 
many billions it’s going to take and . . . the Martin Luther King’s in Chicago, I just don’t 
think you can expect much more. . . .  People just won’t tolerate this low-life stuff like the 
Negroes and the labor unions [sic] been doing.”  Recognizing public frustration with civil 
rights and the Great Society, Johnson continued: “I don’t think these extreme liberal 
things helped us much and I think folks will react.”43 
 In the days following the November elections the president worried over the next 
year’s federal budget, believing that larger numbers of Republicans in Congress would 
require spending cuts.  In a conversation with Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman 
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an agitated LBJ mandated cuts for the India food aid program.  Johnson declared: “These 
giveaway days—they voted them out of office last Tuesday.”44  The president had a 
similar conversation with his secretary of the interior, Stewart Udall.  He exclaimed: 
“We’ve just got to cut like hell, as you can see from the election.”45 
 Johnson increasingly grew more anxious about Republicans potentially slashing 
his Great Society programs.  In late November he described this possible development to 
Humphrey.  Republicans were “going to want to cut all the New Deal stuff—the New 
[Great] Society stuff. . . .  Poverty is the thing that they’re likely to cut most.”  Johnson 
lambasted the callousness of some Republicans toward the poor and minorities: “The 
demagogues are going to say cut out non-essentials. . . . Non-essential is a Negro in 
Jackson, Mississippi.”46 
Back in Texas, H. M. Baggarly, the widely-read columnist and editor of the Tulia 
Herald, as in years past again lambasted conservative Democrats for treating the liberal 
wing of the party so badly, arguing that such hubris led to Tower’s reelection.  “We are 
shedding no tears over the defeat of Waggoner Carr.  He kicked off his campaign by 
kicking Ralph Yarborough in the teeth.  One of his initial utterances was that he was 
needed in Washington to give the Democratic Party the leadership it needed in the 
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Senate.  It almost seemed that he was running against Ralph Yarborough instead of John 
Tower.”47 
In the aftermath of the election, Tom M. Cain, Jr., of Dallas expressed his concern 
about the current state of the Texas Democratic Party.  “As we look to 1968, I am afraid 
that any serious Republican challenge cannot be overcome or even diminished in Dallas 
County, unless all factions of the Democratic Party can be united. . . .  Governor 
Connally has made an excellent governor and enjoys wide bipartisan support.  However, 
his outspoken, Conservative, Party leadership is so resented by the Liberals that they 
went to great lengths to show their dissatisfaction by voting against Waggoner Carr for 
Senator.”48 
 Not just in Texas, but also nationally, Democrats remained divided over 
Johnson’s Great Society and Vietnam policies.  In late December, the president had an 
acrimonious meeting with Democratic governors, who questioned many of his domestic 
initiatives.  Secretary of State Dean Rusk called LBJ to inquire about the meeting.  A 
tired Johnson described his day: “They [Democratic governors] were all rambunctious, 
rather insulting, and so was I, so we didn’t do very well.”  Rusk wondered if the 
governors were worried about foreign affairs, but Johnson asserted they seemed most 
concerned with problems at home.  “They didn’t want any briefing on either foreign 
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policy or defense, really refused to accept it, and spent all their time talking about poverty 
patronage, and civil rights guidelines, and knit-picking general stuff that was not worthy 
of any of us.”  Johnson continued to be plagued by Democratic disharmony.49 
 Political problems remained unabated for LBJ, even after the midterm elections.  
Things actually seemed to be getting worse.  Lady Bird Johnson, who daily witnessed the 
toll the nation’s predicaments took on her husband, reflected on this troubling time 
period.  She wrote: “A miasma of trouble hangs over everything.  If I had to draw a graph 
of when it began . . . I would say about December 10.  All during December there was the 
constant grind with the budget.”  Vietnam appeared to grow more problematic with each 
passing day.  The first lady commented: “The temperament of our people seems to be, 
‘You must get excited, get passionate, fight it, get it over with, or we must pull out.’”50 
In a memorandum to Jake Jacobsen in late 1966, LBJ aide Marvin Watson 
analyzed the turmoil in the Texas Democratic Party.  He explained: “The situation in the 
Democratic Party of Texas is more chopped up now than any time since 1944.  The 
difference between now and previous years is the nature of the divisiveness.  In previous 
years the split was between liberal and conservative Democrats, with the conservatives 
sometimes bolting the party to support Republicans.  Now, however, the basic split is 
between loyal Democrat factions with the state AFL-CIO officials in Austin supporting 
the position of the dissidents.  The dissident liberals voted for Tower, Bush and Grover.  
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The split developed during the first Democratic primary and crystallized in the general 
election.”  Watson noted that Robert Kennedy had supported liberal Texas Democrats in 
the primaries, and he possessed information alleging that the New York senator planned 
to assemble a national political organization in early 1967.  He warned Jacobsen that 
Connally’s supporters should begin preparing for 1968, to ensure that President Johnson 
maintained control of his home state’s party.51 
At the end of 1966, Johnson reflected on his party’s losses in the midterm 
elections, yet determined to continue a course similar to the one he established at the 
year’s beginning.  That the election was a setback for Johnson and his policies there 
could be no doubt, but the president sought continually to provide explanations that 
diverted some blame away from his White House.  In a conversation with United Nations 
Ambassador Arthur Goldberg on New Year’s Eve 1966, the president maintained: “All 
the time you got every paper in America and you’ve got every columnist—all of them—
saying that the people voted against the Great Society.  Now I don’t think there’s any 
question that they did vote against the rioting.”  Johnson bluntly elaborated further: 
“Every place I went they told me, ‘We just got scared to death of Martin Luther King and 
Stokely Carmichael coming in here and talking about how they were going to eat the 
white man up,’ and that Black Power thing scared them.”  While discussing the past 
year’s defeats, LBJ nevertheless still believed that the United States could fight a war in 
Vietnam while building a Great Society at home.  In a telling statement, he concluded his 
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conversation with Goldberg by vowing: “We’re on the move in both places and I am 
going to continue to be on the move in the fight on two fronts—the fight against 
aggression and the fight against the ancient enemies—and we’re going to move on both 
fronts with full steam.”52 
 
 Thus Lyndon Johnson entered 1967 bruised and battered, yet still confident in his 
ability to achieve success in both domestic and international affairs and to hold together 
his fragile Democratic Party.  Yet the final two years of his presidency would prove even 
more tumultuous for Johnson, his party, and the nation, and see the Republican Party, 
seemingly so powerless after the 1964 debacle, resurgent, led by an old foe who craftily 
channeled the frustrations of a large segment of the American population. 
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CHAPTER 4 
“A Great Tide Running”: 
LBJ, Texas, and the White House, 1967-1969 
 
Lyndon Johnson’s final years in the White House proved immensely difficult for 
the president, his Democratic Party, and the nation itself.  Racial unrest, antiwar protests, 
a confusing counterculture, assassinations of prominent individuals, and never-ending 
violence in Vietnam dominated the headlines.  In particular 1968 proved “one of the most 
agonizing years any president has ever spent in the White House,” as Johnson put it in his 
memoir.1  By the late 1960s, Democrats faced troubled political waters, both in Texas 
and nationally, as a result of LBJ’s policies.   
 
Increasing Political Problems in 1967 
 Despite losses in the 1966 midterm elections, Johnson determined to hold his 
party together to support his agenda in 1967.  Yet with each passing day this proved more 
difficult.  Conservatives and liberals in the national Democratic Party continued to battle 
over Great Society spending levels and the Vietnam War.  The president feared division 
would endanger the party’s electoral prospects in 1968.  On January 25, 1967, LBJ 
lamented the especially vocal persistence of such disunity in Congress to administration 
official Nicholas Katzenbach: “Our party’s just split wide open, and I don’t know what 
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the hell they think they can do.  I don’t think we’ve got a chance of winning if the 
constituency of all these programs is against them.”  Johnson continued: “If we can’t get 
along among ourselves, I don’t see how anybody’s going to be elected. . . .  I swear I 
don’t see it.”2 
 Texans themselves divided over the administration’s policies.  The majority 
supported LBJ’s efforts in Vietnam.  If anything, many Texans hoped the president 
would employ stronger military power in the conflict.  In the spring of 1967, newspaper 
editorials in Dallas, Waco, and other Texas cities commended Johnson’s handling of 
Vietnam, despite growing opposition nationally.  The Texas delegation overwhelmingly 
defended the White House on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives, and on 
March 20, Representative Jack Brooks of Beaumont, a staunch LBJ ally, added to the 
Congressional Record editorials in support of LBJ and Vietnam.3   
 However, by 1967 many Texans possessed grave concerns about Johnson’s 
domestic initiatives, especially civil rights and poverty.  John Tower and Texas 
Republicans saw opportunity for continued growth of the GOP in the Lone Star State.  In 
March, Waggoner Carr, Tower’s former foe, wrote LBJ about the current political scene 
in Texas: “Tower and the Republicans continue to strengthen their organizations, both 
adult and youth.  We need to get busy—especially in organizing our youth. . . .  Tower is 
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already recruiting some of the top youth leaders of this State who helped me in the Senate 
race.  We could keep them on our side if we would get busy.”4 
 In April, George Reedy sent LBJ a letter describing conversations from his recent 
visit to Texas.  He noted that supporters Albert Jackson and Houston Harte expressed 
concern about the president’s ability to carry Texas in the 1968 presidential election.  
Reedy explained: “Interestingly enough, neither Albert nor Houston believes that your 
troubles are due to Viet Nam.  They are both convinced that the principal issue is the 
rioting in the large cities and Albert Jackson thinks that the 1968 election will really be 
determined by the peace or turmoil that prevails this summer.  If things are relatively 
quiet, he does not believe that any Republican can defeat you.  But if there are a series of 
riots, he thinks that the campaign will be extremely difficult.”  Reedy continued: “In 
Houston, Everett Collier is considerably more optimistic.  His only concern arises out of 
stories that you might appoint Thurgood Marshall to the Supreme Court.  He is confident 
that this would cost you the entire South and therefore the election.”5 
 Speaking at a fundraiser in Birmingham, Alabama, John Tower predicted 
Republican success in 1968 and relished noting the divisions in the Democratic Party.  
The Texas senator explained: “It should be noted that while there is a decided dichotomy 
between Southern Democrats and other Democrats, no such thing exists in our party.  The 
Southern Republican is indistinguishable from, for instance, the Western or Midwestern 
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Republican.  We are all committed to such broad principles as revitalized state and local 
government, decreased federal centralism, local control of education, fiscal responsibility 
and firmness against communist tyranny.”6  Republicans from all parts of the country 
could sense an opportunity for victory in 1968, a dramatic development from their 
staggering losses in 1964. 
 Compounding LBJ’s problems, many civil rights leaders became increasingly 
disillusioned with the Vietnam War by 1967 as casualties mounted and its funding 
drained resources from Great Society programs.  Martin Luther King, Jr., who long had 
possessed doubts about the conflict, went public with his opposition to LBJ’s Vietnam 
policy in April 1967.  Speaking at Riverside Church in New York, King voiced his 
frustration that Vietnam had diverted the government’s attention away from the War on 
Poverty and threatened to bankrupt the nation morally: “I watched the program broken 
and eviscerated as if it were some idle political plaything of a society gone mad on war.”7  
Civil rights leader Andrew Young lamented that the conflict in Southeast Asia was “the 
kind of war that nobody could win, that was not really in the best interest of the United 
States, and that was seriously damaging the domestic progress we were making that was 
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so necessary.”  He later recalled: “I think we always felt that the domestic crisis was 
more dangerous and therefore more important for the country.”8 
 Racial tensions simmered in Texas.  On May 16-17, furor exploded at Texas 
Southern University, a historically African American school in Houston, when students 
and police clashed following a rally on campus.  The disturbance caused thousands of 
dollars’ worth of property damage and led to the death of one police officer.  Many 
blacks believed the police had been too heavy-handed in their use of force, while whites 
generally viewed the incident as emblematic of other racial violence across the country.9  
A large Anglo group from Hubbard sent LBJ an angry petition in response to it and other 
events of racial strife in the state:  “We would like to lodge a vigorous protest against this 
disregard for law and order in our country, led by Negroes like Stokely Carmichael, 
whom Mr. J. Edgar Hoover has linked with a secret Marxist-Lennist [sic] group, a 
Chinese communist organization, dedicated to overthrowing the government.  We are 
expecting our president and Congress to put an end to this kind of lawlessness taking 
place in our midst, while our boys are dying in Vietnam to protect freedom at home 
which we seem to be losing.”10 
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 Throughout the spring of 1967, John Tower continued to criticize the Democratic 
administration.  In a speech in Jackson, Mississippi, the Texas Republican lambasted the 
White House for rising crime rates at home, unrest abroad, and overall declining 
credibility.  He caustically remarked: “The Great Society’s penchant for over-managing 
every phase of American life has created problems, not solved them.”11  Tower and GOP 
activists labored to increase the Republican Party’s strength in Texas and the South by 
blaming the nation’s problems on Democrats. 
 A Texan from Wichita Falls expressed concern to LBJ about division within the 
state Democratic Party, but professed continued support for the president.  “For the 
Democratic Party I think the Yarborough Connally feud is the most dangerous thing we 
have in Texas.”  Connally’s antagonism toward Texas labor especially worried the writer.  
“We are in contact with the labor leaders in this area and the state and we were not able 
to convince most of them that Carr was better for them than Tower.  It was a matter of ‘a 
plague on both your houses.’  The labor group was especially incensed at our friend John 
Connally (who evidently planned Carr’s strategy) for several reasons.  The most glaring 
incidents were the T.V. and newspaper coverage of the Valley farm workers march, 
where Connally firmly said no, and Carr stood beside him.  Later at the state convention 
Connally exercised his power by preventing the seating of a labor liberal delegation from 
Harris County.  Then at the Carr dinner in Austin Allan Shivers was honored on the 
platform and made a key speech.  After that the labor and liberal forces were against both 
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Connally and Carr.  The small turnout was almost a duplication of the Blakley situation.”  
The long-running feud between Connally and Yarborough epitomized the historic 
tensions between the conservative and liberal wings of the state party, and could provide 
Republicans an opening for further electoral success in Texas.  Nonetheless, Texans 
continued to support LBJ’s Vietnam policy.  The Wichita Falls writer added: “We believe 
your handling of the international problems carries the endorsement of the majority of 
Texans of both parties.”12 
 
A Summer of Turmoil 
 The summer of 1967 became very challenging for the Johnson White House.  In 
June, in what became known as the Six Day War, conflict between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors rocked the stability of the entire Middle East region and threatened to bring the 
United States and Soviet Union into another tense standoff.  The fighting in Vietnam 
continued on its bloody course, trying the patience of the American public.  Lastly, 
violent race riots burned down sections of major American cities, most notably in 
Newark, New Jersey, and Detroit, Michigan, in July.13 
Even a positive development for LBJ caused controversy, especially back in 
Texas.  Following the retirement of Texan Tom Clark, the president named Thurgood 
Marshall, a hero of the civil rights movement, to the Supreme Court in June.  Marshall 
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became the Court’s first African American justice.  However, many conservatives 
resented Marshall’s successful role in arguing the historic 1954 Brown v. Board of 
Education case in which the Supreme Court ruled segregation of public schools 
unconstitutional.  Some people worried even before LBJ nominated Marshall that he 
would make a liberal appointment to the Court.  In March, a Texan from Wichita Falls 
expressed concern about the vacancy created by the retirement of Tom Clark.  “Please, 
Mr. Johnson, appoint a reasonable man to take his place and not the Bobby Kennedy or 
Earl Warren type.  These two ultra liberals have done more harm to this nation than any 
ten hard core communists ever thought possible.”  The man suggested the president 
appoint John Connally.14 
The destructive riots in Newark and Detroit caused some Texans to fear violence 
would plague their state’s cities.  In early August, Luther Holcomb, vice chairman of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, sent a memorandum to Marvin Watson 
reflecting upon his visit to Texas.  Meetings with church congregations in the Dallas 
African American community encouraged Holcomb, but he noted a sense of anxiety 
among many whites.  “Dallas is besieged by rumors.  Merchants are telephoning City 
Hall to see if there is anything they can do to protect their property.  To some extent, 
there is a backlash in the white community.”15 
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 Urban unrest took a toll on LBJ’s approval rating and support for his Great 
Society initiatives in his home state.  In an August interview, reporters asked John Tower 
to evaluate LBJ’s popularity in Texas.  The senator replied: “I would certainly say that 
his domestic policies are not popular in Texas with the vast majority of the people.  I 
would say a vast majority of Texans support him in his position in Southeast Asia, but 
they don’t particularly like his domestic policies.”16  After the long summer of race riots 
across the country, several Longview, Texas, citizens signed a petition to the president 
which stated: “The following voters are diametrically opposed to the proposed surtax and 
to any tax money being used as a reward to rioters through such programs as urban 
renewal, poverty program, job corps, etc.”17  Many white Texans began to associate 
Great Society spending programs with violent cities and the controversial Black Power 
movement. 
 
Vietnam Frustration 
 LBJ fervently continued his attempt to sell his Vietnam policy to an increasingly 
skeptical citizenry.  He often invoked Texas history and imagery when talking about the 
Vietnam War.  One of his favorite anecdotes involved the Texas Rangers, the famous law 
enforcement agency of the Lone Star State.  Johnson frequently remarked: “The Ranger 
is one that when you plug him . . . he just keeps coming.  And we must let the rest of the 
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world know that . . . if they ever hit us it is not going to stop us—we are just going to 
keep coming.”  He encouraged his military leaders to nail “the coonskin on the wall,” and 
compared American soldiers fighting in Vietnam with the heroes of the Alamo, the most 
hallowed battle in Texans’ memories.  LBJ once told the National Security Council: 
“Hell, Vietnam is just like the Alamo. . . .  You were surrounded, and you damn well 
needed somebody.  Well, by God, I’m going to go—and I thank the Lord that I’ve got 
men who want to go with me, from McNamara right on down to the littlest private who’s 
carrying a gun.”  In hindsight, the analogy appears particularly ironic, given that the 
battle of the Alamo was a loss for Texans.18 
An August 27 Dallas Morning News article analyzed the Texas Congressional 
delegation’s attitude toward the Vietnam War during the summer of 1967.  A poll by the 
newspaper concluded: “Most Texans in Congress favor at least some escalation of the 
war in Vietnam and at the same time support President Johnson in his conduct of the war 
thus far. . . .  Fourteen of Texas’s twenty-three Congressmen and two senators urged at 
least limited escalation of the war.  Six other Congressmen said they would support the 
president if he ordered a limited escalation but did not actually urge such action 
themselves.”  Only Bob Eckhardt, a liberal representative from Houston, called for de-
escalation, lamenting that the conflict drained vital resources from domestic programs.  
Some in the Texas delegation, especially John Tower, cried for increased military might 
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and heavy bombing.  The News, never an admirer of Texas’s senior senator, noted that 
Ralph Yarborough desired a settlement similar to the Korean conflict, but had been 
largely silent on the war.  Furthermore, John Young of Corpus Christi specifically 
lambasted Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, a vocal critic of LBJ’s war policy, 
and Henry B. Gonzalez of San Antonio cautioned against “armchair generals who don’t 
have the awesome responsibility that the president has.”19 
 John Tower continued traveling across the South and speaking against the 
Johnson White House.  He made certain to note that the nation’s problems were 
Democratic Party failures, and even referenced the president’s perceived “credibility 
gap.”  While in Owensboro, Kentucky, the Texas Republican lectured: 
The Democratic Administration of our nation has left America suffering 
from a “leadership gap” of frightening proportions. . . . 
In Vietnam the Administration has led us into a no-win policy which 
refuses the use of American power to end the war and promises us instead only 
unending casualty lists or acquiescence to Communist victory. 
In the continuing chaos of civil disorders and climbing crime rates, the 
Administration’s leadership has for so long “looked the other way” that nobody 
now believes it can successfully do anything to end the coddling of criminals, to 
help local law enforcement or to spur such long-term solutions as better housing 
and jobs. 
The recurring pattern of our national Administration is a pattern of failing 
leadership. 
Current Democratic Administration bureaucrats are “federal extremists”—
impulsive to the point of blindness in the use of federal power, and improvident in 
the management of public funds.  Their only solutions are more federal control 
and more red-ink spending.20 
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 Such condemnations exasperated the president.  In a late-September telephone 
conversation with Republican Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois, LBJ lambasted senators 
who criticized his Vietnam policy: “It’s hurting our country, and it’s hurting it very, very 
bad.  If we’re going to ask these five hundred thousand men to stay out there, we can’t 
have every senator being a general, and every senator being a secretary of state.”21 
   
The Approaching Elections 
 By the fall of 1967, the national and state elections, just one year away, appeared 
worrisome for LBJ’s Democratic Party.  In October, Louis Martin, Deputy Chairman for 
Minorities with the Democratic National Committee, sent Marvin Watson a memo with 
clippings from the San Antonio Express detailing Governor Connally’s strained 
relationship with Mexican Americans.  The article addressed a particular feud between 
the governor and State Senator Joe Bernal of San Antonio.  Bernal and other Mexican 
American legislators previously had requested a meeting with Connally to discuss 
Republican inroads within the Texas Hispanic community, especially after the 1966 U.S. 
Senate race between Tower and Carr.  Connally had not even replied to their invitation, 
according to Bernal.  Incensed, the state senator exclaimed: “The Mexican-American is 
sold on the national party, but having to take Gov. Connally for a fourth term, coupled 
with his arrogance, is a hard pill to swallow.”  The article continued: “Ticking off the 
reasons he can’t go for Connally in the event the governor seeks re-election, Bernal cited 
                                                 
21Telephone Conversations: Recording, Lyndon B. Johnson and Everett Dirksen, 
September 28, 1967, LBJ Library. 
  122 
Connally’s failure to acknowledge the May 4 letter, Connally’s New Braunfels 
confrontation with the Valley marchers, his refusal to withdraw the Texas Rangers from 
the Valley and related incidents, and Connally’s charges in answer to Bernal’s letter on 
the lack of a single Mexican-American on the constitutional revision commission.”  
Connally had written Bernal that placing a Mexican American on this commission just 
because of race would amount to “reverse discrimination.”  Internal bickering thus 
continued to plague the state party.22  
 Dick West, editorial editor for the Dallas Morning News, contemplated LBJ’s 
standing in Texas one year out from the 1968 presidential election.  He pondered: “What 
issue is hurting Johnson the most right now in Texas—civil rights and riots, inflation, 
Vietnam?”  He proposed the answer: “Civil rights and riots.  Next, we think, is inflation.  
Vietnam is last—though serious.”  West explained: “Texans like a ‘strong’ president.  
The majority do not think he has been firm enough on civil rights and lawlessness.  By 
the same reasoning, they would like for him to be even firmer on Vietnam.  Texans, 
basically very patriotic, go to bat willingly when this country engages in any conflict.  
But they like to win it, and go home.”  The journalist’s observation suggests that by late 
1967 most Texans equated urban riots and Black Power with the civil rights movement, a 
troubling development for LBJ.23  
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 In November, the Dallas Times-Herald reported on its recent survey of the Texas 
Congressional delegation regarding Texans’ attitudes toward LBJ.  “Almost all of the 
congressmen cited voter discontent over the Vietnam war, urban violence and higher 
taxes.”  For example, “Rep. Olin E. Teague, D, said voter displeasure with the Vietnam 
War and Great Society programs is outweighing any sympathy for Johnson’s problems.”  
Furthermore, “The dean of Texas congressmen, Rep. Wright Patman, D, said he believes 
concern over Vietnam would be balanced by Johnson’s work in the Great Society.  
Teague, however, said he found voters upset about duplication and waste in antipoverty 
programs.”24 
 In the late fall of 1967, John Connally announced that he would not seek a fourth 
term as governor.  Following Connally’s decision, an editorial in the Dallas Morning 
News praised the governor’s service to Texas.  “His 3-term administration has lifted the 
state to higher levels in education, highway development, the administration of welfare, 
in traffic safety, race relations, tourist income and industrial expansion.”  The editorial 
commented on Connally’s firm political control over the state.  “Politically, he avoided 
the extremes of visionary liberalism, on the left, and stultifying reaction on the right.  He 
succeeded in his original purpose: To strengthen control by conservatives and moderates 
with a ‘fusion front’ which would direct Texas along a path of sound progressivism.”  
Lastly, in a subtle criticism of LBJ and the Great Society, the Dallas Morning News 
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noted: “Foremost in his mind has been a personal determination to protect states’ rights 
against the tidal waves of federal erosion.”25 
 In a Washington Post article, journalists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak 
surmised that John Connally’s decision not to seek a fourth term as governor would hurt 
LBJ’s chances of carrying Texas in the 1968 election.  “There is no true successor to 
Connally, and therein lies the reason why his retirement threatens Mr. Johnson.  
Connally, essentially a conservative but commanding support across the political 
spectrum, has for six years thwarted the inevitable evolution of one-party Democratic 
Texas into a two-party Texas of conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats.  With 
him gone, the evolutionary process resumes.”26 
 Marianne Means, a Washington journalist who wrote a regular political column, 
analyzed the impact of Connally’s retirement on LBJ’s political future and the fractured 
Texas Democratic Party.  She contemplated: “President Johnson and Texas Gov. John 
Connally are so intimately identified with each other that most voters assume they 
operate in political tandem.”  Means noted that although this had not always been true, as 
the two leaders often had disagreed in the past, recent developments illustrated their close 
ties.  She explained: “Gov. Connally’s pending retirement is causing a multitude of 
horrendous problems for the president in his home state.  The Democrats are heading into 
a messy primary which almost certainly will leave the party in disarray for the general 
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election.  The squabbling that has already surfaced indicates the Democrats are so wildly 
divided a Republican may even sneak into the statehouse for the first time in memory.  
And certainly without Connally on the ballot the 1968 Johnson-Humphrey ticket is 
considerably weakened in Texas.”27  Pundits recognized that although he could be 
controversial, Connally wielded great political power in his state. 
 
A Tumultuous Year Begins 
 In retirement LBJ reflected: “I recall vividly the frustration and genuine anguish I 
experienced so often during the final year of my administration.  I sometimes felt that I 
was living in a continuous nightmare.”28  Indeed, 1968 proved to be a nightmare for the 
entire country.   
In late January 1968, on the Vietnamese New Year of Tet, North Vietnamese and 
National Liberation Front (NLF or Vietcong) forces launched a massive attack on thirty-
four provincial capitals and numerous other cities across South Vietnam.  Television 
images of Vietcong guerrillas reaching the grounds of the U.S. embassy in Saigon 
shocked Americans.  Ultimately, U.S. and South Vietnamese soldiers repelled the attacks 
across the region and inflicted major damage upon the enemy combatants.  However, the 
Tet Offensive proved a devastating psychological blow to the American public.  LBJ’s 
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prior pronouncements of progress in Vietnam appeared completely baseless and without 
merit in the wake of such a large-scale, highly coordinated assault.29 
After the Tet Offensive, a couple from Big Spring, Texas, voiced the views of 
many Texans on the Vietnam War.  They extolled the president: “We want to either ‘get 
in or get out’ of Southeast Asia.  It is time to forget diplomacy and politics and take a 
positive course of action in one direction or the other, putting the welfare of this country 
ahead of all other considerations.”30 
 The Tet Offensive convinced many Americans that the Vietnam War could not be 
won and that the U.S. should reevaluate its foreign policy in Southeast Asia.  LBJ keenly 
understood that the conflict threatened his political future.  Chief of Staff Marvin Watson 
later remembered: “The president despised the war.  It was killing Americans.  It was 
destroying his dreams for a Great Society by sucking up immense amounts of money.  
Simultaneously, as he realized more than anyone else, it was causing the disintegration of 
his public approval and thus his ability to lead the nation.  Nevertheless, it was his 
conviction . . . that the well-being and safety of America from the worldwide ambitions 
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of hostile Communist governments required the United States to continue the Vietnam 
struggle.”31 
Domestic problems also intensified.  Following the urban violence during the 
summer of 1967, LBJ had appointed a bipartisan commission led by Illinois Governor 
Otto Kerner to study the race riots and recommend actions to prevent future upheavals.  
The Kerner Commission issued its report in February 1968, arguing that an underlying 
racism that divided the United States into separate white and black societies served as the 
primary cause of the riots.  The report called for massive increases in federal spending to 
alleviate the poverty which plagued urban black ghettos.  The Kerner Commission’s 
finding infuriated LBJ, who believed it failed to credit him for his administration’s efforts 
to combat racism and economic inequality.  Johnson further knew that the American 
people, already weary of his Great Society spending, would reject additional government 
aid to the poor, especially in an election year.  In anger the president ignored the Kerner 
Commission and gave little thanks to its members for their service, much to the chagrin 
of civil rights leaders.  NAACP leader Roy Wilkins later reflected on LBJ’s demeanor: “I 
think probably, maybe the word racism, white racism, frightened him.  He didn’t want to 
go down in history as the president who had pointed his finger at his own people.”32 
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Even in these most trying times, a majority of Texans continued to support their 
native son president.  A poll on March 10 showed LBJ with a 51 percent approval in the 
Lone Star State, with 36 percent unfavorable, surprisingly slightly better numbers than in 
the previous fall.  However, in a telling statistic, only 37 percent of Texans approved of 
Johnson’s handling of the Vietnam War, while 48 percent disapproved.  The poll noted 
that most of those who disagreed with the president’s Vietnam policies wanted a firmer 
military response in Vietnam, rather than a withdrawal, consistent with previous samples 
of Texans’ preferred courses of action in the war.33 
LBJ faced electoral challenges from within his own party as he contemplated 
whether to seek another term in 1968.  Eugene McCarthy, an antiwar senator from 
Minnesota, won a surprising 42 percent of the vote in the New Hampshire Democratic 
primary on March 12, magnifying Johnson’s vulnerability.  Four days later, LBJ’s old 
nemesis Robert Kennedy entered the presidential race promising a departure from his 
Vietnam policy.  Interestingly, the presence of Kennedy caused some Texans to rally 
behind their native son.  LBJ received many supportive letters, telegrams, and local 
resolutions when RFK, who was deeply unpopular in Texas, announced his candidacy.  
The writers generally supported Johnson’s course in Vietnam and decried protestors as an 
annoying vocal minority of Americans.  A group of Democrats from El Paso sent LBJ a 
message following Kennedy’s entrance in the contest.  Capturing the mood of many 
Texans, they exclaimed: “We are John Connally people.  We stand with you now and 
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will stand with you at the convention, during the election, and as individuals.  [We] are 
against Robert Kennedy, McCarthy, and the devil himself.”34 
In a telephone conversation with Wilbur Mills, LBJ discussed his unpopularity 
among many Congressional Democrats during these difficult days: “Other people which 
represent a majority of the senators and a good block of Democrats in the House—not the 
southerners and not the Republicans, but a good block of Democrats—tell me that I’m 
not doing near enough in the cities and I’m not providing leadership and the country’s 
going to burn down and all this kind of stuff and I didn’t endorse the Civil Disorders 
Report.  Therefore they’ve got to have a change, and I’m responsible for the crime, and 
all this stuff that Bobby Kennedy’s talking about.”35 
Although a frequent critic of the administration, John Tower mostly remained an 
ally to the White House on Vietnam.  The Texas Republican recalled: “In the darkest 
days of the Vietnam War, Johnson paid me what was, for him, the ultimate compliment: 
‘John, I get more loyalty and support from you than I do from the members of my own 
party.’”  Lady Bird Johnson in her diary similarly noted Tower’s support: “Lyndon and I 
watched Senator John Tower for the Republicans and Senator Joe Clark for the 
Democrats on television—the Today show—talking about Vietnam.  What a twist of fate 
it is to see the Administration—indeed us—being explained, backed—yes, even 
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defended—by John Tower, while that red-hot Democrat Joe Clark slashes at the 
Administration’s policy with rancor and emotion.  The wheel does turn.”36 
On March 31 (ironic in light of what would occur later this evening), the Dallas 
Morning News printed an article titled “The Mood of Texas.”  The piece provided quotes 
from residents throughout the state and analyzed how they felt about the current times: 
Most of all they [Texans] are troubled about the war in Vietnam—the 
long, nagging war that has begun to strike closer to home. 
They are troubled about a weakness—a weakness they are not accustomed 
to knowing.  They see no clear victory possible in Vietnam.  They see weakness 
in the cities where riots have left death and destruction.  They experience 
weakness in the dollars they earn.  They sense weakness in the nation’s 
leadership. . . . 
Many Texans who only yesterday cried out for a tough, all-out assault in 
Vietnam in order to achieve total victory today are tempering their opinions.  Now 
they would welcome some kind of honorable peace so the boys of America could 
come home and the nation could get on with its other business. 
Most Texans interviewed want Negroes to get better breaks in jobs and to 
become educated.  But they are losing patience with those who riot, and those 
who permit riots.  Many are convinced the riots are inspired and led by 
Communists. . . . 
There was also a surprisingly large number, perhaps a fourth of those 
interviewed, who believe the country’s problems are deeper even than the war in 
Vietnam, the reporter found. 
“These people talked in terms of moral deterioration, personal and 
corporate greed, departure from Christian precepts and a general feeling that the 
country has lost its sense of purpose and direction because of too many goals that 
compete with and detract from the national sense of unity and oneness,” he said.37 
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 Longtime aide Horace Busby reflected upon LBJ during these tumultuous days: 
“America’s agonies abroad and torments at home were centering squarely on him.  He 
stood at the eye of a strange and swirling storm of unrest and division, and with him 
stood the future of the office he held, the nation he led, and the causes he had chosen to 
champion in the world.”38 
  
LBJ’s March 31 Announcement 
LBJ faced a crossroads.  In addition to his numerous political problems, Johnson 
worried about his health and whether he could physically survive another term in office.39  
On Sunday evening, March 31, 1968, LBJ gave a televised address to the nation.  He 
announced a bombing halt over most of North Vietnam to encourage the North 
Vietnamese to begin productive negotiations for peace with the United States, and 
acknowledged the division the war had brought to the country.  Johnson concluded his 
speech with a revelation that shocked the political world: 
There is division in the American house now. There is divisiveness among 
us all tonight. And holding the trust that is mine, as President of all the people, I 
cannot disregard the peril to the progress of the American people and the hope 
and the prospect of peace for all peoples. 
So, I would ask all Americans, whatever their personal interests or 
concern, to guard against divisiveness and all its ugly consequences. 
Fifty-two months and 10 days ago, in a moment of tragedy and trauma, the 
duties of this office fell upon me. I asked then for your help and God’s, that we 
might continue America on its course, binding up our wounds, healing our 
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history, moving forward in new unity, to clear the American agenda and to keep 
the American commitment for all of our people. 
United we have kept that commitment. United we have enlarged that 
commitment. 
Through all time to come, I think America will be a stronger nation, a 
more just society, and a land of greater opportunity and fulfillment because of 
what we have all done together in these years of unparalleled achievement. 
Our reward will come in the life of freedom, peace, and hope that our 
children will enjoy through ages ahead. 
What we won when all of our people united just must not now be lost in 
suspicion, distrust, selfishness, and politics among any of our people. 
Believing this as I do, I have concluded that I should not permit the 
Presidency to become involved in the partisan divisions that are developing in this 
political year. 
With America’s sons in the fields far away, with America’s future under 
challenge right here at home, with our hopes and the world’s hopes for peace in 
the balance every day, I do not believe that I should devote an hour or a day of my 
time to any personal partisan causes or to any duties other than the awesome 
duties of this office—the Presidency of your country. 
Accordingly, I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my 
party for another term as your President.40 
 
LBJ’s withdrawal stunned the country and signaled the end of an era for the Texas 
Democratic Party.  A Texan had possessed a powerful leadership role in Washington 
since the days of John Nance Garner and Sam Rayburn.  With LBJ’s exit from politics, 
plus Connally’s decision not to seek reelection as governor, a power vacuum suddenly 
arrived in the state party, which many Texas Democrats feared could hurt its long term 
viability.  Ben Barnes later argued: 
The reality was, Texas Republicans had been biding their time until 
Johnson and Connally were gone—and they’d never been shy about saying so.  In 
July of 1967, before either man had yet bowed out of politics, Republican state 
Senator Henry Grover had practically foamed at the mouth while talking about the 
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possibilities for his party when those two were gone.  “Texas, like most states of 
the South and West, is going Republican,” Grover told a group of party 
supporters.  “The only thing that keeps Texas Democratic is that President 
Johnson is from Texas.”  A former Democrat himself, Grover evoked a groan 
from the audience when he talked about the Democrats nominating either Bobby 
Kennedy or Vice President Humphrey in Johnson’s stead.  “That makes 
conservative Democrats groan just as much as you—don’t think it doesn’t,” he 
said.41 
 
 
What is Happening to Our Country? 
 LBJ hoped his removal from the presidential race would allow the country to 
work toward peace at home and abroad.  Yet subsequent events of turmoil and tragedy 
only exacerbated a feeling of ominousness permeating American society.  On April 4, 
just days after Johnson’s speech, a white supremacist assassinated Martin Luther King, 
Jr., sparking riots in cities across the country.  John Connally did not help matters when 
he remarked to members of the press: “Much of what Martin Luther King said and much 
of what he did, many of us could violently disagree with, but none of us should have 
wished him this kind of fate.”  Connally callously surmised: “He contributed much to the 
chaos and the strife and the confusion and the uncertainty of this country, but whatever 
his actions, he deserved not the fate of assassination.”  Ben Barnes later described 
Connally’s comments as “about as tone-deaf a statement as anyone could possibly have 
made.”42 
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As had been the case with John Kennedy’s death and the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, LBJ employed King’s martyrdom to cajole Congress to pass stalled legislation.  A 
week after King’s slaying, Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (commonly 
termed the Fair Housing Act) into law, which prohibited racial discrimination in the sale 
and rental of housing.  The issue of fair housing remained controversial, however.  
George Bush voted in favor of the legislation and received much criticism in his Houston 
district.  He told a supporter: “I am being fitted for my lead underwear,” and encountered 
angry constituents in contentious meetings back home.  In a letter to a friend, Bush wrote: 
“The roof is falling in—boy does the hatred surface.  I have had more mail on this subject 
than on Viet Nam and Taxes and sex all put together.  Most of the mail has been highly 
critical of my vote—emotional and mean—but a little has been reassuring.”  While Bush 
convinced some people of the worthiness of the law by noting that soldiers of all races 
were fighting and dying in Vietnam, many remained skeptical.43   
Tragedy struck again just two months after the King assassination when a 
disturbed Jordanian gunman murdered Robert Kennedy just moments after his dramatic 
victory in the California presidential primary.  Lady Bird Johnson recalled the terrible 
feelings of anxiety following RFK’s assassination.  “Very early in the morning . . . 
Senator Mansfield came in. . . .  He had a staring look in his eyes.  He said, ‘What is 
happening to our country?’  The feeling of being a sleepwalker in a dream persisted.”  
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She continued: “All day long I had heard this cacophony over and over—the reactions of 
people questioned.  What is our country coming to?  What is happening to us?  Are we a 
sick society?”44 
A woman from Irving, Texas, wrote LBJ to express her view on violence in 
American society.  Robert Kennedy’s murder horrified her, and she blamed liberal 
leaders for creating a culture of permissiveness.  “I feel as many do, our nation is not 
sick, we just need to be able to punish those who are wrong, we have more than ample 
laws in our books to curb violators.  All we need is for the President, the Supreme Court 
and some of our senators to quit trying to tell our professional law enforcement officers 
what laws should and should not be enforced.  One main cause of the breakdown of law 
and violence is the criminal-coddling decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.”  She 
lamented: “I’m sorry to say ever since Earl Warren was appointed chief justice of the 
Supreme Court, respect for law has deteriorated with osmotic retrogression.”45 
 
Summer Politics 
Lieutenant Governor Preston Smith, a conservative from Lubbock, triumphed 
over a crowded field in the Texas Democratic gubernatorial primary to become 
Connally’s likely successor.  The New York Times editorialized that Smith’s nomination 
meant that Texas had moved to the right politically: “Mr. Smith stressed ‘law and order,’ 
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which has become a popular catchall theme for conservative candidates appealing this 
year to voters displeased by Negro militants, rebellious students and other disturbers of 
the status quo.”  The newspaper further commented: “The Texas Democratic party, 
which traditionally has been an umbrella for every political opinion from radical to 
reactionary, is slowly breaking apart as the repeated victories of Republican Senator John 
Tower and of other GOP candidates demonstrate.”46 
 In July, Joe Belden, Director of “The Texas Poll,” analyzed how white Texans 
viewed African Americans and the civil rights movement.  In a positive development, he 
wrote that Anglo Texans had dramatically increased their acceptance of blacks as equals 
over the course of LBJ’s presidency.  “Today, for instance, eight out of ten white adults 
accept Negroes’ riding in the same section of trains and buses; only half accepted it four 
years ago.  The change has been as marked in accepting Negroes in the same restaurants 
(73 percent now, and only 40 percent in 1963) and in the same hotels (66 percent now, 
and only 36 percent in 1963).”  However, Belden noted some areas where white attitudes 
had experienced little change.  “Majorities continue to reject mixing of the races in 
swimming pools, in social gatherings in their own homes, as next-door neighbors, and as 
college roommates.”  Furthermore, 63 percent of white Texans believed the Johnson 
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administration was moving too fast with integration in 1968, up from 54 percent in 
1965.47 
 During the summer of 1968, Chief Justice Earl Warren announced his retirement 
from the Supreme Court, providing LBJ with an opportunity to ensure its leadership 
remained in the hands of a liberal judge.  On July 9, Frederick Panzer sent a memo to 
LBJ detailing Americans’ declining opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, as noted by an 
upcoming Gallup Poll.  “Public attitudes toward the Supreme Court are now unfavorable 
by a 3 to 2 margin.  A year ago, the public was evenly divided on the job the Court was 
doing. . . .  Groups less favorably disposed to the Court are Republicans, Southerners, and 
older persons.”48  The famous Christian evangelist Billy Graham expressed this attitude 
when he wrote LBJ regarding the Court vacancy.  “It is my prayer that you will give 
serious consideration to balancing the Court with a strong conservative as Chief Justice.  
I am convinced that many of the problems that have plagued America in the last few 
years are a direct result of some of the extreme rulings of the Court, especially in the field 
of criminology.”  Interestingly, Graham suggested LBJ appoint John Connally.49 
 Instead Johnson nominated his old friend Justice Abe Fortas, a strong liberal on 
the Court.  Fortas’s confirmation hearings proved contentious, as a coalition of senators 
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led by Strom Thurmond of South Carolina voiced the concerns of many conservative 
Americans who had grown wary of the liberal Warren Court.  Ultimately, Fortas 
withdrew his nomination and the Senate decided to wait for the result of the upcoming 
presidential election to choose Warren’s succcessor.  In his memoirs LBJ recalled his 
frustration with the failure of the Fortas nomination:  
The truth is that Abe Fortas was too progressive for the Republicans and 
the Southern conservatives in the Senate, all of whom were horrified at the 
thought of a continuation of the philosophy of the Warren court.  The opposition 
was strengthened by the fact that the Republicans and the Southerners were 
convinced that Richard Nixon, if elected, would choose a conservative Chief 
Justice. . . . 
The Fortas incident left me with a sense of deep foreboding.  I feared the 
Congress’ action would eventually lead to a conservative Court, a reversal of the 
philosophy of the Warren court, and a dissipation of the forward legislative 
momentum we had achieved during the previous eight years.  In the end, the 
result of the 1968 Presidential election foreshadowed such a swing to the right, 
and it came as the final blow to an unhappy, frustrating year.50 
 
 
The Democratic National Convention Drama 
 The 1968 Democratic National Convention, held in late August in Chicago, 
turned out to be a disaster for the party.  Drama played out both inside and outside the 
halls of the meeting.  Following a primary marked by LBJ’s withdrawal and RFK’s 
murder, Hubert Humphrey beat Eugene McCarthy for the presidential nomination, but 
not before a bitter fight over the party’s platform on the Vietnam War.  Connally led the 
Texas delegation, and in a private meeting, harangued Humphrey into supporting a plank 
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endorsing the administration’s policy on Vietnam.  Outside the convention antiwar 
demonstrators clashed with Chicago police officers.  Television cameras broadcast 
images of bloodied journalists and protestors in the streets of Chicago and delegates 
screaming at each other inside the hall.  Some LBJ aides threatened to draft Johnson as a 
candidate if Humphrey failed to maintain control of the convention.  Ben Barnes believed 
LBJ did not want to run again, but the president desired merely to be asked, to be needed.  
Barnes recollected how painful the whole convention was for the Texas delegation: 
I didn’t believe that drafting President Johnson would have been a good 
idea, but it tore me up to see how he was being treated in that convention hall.  
This was a man who’d given his all to his country, who’d overseen the greatest 
advances in civil rights since Abraham Lincoln, and who’d done more for 
ordinary Americans than any President since FDR.  No matter what people 
thought of him personally, Lyndon Johnson was a man who truly cared about 
giving Americans a better life, and he’d put himself on the line time and time 
again to prove it.  Yet here was his own party, booing and hissing him like he was 
some kind of criminal.  It was, and remains, one of the most egregious insults ever 
perpetrated on an American President by his own party. 
 
Connally similarly remembered the dispiriting experience: “I would not forget the boos at 
the Democratic Convention that rang out with every mention of Texas, or the Texas 
delegation.”51 
Bernard Rapoport, a wealthy Texas insurance executive and longtime supporter of 
the liberal wing of the state Democratic Party, recalled the drama of the Chicago 
convention.  “It was an exciting, depressing, fascinating, and frustrating experience. . . .  I 
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was emotionally invested in the McCarthy campaign; it seemed to me literally that 
thousands of Vietnamese and American lives were at stake. . . .  Those of us on the 
McCarthy side really thought the world was going to come to an end if Gene didn’t win 
the Democratic nomination.”52 
Ben Barnes recalled the terrible toll the Vietnam War took on the Democratic 
Party and the entire United States during 1968: 
There’s just no easy way to sum up the very complicated relationship 
between the Vietnam War, the Democratic Party, and the election of 1968.  If we 
hadn’t become so mired in the war, Democrats could have run on a platform 
extolling all the strides President Johnson had made in improving lives of 
ordinary Americans, making civil rights a reality, and competing with the Soviet 
Union in the space race and Cold War.  We could have offered a message about 
keeping Americans safe at home, and of keeping the nation economically strong.  
But Vietnam thrust a dagger right through all that.  There would be no winners in 
that conflict, and the end was nowhere in sight.  Yet it was clear that we couldn’t 
simply abandon the President, and abandon the tack that the party had taken over 
the past few years, without losing a moderate voting segment that we desperately 
needed. 
In many ways, this was just a larger version of the ongoing struggle we’d 
been facing in Texas.  The only way we could win was by keeping the moderates 
and liberals together—but that task was proving more complicated than herding 
cats.53 
 
In his memoirs, LBJ reflected: “The disruptive methods of the radicals of the 
‘new left,’ at the Chicago convention and on university campuses, offended the majority 
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of American citizens and pushed them to the right.  The violence in Chicago was one of 
the greatest political assets Nixon had.”54 
LBJ aide Harry McPherson discussed Johnson’s disconnect with many youth, 
reflective of the larger “generation gap” permeating American society during the 1960s: 
“He was a poor performer on television, and for a generation raised on it, that was 
inexcusable. . . .  He was a manipulator of men, when the young were calling for 
everyone to do his own thing; a believer in institutions such as government, universities, 
business, and trade unions, when these were under constant attack on the campuses; a 
paternalist, in a time of widespread submission to youthful values and desires.”  The 
generation gap illustrated itself most clearly in the realm of foreign policy.  World War II 
and its lessons of confronting aggression abroad formed the basis of LBJ’s foreign policy 
outlook, while “to the young, the experience of the thirties and forties might as well have 
occurred during the Renaissance.”  McPherson further contemplated: “The student 
activists were helping to form a new politics in America—a more divisive and impatient 
politics, ‘radicalizing’ opinions on both sides.  Many liberal people who should have 
known better adopted the most extreme views of the student left.  Many moderate people, 
shocked by the violence, destruction of property, and anti-intellectualism of the left, 
looked to the conservatives for answers.”55 
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The Return of Richard Nixon 
 Richard Nixon, the former vice president narrowly defeated by the Kennedy-
Johnson ticket in 1960, captured the Republican presidential nomination in 1968 by 
voicing the anxieties of Americans tired of upheaval at home and abroad.  He lambasted 
LBJ’s Great Society, called for “law and order” in the United States, and claimed he 
possessed a “secret plan” to end the Vietnam War.  In his memoirs, Nixon discussed his 
criticism of LBJ’s policies: “The fatal flaw of his Great Society was precisely its 
inclination to establish massive federal programs.  The price tag was astronomical.  In 
five years, Johnson’s spending for the poor doubled, from $12.5 billion to $24.6 billion.  
Federal funds for health and education jumped by over $18 billion.”  Nixon argued: “The 
Great Society promised so much to so many that, instead of inspiring people to work hard 
to attain its goals, it made people impatient and angry when the goals were not 
immediately achieved without effort on their part.”  Such individuals were “a new 
constituency of government dependents who would always demand more than he 
[Johnson] could give.”  Nixon further lambasted the “liberal academics and bureaucrats 
steeped in the myths of the New Deal” who created Great Society policies.  Nixon 
himself resented both the creators and the recipients of such progressive reforms, and 
campaigned to win the votes of the growing number of Americans who shared his 
sentiments.56 
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 Nixon convinced Strom Thurmond, who had left the Democratic Party for the 
GOP in 1964 due to opposition to LBJ’s Civil Rights Act, to endorse him for the 
presidency.  Although he supported the civil rights laws, Nixon promised Thurmond he 
“would not make the South the whipping boy,” implying that as president he would be no 
major ally for those who sought racial equality.  A key Nixon aide noted that “Thurmond 
liked the candidate’s words about ‘balancing the Supreme Court,’ about ‘restoring state 
and local powers of government,’ about ‘preserving law and order.’”  Nixon knew that 
Thurmond’s strong political clout in the South would prove critical for his efforts to carry 
the region in the election.57 
 Nixon viewed the South as crucial for his election.  Around the time of the 1966 
midterms, Harry Dent, a political strategist from South Carolina, had convinced Nixon 
that the once-solidly Democratic South was ripe for partisan change.  Goldwater’s 1964 
campaign, while failing nationally, had convinced many southerners to take a look at the 
GOP.  Dent explained: “Down South, we new Republicans were first concerned about 
saving America from the leftward gallop of the Democratic donkey.  The national 
Republican Party was seen as the best vehicle.”  Dent argued that secondly, southerners 
had grown weary of being ignored by Democrats: “We wanted to see the Yankee 
candidates come down South and at least curtsey during election time by visiting 
Dixieland and wooing southern folks.”58 
                                                 
57Richard Nixon, RN, 304-305; and Harry S. Dent, The Prodigal South Returns 
to Power (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), 216. 
 
58Harry S. Dent, The Prodigal South Returns to Power, 6-7. 
  144 
 When Nixon gave his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention 
in Miami in August, he strove to appeal to Americans frustrated and frightened by the 
turmoil in the United States and uncertainty abroad: 
America is in trouble today not because her people have failed but because 
her leaders have failed. 
When the strongest nation in the world can be tied down for four years in 
a war in Vietnam with no end in sight; 
When the richest nation in the world can’t manage its own economy; 
When the nation with the greatest tradition of the rule of law is plagued by 
unprecedented lawlessness; 
When a nation that has been known for a century for equality of 
opportunity is torn by unprecedented racial violence;  
And when the President of the United States cannot travel abroad or to any 
major city at home without fear of a hostile demonstration—then it’s time for new 
leadership for the United States of America.59 
 
Texas would be an important state in the upcoming election.  George Wallace, the 
segregationist former Alabama governor, ran as an independent and threatened to siphon 
away votes from Nixon.  Wallace appealed to white conservatives with sheer 
demagoguery.  He promised to run over protestors if they blocked his car, referred to 
Supreme Court justices as “hypocrites” and “perverts,” and promised to end foreign aid, 
which he labeled money “poured down a rat hole.”  He claimed no difference existed 
between the two major parties, and vowed to withdraw all U.S. soldiers from Vietnam if 
he could not win the war within ninety days of taking office.  Wallace urged citizens to 
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“stand up for America” in what one prominent historian characterizes as “the politics of 
rage.”60 
Nixon campaign literature strove to convince Texans that the former vice 
president most clearly represented their political views.  Such advertisements portrayed 
the Democratic nominee as too liberal for Texans, and praised Wallace but delicately 
warned citizens that voting for him only would ensure Humphrey’s election by depriving 
Nixon of support.  One pamphlet argued: “Most Texans agree with Richard Nixon on the 
role of government.  It has been his consistent belief that we should do everything we 
possibly can to give people an opportunity to control their own lives and destinies.”  
Texas Democrats for Nixon bought newspaper space illustrating how Texans could vote 
for Nixon as president while choosing Democratic candidates for state and local offices.  
The group hoped to prevent people from voting the straight Democratic ticket.  Nixon 
labored to appeal to conservative Democrats and Wallace sympathizers in Texas.  Allan 
Shivers, the former Democratic governor of Texas who had supported the Republican 
presidential tickets in 1952, 1956, and 1960, served as national chairman of Democrats 
for Nixon.  Also leader of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Shivers maintained strong 
political influence in the Lone Star State.  He argued for Nixon as the best candidate to 
solve the nation’s domestic and international problems, and warned that voting for 
Wallace only would strengthen Humphrey.  Furthermore, John Tower proved an 
important ally for Nixon in his efforts to win Texas and other states across the South.  
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Tower, along with Strom Thurmond, especially labored at the Republican National 
Convention in Miami to solidify support for Nixon against Ronald Reagan, the first 
choice of many southern Republican delegates.61 
Harry Dent, the key architect of Nixon’s southern strategy, explained his personal 
allegiance to the Republican Party and his hope that Texans and southerners might 
renounce their historic Democratic ties: “I came to understand that national Republicans 
stood more in line with our political thinking—for individual freedom versus government 
coercion, for free enterprise versus the trend toward socialism, for a strong national 
defense, and in opposition to the principal enemy of all these—communism.”  He 
recalled the angst many conservative citizens held by the time of the 1968 election:  “In 
the 1960s under the leadership of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, it appeared to 
most conservatives that America had lost all its moorings.  The streets were filled with 
radical dissenters, cities were literally burning down, crime seemed uncontrollable, and 
the vast social programs of the Democrats were excessively expensive.”62 
 
The Election of 1968 
In September, a poll showed the presidential race close in the Lone Star State.  
Humphrey and Nixon each held about a third of the Texas electorate, while Wallace 
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claimed another fourth of Texans.  The survey noted that Humphrey “is indeed not 
assured of the traditional Democratic majority enjoyed by so many presidential 
candidates before” in Texas.  The state suffered from a fractured Democratic Party, as 
more white conservatives favored Nixon or Wallace.  Humphrey, however, did maintain 
a large advantage with Texas minorities.  Additionally, the poll declared: “In the twenty-
eight years in which The Texas Poll has kept tab on state politics seldom has one issue so 
overshadowed all others in a campaign as Vietnam does in this one.”63  Despite division 
regarding presidential preferences, Texas appeared firmly in the Democratic column for 
the gubernatorial race.  A poll released just two days later showed conservative Democrat 
Preston Smith handily beating Republican Paul Eggers for the Texas governor’s 
mansion.64 
 Lady Bird Johnson recalled the tense months before the election.  Contrasting 
emotions besieged her husband.  She remembered one specific occasion when LBJ 
reflected on the country’s mood: 
Lyndon said there were two conflicting emotions in him.  He said 
something like this: there is a great tide running—a great pendulum swinging—in 
the country.  In response to the permissiveness, the lawlessness of the day, there 
may be a great swing back toward authoritarianism and conservatism.  He said 
there would be a part of him that would welcome it . . . think it necessary.  But 
there is the other side of him that says if such a reaction happens it would set back 
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all the things he stands for, that he has fought for, that he believes in and wants—
the attacks on ignorance, poverty, and disease.  It will set us back many decades.65 
 
LBJ later wrote of his worry that the Democratic Party had exhausted much of its 
political capital with its momentous initiatives of the previous few years.  “Poll after poll 
indicated that the average voter thought we had pushed too far and too fast in social 
reform.”  Division, especially over racial issues, plagued the country in 1968.  Johnson 
continued: “The blue collar worker felt that the Democratic Party had traded his welfare 
for the welfare of the black man.  The middle class suburbanite felt that we were gouging 
him in order to pay for the antipoverty programs.  The black man, having tasted the fruits 
of equality, began demanding his rightful share of the American promise faster than most 
of the nation was willing to let him have it.”66  Wilbur J. Cohen, LBJ’s secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, in later years similarly surmised: “We tried to do too 
much in too many places in too short a time.”67 
Joe Belden’s “The Texas Poll,” released about one month before the presidential 
election, analyzed Texans’ opinions on the Vietnam War and found that they wanted 
stronger military action.  Belden concluded: “Support for the current conduct of the 
Vietnam War has been deteriorating in Texas.  The great majority, about six out of ten, 
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would push for victory in Vietnam, rather than continue the present holding action or 
begin a pull-out from the conflict.”68 
 While at times lukewarm in his support of Humphrey’s campaign, LBJ 
determined to ensure that the vice president carried Texas in November.  Many allies of 
the president, including John Connally, labored for Humphrey’s candidacy solely to 
prevent Johnson the embarrassment of the Democratic nominee losing Texas in the 
election.  Such efforts caused old enemies, most notably Connally and Ralph 
Yarborough, to suspend their animosities in an attempt to hold the state party together.  A 
Dallas Times-Herald article humorously discussed the awkward partnership between 
Connally and Yarborough in appearing together to support Humphrey at a rally in Texas: 
“Whatever produced this week’s lovefest between Gov. John Connally and Sen. Ralph 
Yarborough it was not true love.  It was a remarkable spectacle—two old adversaries 
sitting together, clapping, calling each other ‘Ralph’ and ‘John’ during Vice President 
Humphrey’s Texas tour.  But as one Republican said, ‘There is less there than meets the 
eye.’  Republicans saw it as a shotgun wedding, with Lyndon Johnson holding the muzzle 
to Connally’s back in an attempt to spare Johnson the scandal of having his own state 
produce 25 electoral votes for Richard Nixon.  Democrats saw it as a marriage of 
                                                 
68“The Texas Poll,” October 7, 1968, Office Files of Frederick Panzer, Box 178, 
LBJ Library. 
 
  150 
convenience that will last only as long as the two have a common interest—the election 
of Humphrey.”69 
 Connally recalled his tenuous support of Humphrey: “My role in the 1968 
campaign was not an active one until the final weeks and then, cranking up my own 
organization, we helped carry Texas for Hubert Humphrey.  Though it came late, the 
effort was more in the form of sparing Lyndon Johnson’s pride than electing Hubert.”70 
 Texas liberals divided over whether to support or oppose Humphrey, illustrating 
the fracturing of the Democratic Party at both national and state levels.  The editor of the 
Texas Observer urged Texans to vote against Humphrey, even at the cost of electing 
Nixon, in order to purge warmongers from the Democratic Party and guide them toward 
the GOP.  However, the magazine’s associate editor and publisher, while initially hostile 
toward Humphrey’s candidacy, eventually supported the vice president as a better choice 
for liberalism than Nixon or Wallace.71 
 Ultimately, Nixon triumphed in a close election, defeating Humphrey by just over 
500,000 votes nationally, but took 32 states, including most of the South.  Wallace 
received over 13 percent of ballots cast and carried five states in the Deep South.  
Humphrey managed to win Texas by a narrow margin, much to LBJ’s relief, earning 41 
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percent compared to Nixon’s 39 and Wallace’s 18 percent of the vote.  Nevertheless, 
fatigued from the LBJ years, the country chose Nixon as its next president. 
Ben Barnes viewed 1968 as a key turning point for the Democratic Party, both in 
Texas and nationally.  Civil rights and the Vietnam War badly divided the party.  
However, Barnes also blamed the actions of the ever-controversial Richard Nixon, who 
“had blatantly stirred up racist sentiment in the South in an effort to win votes.  His 
‘Southern Strategy,’ cooked up with the help of Texas’s own John Tower, was a cynical, 
purely partisan strategy that called for slowing the pace of desegregation, kowtowing to 
Southern Republicans and conservatives, and choosing a reactionary running mate 
[Governor Spiro Agnew of Maryland].”  The success of Nixon’s Southern Strategy had 
long-lasting results, according to Barnes.  “The Republican Party had found its new 
playbook.  This basic political strategy—divide and conquer, using the rawest, most 
emotional issues in American life as a bludgeon and wedge—is the same strategy 
Republicans continue to use today, unfortunately to great effect.”72 
 
 On January 20, 1969, Lyndon Johnson retired to Texas after watching Richard 
Nixon sworn in as president.  Exhausted from five tumultuous years in the presidency, 
LBJ nonetheless proudly defended his Great Society record and remained convinced he 
made the correct decisions in Vietnam.  Now a new White House occupant, a Republican 
who had ran against such policies, would pursue his own domestic and foreign initiatives.  
The Texas Democratic Party, although strongly in control of state government and in 
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possession of significant clout in Congress, lacked a truly national leader in Washington.  
What would the badly-divided Texas Democratic Party look like in the post-LBJ era?  In 
later years Harry McPherson concluded about Lyndon Johnson and his dramatic times: 
“He finished the old agenda, and by painful example taught us something about the 
new.”73 
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CHAPTER 5 
“The New Majority We Had Only Dreamed of”: 
Nixon, the Southern Strategy, and Texas, 1969-1972 
 
 The desire for reelection in 1972 obsessed Richard Nixon from the moment he 
entered the White House in January 1969.  He resolved to assert his political will over the 
nation’s many domestic and international problems, thereby creating an impression of 
strong presidential leadership that would reap political rewards for him and the 
Republican Party.  Nixon particularly had an interest in the state of Texas and its electoral 
votes, which had eluded him in both 1960 and 1968.  He believed that building a viable 
GOP in the Lone Star State could change the country’s political course dramatically. 
 
Nixon’s Plan for a Republican Majority 
Upon becoming president, Richard Nixon determined to voice, and to exploit for 
political gain, the resentments of Americans weary of the turmoil of the previous years. 
As in the presidential campaign, he blamed his Democratic predecessors for the nation’s 
woes.  Nixon recalled in his memoirs: “As I saw it, America in the 1960s had undergone 
a misguided crash program aimed at using the power of the presidency and the federal 
government to right past wrongs by trying to legislate social progress.  This was the idea 
behind Kennedy’s New Frontier and Johnson’s Great Society.”  Nixon blamed such 
policies for “raising hopes they proved unable to fulfill,” and lambasted the inefficiencies 
of the welfare system.  The president also especially criticized the “mindless rioters and 
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professional malcontents” whom he claimed “spawned an intolerance for the rights and 
opinions of those who disagreed with the vocal minority.”  Nixon asserted: “I was ready 
to take a stand on these social and cultural issues; I was anxious to defend the ‘square’ 
virtues.”  He planned to enact a “New Federalism,” shifting more power to state 
governments and away from the national bureaucracy.1 
In early 1969, Kevin Phillips, a Nixon campaign aide, completed The Emerging 
Republican Majority.  Phillips argued that Nixon’s election in 1968 “bespoke the end of 
the New Deal Democratic hegemony and the beginning of a new era in American 
politics” marked by Republican domination.  He maintained that the southern, 
southwestern, and western states, which he termed the “Sun Belt,” would serve as the 
base of power for the GOP’s electoral victories.  The Emerging Republican Majority 
received much acclaim, and accurately foreshadowed the course of American politics, as 
the ensuing decades would prove.  Newsweek termed it “the political bible of the Nixon 
era.”  The president particularly loved the book, which applauded his 1968 campaign’s 
southern strategy as a method for future GOP successes.2 
 Phillips described how Democrats allegedly lost favor in the eyes of the American 
public.  He contended: “The principal force which broke up the Democratic (New Deal) 
coalition is the Negro socioeconomic revolution and liberal Democratic ideological 
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inability to cope with it.”  LBJ’s policies held significant blame, as “Democratic ‘Great 
Society’ programs aligned that party with many Negro demands, but the party was unable 
to defuse the racial tension sundering the nation.”  Moreover, “the general opposition 
which deposed the Democratic Party came in large part from prospering Democrats who 
objected to Washington dissipating their tax dollars on programs which did them no 
good.  The Democratic Party fell victim to the ideological impetus of a liberalism which 
had carried it beyond programs taxing the few for the benefit of the many (the New Deal) 
to programs taxing the many on behalf of the few (the Great Society).” 
 Phillips predicted a Republican majority for years to come.  He discussed: “In all 
likelihood, 1968 marks the beginning of an era of decentralizing government, whereby 
Washington can regain the public confidence.”  According to Phillips, in 1968 this new 
majority voted “for a shift away from the sociological jurisprudence, moral 
permissiveness, experimental residential, welfare, and educational programming, and 
massive federal spending by which the Liberal (mostly Democratic) Establishment 
sought to propagate liberal institutions and ideology—and all the while reap growing 
economic benefits.”  Former Democrats, now more inclined to support Republicans, 
“were principally alienated from their party by its social programs and increasing 
identification with the Northeastern Establishment and ghetto alike.”  Phillips further 
proposed that Wallace voters in 1968 held much more sympathy for Nixon and the GOP 
than Humphrey and the Democrats.  In his view, Nixon would have won by a larger 
margin had Wallace not been in the contest, and specifically would have carried Texas.   
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Texas, on the outer edge of the South and in the center of the Sun Belt, would be a 
critical segment of the new Republican majority according to the author.  Phillips 
forecast: “Without third-party interference, Texas (25 electoral votes) will support 
moderate conservative national Republicanism against Northern Democratic liberalism.”  
A booming economy and warm climate lured new residents to the Lone Star State.  “The 
drift of middle-class Americans to the South and West is also one of the nation’s major 
political trends.  Thirty years ago, the rich oil towns of Odessa and Midland barely 
existed, but since then, rapid urbanization has created a fiercely conservative two-county 
metropolitan area of nearly two hundred thousand people.” 
 The Sun Belt marked the most promising region of the nation for Phillips, both 
economically and politically.  He concluded: “The American future lies in a revitalized 
countryside, a demographically ascendant Sun Belt and suburbia, and new towns. . . .  
The 1968 election returns were barely final before Richard Nixon announced that he was 
transferring his voting residence from New York to Florida, and picked a cabinet notably 
short on representatives of the Northeastern Establishment.  And the Democrats waited 
only a little longer to replace Louisiana’s Earl Long with Massachusetts’s Edward 
Kennedy as their Senate Whip.  A new era has begun.”3 
 To help build a new Republican majority, Nixon quickly named Harry Dent of 
South Carolina, the architect of his 1968 southern strategy, to his White House staff.  
Dent recalled: “The fact that I was so closely identified with [Senator Strom] Thurmond 
could—and did—create an impression that Thurmond was going to wield a strong 
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influence on Nixon.  This would be proof that there were deals made with the southern 
GOP and that there was indeed a Nixon Southern Strategy.”4 
Texas seemed ripe for Nixon’s goals.  In the months after Nixon’s election, Ben 
Barnes reflected upon how national Democrats felt about their Texas counterparts.  He 
had been contemplating a future run for the U.S. Senate, believing he could redeem the 
state’s position in the party: “There might be a possibility that I could consolidate the 
South and the Southwest, so at least they wouldn’t just ride us out of the party—which, 
right now, is what most of the people in national party leadership roles want to do to us.  
They’re mad at Johnson and they’re mad at the South and at the attitudes in the South.”  
Barnes further explained: “Texas needs political influence.  We’re at the lowest point, I 
think, in the history of our state—or at least since the turn of the century.”5 
 John Tower similarly confessed: “A number of Lyndon’s friends have told me 
that they feel they can now identify with us.  I think the centralization of leadership 
power in the hands of the very liberal element nationally, in the Democratic Party, is 
going to drive them into our party, without our doing anything in a positive way to attract 
them.”6 
In September 1969, Robert Baskin of the Dallas Morning News decried the 
alleged abandonment of conservatives by the national Democratic Party.  He questioned 
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how much longer conservative Democratic leaders in Texas would take such treatment, 
especially given that many had remained loyal to the party in 1968 despite wariness of 
Hubert Humphrey’s nomination.  The conservative columnist angrily wrote: 
The national party in the last few years has been going through a period of 
tremendous change.  A good part of the old “Solid South” has been written off in 
the process.  The party now appears to want its principal identity to lie with the 
ethnic minorities, the wayward youth groups, and the northern latter-day 
abolitionists. 
The main point of all this may be how many times do you have to be hit 
over the head to learn you are out of place in the club? 
The humiliation John B. Connally and his delegation experienced at the 
Chicago convention should have been adequate evidence that the party they had 
known in the past was dead and buried.7 
 
 In a widely-covered example of the southern strategy, Nixon traveled to 
Fayetteville, Arkansas, on December 6, 1969, to watch a football game between the 
University of Arkansas and the University of Texas.  Yet this was no regular college 
football game.  Both teams were undefeated and consisted of all-white rosters.  Often 
heralded as “the Game of the Century,” the Longhorns dramatically defeated the 
Razorbacks by a score of 15-14, and after the game, Nixon presented Coach Darrell 
Royal with a plaque declaring Texas the national champions of college football.  The 
1969 Texas Longhorns were the last all-white national championship team.  Coveting the 
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electoral votes of Texas, Arkansas, and other southern states, Nixon shrewdly made his 
presence known at what became an iconic game in the region’s most popular sport.8 
 
The Silent Majority Speech 
The Vietnam War remained the nation’s most divisive issue.  On the campaign 
trail, Nixon had claimed to possess a “secret plan” to end the conflict, but as the first year 
of his presidency drew to a close, this promise appeared empty.  Henry Kissinger, a 
Harvard University political scientist, served as national security advisor and later 
secretary of state.  Together Nixon and Kissinger developed what became known as 
“Vietnamization,” a process of incrementally withdrawing American soldiers and 
transferring more military responsibility to the South Vietnamese.  Yet Nixon doggedly 
pursued what he called “peace with honor,” a secure and independent South Vietnam.  
On October 15, 1969, two million Americans participated in a “Moratorium” against the 
Vietnam War, taking to the streets to urge the president to end the conflict and bring U.S. 
soldiers home.  Life magazine labeled the Moratorium “the largest expression of public 
dissent ever seen in this country.”  Americans from all parts of the land, of differing ages 
and backgrounds, abandoned their daily duties and joined in the protests.9  
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The Moratorium threatened to upend the administration’s Vietnam policy, and the 
president feverishly worked on a critical speech to regain political momentum.  On 
November 3, 1969, just approximately two weeks after the Moratorium, Nixon addressed 
the nation from the White House in what became known as the “Silent Majority” speech, 
one of the most significant of his presidency.  He announced his determination “to 
continue fighting until the Communists agreed to negotiate a fair and honorable peace or 
until the South Vietnamese were able to defend themselves on their own—whichever 
came first.”  Vietnamization would continue uninterrupted, however.  Nixon concluded 
with an appeal: “And so tonight—to you, the great silent majority of my fellow 
Americans—I ask for your support.”  By directly employing the term “silent majority,” 
he continued his political goal of voicing and exploiting the frustrations of those 
Americans weary of unrest and protests in the country.  “Silent majority” became a rubric 
for conservative Americans.10 
Nixon’s “Silent Majority” speech was a smashing success with the public, with 77 
percent of Americans voicing favor.  The White House received a record 50,000 
telegrams and 30,000 letters in the following days, the majority of which expressed 
support for the president’s course of action in Vietnam.  Nixon proudly exhibited stacks 
of these messages in the Oval Office.  His approval rating rose to 68 percent, its highest 
point yet.  For the time being, despite the Moratorium, most citizens and members of 
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Congress were willing to grant the administration time for its policies in Southeast Asia 
to work.11 
 
Nixon, Civil Rights, and Benign Neglect 
In early 1970, Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote Nixon: “The time may have come 
when the issue of race could benefit from a period of ‘benign neglect.’”  A key architect 
of domestic policy during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, Moynihan served as 
leader of Nixon’s Urban Affairs Council, and was not afraid to criticize policies he found 
problematic.  In 1965, he authored a controversial report for the Department of Labor 
titled “The Negro Family: A Call to Action.”  Moynihan blamed much of the poverty in 
African American communities on the instability of black families, which he claimed 
often lacked an adult male in their households.  While many conservatives praised the 
Moynihan Report, liberal antipoverty activists castigated its emphasis on cultural rather 
than economic structures.  Nixon found Moynihan’s willingness to critique liberal 
positions appealing, and convinced him to join his staff.  Moynihan suggested to the 
president that race “has been too much talked about.  The forum has been too much taken 
over by hysterics, paranoids, and boodlers on all sides.  We may need a period in which 
Negro progress continues and racial rhetoric fades.”  The Nixon White House adopted 
this controversial strategy of “benign neglect” toward civil rights, which merged well 
with its “southern strategy” of reaching out to white voters.  Nixon sensed that the 
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expanding national backlash against the civil rights movement could continue to benefit 
him politically, as it had in 1968.12 
 
The Haynsworth and Carswell Nominations 
 Conservatives often lambasted the rulings of the Supreme Court during the 1960s 
and 1970s, especially its declarations on matters of civil rights, privacy, and crime.  A 
critic himself, Nixon believed his appointments could bring a more conservative bent to 
the nation’s judiciary, and also win the approbation of the silent majority.  With this in 
mind, and in a nod to the southern strategy, on August 18, 1969, Nixon nominated Judge 
Clement F. Haynsworth of South Carolina to the Supreme Court.  The Haynsworth 
selection proved contentious, as allegations of financial improprieties and support of 
segregation plagued the judge.  On November 21, the Senate rejected Haynsworth by a 
vote of 55 to 45.  Determined to appoint a southerner to the Supreme Court, Nixon next 
nominated Judge G. Harrold Carswell of Florida.  Carswell became as problematic as 
Haynsworth, troubled by claims of judicial “mediocrity” and racism against African 
Americans.  The Senate rejected his nomination on April 8, 1970, 51 to 45.  Following 
the failure of the Carswell selection, in a hasty television speech Nixon angrily stated:  
I have reluctantly concluded that it is not possible to get confirmation for a 
Judge on the Supreme Court of any man who believes in the strict construction of 
the Constitution, as I do, if he happens to come from the South. . . . 
When you strip away all the hypocrisy, the real reason for their rejection 
was their legal philosophy, a philosophy that I share, of strict construction of the 
Constitution, and also the accident of their birth, the fact that they were born in 
the South. . . . 
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And I have concluded, therefore, that the next nominee must come from 
outside the South, since this Senate, as it is presently constituted, will not approve 
a man from the South who shares my views of strict construction of the 
Constitution. . . . 
I understand the bitter feelings of millions of Americans who live in the 
South about the act of regional discrimination that took place in the Senate 
yesterday.  They have my assurance that the day will come when men like Judge 
Carswell and Haynsworth can and will sit on the high court.13 
 
 While infuriated by the rejection of his Supreme Court nominees, Nixon saw a 
silver lining to the ordeal.  He had illustrated his willingness to defend the South and 
conservative Americans against the liberal establishment.  Harry Dent discussed the 
outcome of the failed nominations of Haynsworth and Carswell: “Richard Nixon was a 
hero in the South. . . .  No action by the president did more to cement the sinews of the 
southern strategy.”  Dent also described: “The sides of Richard Nixon that repelled many 
in the Northeast—his anticommunism, his prosecution of Alger Hiss, his stands for 
strong national security and foreign policy objectives—were his biggest attractions in the 
South.”14 
 
Bentsen Challenges Yarborough 
Ralph Yarborough, Texas’s senior senator, faced reelection in 1970.  
Yarborough’s liberal views, particularly on the Vietnam War, disturbed many Texans, as 
did his votes against the Haynsworth and Carswell nominations.  On January 6, 1970, 
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Lloyd Bentsen, Jr., a wealthy Houston businessman who had represented the Rio Grande 
Valley in Congress during the 1950s, announced his intention to challenge Yarborough in 
the Democratic senatorial primary.  Bentsen possessed the full support of John Connally, 
who yearned to oust his longtime foe from office.   
Bentsen characterized Yarborough as out of touch with most Texans.  In a 
February meeting with reporters in Washington, Bentsen claimed Yarborough’s weak 
leadership in the Senate had cost Texas the national influence it had possessed under 
LBJ.  He criticized him for allying with Senate liberals and endorsing the Vietnam 
Moratorium.  The Dallas Morning News noted that Bentsen employed George Christian, 
a longtime ally of LBJ and Connally, as a top advisor, a sign that he held the allegiance of 
the state party establishment.  The conservative newspaper questioned “how well Bentsen 
can get along with the national Democratic Party, which is moving inexorably to the left.  
The old Southern leadership of the Senate, into which Texas Democrats could fit 
comfortably in the past, is fading out.”  However, “Yarborough has become identified 
with the liberal element, and Bentsen intends to bear down in the campaign on 
Yarborough’s associations with senators who have no love for Texas or understanding of 
its views.”15 
 Very quickly the Dallas Morning News endorsed Bentsen over the “ultraliberal” 
Yarborough in the Democratic Senate primary.  The conservative editorial board argued 
that Yarborough “should be replaced by one who is not contentious, who is not a 
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troublemaker.”  Bentsen appeared a pragmatic and unifying figure to the editorial board.  
However, “Yarborough is too preoccupied with his personal, liberal philosophy” and “out 
of step” with the majority of Texans.16 
 The Houston Post similarly voiced its selection of Bentsen in the primary.  
“Bentsen is a moderate conservative, and so are a majority of the people of this state.”  
Yarborough’s “terms in the Senate have been punctuated by repeated hassles with all 
other party leaders, regardless of their place on the political spectrum—from former Gov. 
John Connally to Rep. Henry Gonzales.”  The Post particularly contrasted the candidates’ 
opinions on the Vietnam War.  In the editors’ view, Yarborough irresponsibly supported 
the “Moratorium demonstrations and Sen. Eugene McCarthy’s candidacy for President,” 
while Bentsen wisely backed “the orderly withdrawals and negotiations advocated and 
practiced by Presidents Johnson and Nixon.”17 
Analyzing Senator Ralph Yarborough’s upcoming primary battle in 1970, 
editorialists for the liberal Texas Observer surmised: “The consensus now is that Bentsen, 
with all his money, the old Shivers machine, and the natural reactionaries behind him, 
will mount a solid challenge, but that Yarborough should take him with votes to spare.  
Bentsen, after all, is special interest personified, and Yarborough is the people’s interest 
personified.”  They believed Yarborough’s tougher opponent would be Republican 
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George Bush in the general election.  Leaving no doubt as to which candidate they 
supported, the editors proclaimed: “This man Yarborough is the substance and the soul of 
progressive politics in Texas. . . .  He has earned everything we’ve got.”18 
Many Texans did not share the viewpoint of the Texas Observer, however, and 
wanted rid of Yarborough.  Mrs. Edyth Chapan of Fort Worth wrote a letter to the editor 
of the Dallas Morning News urging: “The people of Texas and especially those with sons 
in the service of our country should do everything in their power to defeat Sen. 
Yarborough this year.”  She explained that she had a family member killed in Vietnam in 
1965, and “we were broken-hearted again and filled with disappointment and shock when 
Sen. Ralph Yarborough sent congratulatory notes and words of encouragement to the 
moratorium street marchers.”  She continued: “Like Lloyd Bentsen, we too ask: ‘Why on 
earth should a U.S. senator from Texas do anything to encourage such people?’  We were 
horrified and trembled for our country.”19 
The primary battle increasingly grew nasty and personal.  An article in Time later 
recalled the Yarborough-Bentsen race: “The primary contest was grimy even by Texas 
                                                 
18“This Man Yarborough,” Texas Observer, February 20, 1970, in Char Miller, 
ed., Fifty Years of the Texas Observer (San Antonio, Tex.: Trinity University Press, 
2004), 51-53. 
 
19Dallas Morning News, April 6, 1970, Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr., Papers, 1921-
1998, Dolph Briscoe Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin, 
Box B2. 
  167 
standards, the candidates swapping insults worthy of a saloon brawl.”20  Bentsen 
lambasted Yarborough’s criticism of Nixon’s Vietnam policies as “partisan sniping.”  
Bernard Rapoport, the prominent insurance executive and longtime supporter of liberal 
causes in Texas, remembered: 
That was a mean and dirty campaign.  Bentsen’s campaign ads showed a 
film of student protestors confronting the police outside the National Democratic 
Convention in Chicago in 1968, with the narrator stating, “Ralph Yarborough is 
against the war in Vietnam.”  Of course, there was no relationship between the 
riots and Yarborough’s position on Vietnam, but the ads implied that Ralph had 
endorsed the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and their cohorts in the 
radical left who had confronted the Chicago police.  Other ads falsely claimed that 
Ralph was an ultraliberal who opposed school prayer and supported compulsory 
school busing to advance racial integration.  That was the kind of campaign they 
ran against Ralph.21 
 
Ultimately, Bentsen defeated Yarborough in the primary 54 to 46 percent.  
Although some supporters criticized the senator for not spending more time campaigning 
in the state, most voters faulted Yarborough as not in line with Texas and the country’s 
more conservative mood in 1970.  After the losing the election, Yarborough blamed his 
vote against a school prayer proposal, which Bentsen raised in the closing days of the 
race.  The New York Times analyzed: “Mr. Bentsen had adopted President Nixon’s 
‘Southern strategy’ as a campaign tactic and it called Senator Yarborough ‘too liberal for 
Texas.’  He attacked Mr. Yarborough’s votes against Judges Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., 
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and G. Harrold Carswell for the Supreme Court, and he criticized the Senator for failing 
to vote on a bill to prohibit forced busing of pupils [to] public schools.”22 
 
Campus Unrest in Texas 
Frank Erwin ruled over the University of Texas campus during the late sixties and 
early seventies.  An Austin lawyer and former state Democratic Party chief, Erwin 
pursued controversial policies as chair of the UT Board of Regents, frequently angering 
both students and faculty.  David Richards, an attorney and longtime liberal activist, 
explained: “Frank embodied to the left . . . all the evils of the ‘good old boy’ Texas power 
structure.  He was the confidant of Johnson and Connally and wielded great power 
throughout the state.”  In October 1969, when the UT administration attempted to cut 
down an old cypress forest at Waller Creek to allow for expansion of the football 
stadium, protestors climbed up high in the trees to prevent their removal.  Erwin 
personally went to Waller Creek and ordered campus police to get “those goddamn trees 
down and arrest those dirty hippies.”  Around this time Erwin similarly tried to bar the 
distribution of the Rag, a local counterculture newspaper, from campus.  Faculty from the 
University of Texas and other schools across the country accused Erwin of infringing 
upon academic freedom and shared governance structures with his excessive involvement 
in hiring and firing of school administrators, most notably with the dismissal of John 
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Silber, dean of the UT College of Arts and Sciences.23  Kenneth Ashworth, a UT 
administrator who often found himself at odds with the regents chairman, noted: “Erwin 
was utterly unyielding in keeping students from taking over the UT Austin campus” 
during these years of upheaval in universities across the country.24 
As UT simmered with tension, on April 30, 1970, Nixon addressed the nation and 
announced a shocking expansion of the Vietnam War, ordering American forces to 
eliminate enemy sanctuaries in neighboring Cambodia.  Extending the conflict to another 
country belied Vietnamization and hopes that the war was nearing an end.  Campuses 
erupted in protest, and tragedy occurred when students at Ohio’s Kent State University 
and Mississippi’s Jackson State College died during clashes with the National Guard and 
law enforcement personnel.  The killings caused even greater demonstrations at schools 
across the country.  On May 5, the day after Kent State, protestors from the University of 
Texas descended upon the State Capitol before Austin police deployed tear gas to remove 
them from the scene.  Infuriated antiwar activists took some comfort when on May 8, a 
judge removed a prohibitive city order and allowed 20,000 demonstrators to march from 
the UT campus to the capitol building to protest the war and the shootings.  Many 
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students and faculty participated, and although not supportive, Frank Erwin and the 
administration expressed relief that the rally remained peaceful.25 
 
Bentsen versus Bush 
Once Lloyd Bentsen won the Democratic senatorial primary, he shrewdly reached 
out to liberals in an effort to unify the state party, hoping to avoid the mistakes of 
Waggoner Carr in 1966.  Bentsen visited Bernard Rapoport and J. R. Parten, two of the 
most prominent financial backers of liberal Democrats in Texas, and ultimately secured 
their support.  Jack DeVore, a longtime Bentsen aide, remembered: “He reached out to 
them [Rapoport and Parten], he reached out to labor, he reached out to traditional liberal 
Democratic constituencies.  It was the more so important because he had beaten an icon, 
a liberal icon [Ralph Yarborough].  You go back to what Waggoner Carr did when he 
was running against Tower in 1966, they pulled the same old crap, spitting in the eye of 
the vanquished in the primary under the out-of-date belief that the Democratic primary 
winner was the big winner.  Bentsen understood things had changed and that to me was 
the most important thing he did for the Democratic Party, which gave them vitality.”26  
 Rapoport recalled how Bentsen won his allegiance.  One evening Bentsen stopped 
by the Rapoport home in Waco for a candid conversation about the bruising fight with 
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Yarborough and the future of Texas politics.  The nominee’s honesty impressed the 
initially hostile Rapoport.  Bentsen maintained “that Ralph’s time had passed, that Texas 
and the nation were becoming more conservative politically, and that Texans wanted a 
moderate voice in Washington. . . .  He was not an ideologue . . . but a pragmatist in the 
tradition of Sam Rayburn, who had been his mentor during his years as a congressman.  
He wanted to get things done for Texas.”  Bentsen believed he could defeat George Bush 
in the general election, and promised “he was not John Connally’s puppet,” but was “a 
loyal Democrat who will work effectively with the party’s leaders in the Senate.”27 
 The editorial board of the Dallas Morning News supported Bentsen in the 1970 
general election.  While praising George Bush, the Republican nominee, as an impressive 
candidate, the editors chose Bentsen because most Texans considered themselves 
Democrats.  “The big majority of Texas’s 11 million people are Democrats—by heritage, 
choice and instinct—and the majority of those Democrats are in the middle between the 
reactionary right and the extreme left.  This is where Bentsen is.  If Mr. Bush is elected, 
this heavily Democratic state will have no Democrat in the United States Senate.”  
Furthermore, “If, after the November elections, the Senate is still controlled by 
Democrats, do you want those Democrats to be men like Bentsen or ultraliberals like Ted 
Kennedy?  A vote for Bentsen will make the party itself, as well as the Senate, sounder 
and more balanced.”  The newspaper noted: “Bentsen was the first candidate to take a 
firm stand against unwarranted demonstrations and the hippie-type permissiveness which 
is degrading the country’s character.”  The conservative editorial board added: “Let us 
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interject, here, that if the liberal Democrat, Ralph Yarborough, had defeated Bentsen, The 
News would have endorsed Bush.”28 
 Bush held the full support of the Nixon White House, which longed to have both 
Texas senators as Republicans.  Bush sought to bring more conservative Texans to the 
GOP.  In an address in Temple, Bush contrasted the Democratic and Republican parties: 
“My opponent is in a party whose national philosophy advocates concentrating more and 
more power in the federal government; I say it is time for new policies which will move 
power away from Washington back to the states, local governments, and the people.”29 
 Yet Bentsen invoked a similarly conservative message.  In a July speech in 
Austin, Bentsen addressed the public’s perception of government: “There’s a great 
distrust of government today, and I don’t mean just the distrust of the youngsters and the 
radicals who have ‘turned off’ the establishment. . . .  People are not satisfied with 
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inefficient, ineffective, wasteful government and they shouldn’t be.  They want 
improvements.  They want a better return on their tax dollar.”30 
Bentsen also took on complicated social issues.  In a speech in Fort Worth, he 
declared: “We seem to be bogging down in filth, both literally and figuratively. . . .  We 
are being subjected to a flood of pornography, which includes filthy movies, and to a 
terrifying increase in drug addiction and drug abuse. . . .  We need strong law 
enforcement, with swift, sure justice, backed up by our elected officials.”31 
 The prominent journalist William S. White analyzed the Bentsen-Bush race and 
Nixon’s stature in Texas.  He proposed that Texans would face a difficult choice between 
the two attractive, and conservative, Senate candidates: “The ‘silent majority’ . . . is in a 
devil of a fix.  For no state in the Union can be more wholeheartedly in support of 
President Nixon on, say the Cambodian operation.  Indeed, the net effect here of the 
President’s decision to go into Cambodia was to push him even farther up than he had 
been in popular favor.”  Few Texans sympathized with protestors on the UT campus; if 
anything, their actions caused more backing for the White House.  Nixon’s approval 
rating in Texas went from 55 to 59 percent after the Cambodia invasion announcement, 
which White noted had the support of Lyndon Johnson.  White summarized: “It is 
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perfectly plain that a large majority in this state—a state that Richard Nixon has never 
carried—is pro-Nixon because of, and not in spite of, his foreign policy attitudes.”32 
 On the campaign trail, Bentsen repeatedly made appealing political arguments to 
conservative Texans.  He promised to give the president support in foreign policy and not 
to make the Vietnam War a partisan issue.  He stressed the benefits Texas would continue 
to have by having a senator in each party, and criticized Bush for endorsing the 1968 gun 
control law and Nixon’s guaranteed income bill.  In the days before the election at a rally 
in Amarillo, Bentsen again declared: “I agree with Senator Tower’s statement in 1966 
that Texas needs a voice in both parties—but I think it is particularly important for Texas 
to have a voice in the Democratic Party, especially in these times of economic crisis and 
threats of anarchy.”  He continuously lambasted his opponent’s inconsistencies: “I think 
we need a man who will vote the same way he talks—without trying to disguise his votes 
for such things as gun control and a guaranteed annual income.”33 
 Days before the election, the Dallas Morning News repeated its endorsement of 
Bentsen.  The editorial board again stressed: “He was the first major candidate earlier in 
the spring to take a firm stand on law and order and to urge stricter measures against the 
dope traffic and those insidious groups whose avowed aim is to destroy our colleges and 
universities.”  The newspaper also reiterated one of Bentsen’s frequent arguments: 
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“Republican John Tower . . . emphasized in his last campaign (1966) that a senator from 
the minority party could give this state balanced leadership.  Does it not follow that Texas 
even more needs a senator representing the majority of the majority party?”34 
 The Houston Chronicle backed Bentsen for similar reasons: “Texans, a majority 
of whom are moderately conservative in their thinking, need a strong voice on the 
Democratic side of the Senate, especially since very liberal philosophies prevail there.  
Lloyd Bentsen will strengthen the moderate conservative thinking on the Democratic side 
of the Senate and is able and forceful enough to make his voice heard.”35 
 In the days before the election, Nixon appeared with Bush at large, energetic 
campaign rallies in Dallas and Longview.  According to political journalist Jimmy Banks, 
however, Bentsen shrewdly manipulated the Nixon-Bush alliance to his advantage: 
Bentsen had prepared well for this in advance.  He said the President was 
always welcome in Texas but that Bush had to surrender his independence in 
return for the all-out invasion of the state by the Republican administration.  He 
pictured Bush as a “coattail candidate” who would be a rubber-stamp for the 
administration, reiterating his oft-expressed theme that he would support the 
President when he felt he was right but would be free to give him responsible 
opposition when he felt he was wrong.36 
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On election day, Bentsen triumphed over Bush, 53.5 to 46.5 percent.  In his 
concession speech, Bush lamented: “Like Custer, who said there were just too many 
Indians, I guess there were just too many Democrats.”  Political observer Jimmy Banks 
analyzed the change in Texas Democrats’ fortunes from the 1968 to 1970 elections.  He 
maintained that “the surprising amount of unity promoted by Lloyd Bentsen in the 1970 
campaign, left Texas Republicans bewildered as well as frustrated.”  Yarborough’s defeat 
in the Democratic primary hurt Bush, who believed he could defeat the liberal incumbent 
senator in the general election.  Bush did not expect the more conservative Bentsen to 
win.  Once Bentsen secured the nomination, voters faced a choice between two similar 
candidates, and since most Texans still remained Democrats, they voted for Bentsen.  
1970, which Nixon hoped would be a banner year for the Texas Republican Party, was 
instead a serious setback.37 
Furthermore, the conservative Bentsen quickly asserted his Democratic loyalty.  
Upon his election to the Senate, the Nixon White House welcomed Bentsen as part of 
their “ideological majority.”  However, Bentsen immediately rejected this claim, 
asserting: “I’m coming here as part of the loyal opposition, not as part of the Nixon 
forces.”  To the president’s chagrin, Bentsen would play no role in helping move Texas 
toward the Republican Party.38 
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Larger Implications of the 1970 Elections 
Garth Jones, a reporter for the Associated Press, analyzed the 1970 elections for 
the Lone Star State: “Texas Republicans smarted Wednesday from the good old country 
licking handed them at the polls.  Any way they turned it hurt. . . .  Texas Democrats, 
headed by former President Lyndon Johnson and former Gov. John Connally, are in 
better political shape than they have been since Johnson punctured another GOP revival 
move in 1964.  Texas definitely can still be called a one-party state.”39 
The Republican Party did not fare well nationally either in the 1970 midterms.  
Congress remained firmly in the control of Democrats, as the GOP lost twelve House 
seats and made only minimal Senate gains, despite Nixon’s efforts to elect like-minded 
candidates.  Nixon had tasked Spiro Agnew with rallying voters to the Republicans, but 
the vice president’s harsh rhetoric, plus a shaky economy, turned off voters.  Lawrence 
O’Brien, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, expounded: “Agnew acted as 
Nixon’s hatchet man in 1969, with his attacks on newsman and anti-war militants, but he 
soon shifted to his real targets—those politicians of either party who opposed the 
Administration.  By mid-1970, his attacks on ‘radical liberals,’ a term that stretched from 
the Black Panthers to liberal Republicans, were receiving tremendous publicity.”  
O’Brien believed this strategy by the Nixon-Agnew team ultimately helped Democrats.  
“I was glad to take on Agnew.  I felt that his tactic of lumping sincere and legal dissenters 
with criminals and Communists extended far beyond the accepted boundaries of political 
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debate.  Like Senator Joe McCarthy, he questioned not only his opponents’ judgment but 
their motives and patriotism.”  O’Brien continued: “As the campaign progressed, I sensed 
that Agnew’s smears were becoming counterproductive. . . .  Nixon and Agnew were 
underestimating the intelligence of the voters, and, in time, they only created sympathy 
for the men they smeared.”40 
 
Nixon’s Connally Coup 
 Chastened by his party’s setbacks in 1970, Nixon determined to regain the 
political upper-hand over Democrats.  Winning the allegiance of Texas voters remained a 
priority for him.  Shortly after the midterms, the president surprisingly convinced John 
Connally to become his secretary of the treasury.  It was a stunning and brilliant political 
coup.  Yet both Texas Democrats and Texas Republicans were shocked and wary of the 
move.  The recently defeated George Bush, who Nixon had convinced to give up a safe 
House seat to run for the Senate, especially felt frustrated. 
 Connally’s decision to become Nixon’s treasury secretary did not please his old 
mentor, Lyndon Johnson.  Connally recalled: “President Johnson’s reaction was a 
personal one; he felt he had a proprietary interest in me and I had no right to make a 
commitment without consulting him.  By forming an alliance with Richard Nixon, I 
offended both his personal and his political values. . . .  He thought Nixon was an 
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unscrupulous campaigner . . . and held him responsible for the ruined careers of several 
Democrats who were painted as soft on Communism.” 
 Ben Barnes recalled: “Connally’s decision to take a seat in President Nixon’s 
cabinet stunned a lot of people in Texas.  Here was the icon of the Democratic Party, the 
man who’d held Texas Democrats together for so many years, happily agreeing to join 
forces with the Republican president.  And not just any Republican, but Richard M. 
Nixon.”  In his memoirs, Barnes suggested that Nixon viewed Connally as crucial for his 
plans to improve Republican fortunes in Texas.41  
 Although Johnson and Barnes did not approve, many Texans supported 
Connally’s selection.  Connally explained: “The state had made an even wider turn to the 
right, largely the result of a middle-class backlash against the years of anti-war unrest and 
social upheaval.  On the editorial pages of newspapers around the state, a certain pride 
was evident: a Texan had been given a position of importance.”  Connally suggested that 
Texas Republicans, especially George Bush, expressed the most outrage to Nixon for 
placing a Democrat in such a prominent position.  Connally later claimed that he 
convinced the president to name Bush ambassador to the United Nations in an effort to 
ameliorate the complaints of the former congressman.42 
 Nixon and Connally developed a close relationship that each man exploited for 
political gain.  Connally became Nixon’s favorite cabinet member.  Presidential aide Pat 
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Buchanan, impressed by the former Texas governor, told Harry Dent: “John Connally is 
like a peacock in this Cabinet strutting amongst a bunch of mud hens.”  Dent reflected: 
“Nixon was intrigued with Connally.  Connally was probably the only person in the 
Nixon administration deemed by Nixon to be the potential president in the Nixon ranks. . 
. .  As Agnew declined in presidential favor, carrying out presidential orders, Connally 
began to rise.”  Dent elaborated: “Connally had all the strong Nixon characteristics and 
more.  He was Nixon plus.  I think the president realized this.  Connally could match the 
Nixon mind. . . .  Philosophically, Connally was in the great center with Nixon, and like 
Nixon his instincts were conservative and hard-nosed.”43 
 
The Sharpstown Scandal Rocks Texas Politics 
 Connally joining ranks with Nixon was not the only shock to Texas Democrats in 
1971.  On January 18, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a civil suit 
alleging stock fraud and widespread corruption in the Texas state government.  The suit 
specifically mentioned Waggoner Carr, the former Texas attorney general and 
Democratic Senate nominee, and John Osorio, a past state insurance commissioner.  
Ironically (or perhaps not so, as will be seen), the SEC completed its action on the same 
day as a large victory gala celebrating the next day’s inauguration of top Texas 
Democrats in the state government.  In February 1972, Sam Kinch, Jr., a political 
columnist for the Dallas Morning News, and Ben Procter, a historian from Texas 
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Christian University, completed their book Texas Under a Cloud, which detailed this 
raging scandal.  Kinch and Procter described the effect of the SEC suit on the 
inauguration celebration: “The Democratic ‘gala’ mood, like the mood of Texas generally 
on the night of January 18, was tinged with considerable foreboding.  By noon of January 
19, the conservative Democratic establishment might as well have held the political 
version of a wake for its previously victorious forces.”44 
 The controversy became known as the Sharpstown scandal.  Allegations held that 
Houston banker Frank W. Sharp granted profitable stock purchases as bribes to top state 
officials to pass legislation favorable to his businesses in a 1969 special session.  Besides 
Carr and Osorio, the scandal also implicated House Speaker Gus Mutscher, Jr., state 
Democratic Chairman Elmer Baum, and several legislators.  Although he ultimately 
vetoed the Sharp bills, Governor Preston Smith likewise made money from the stock 
purchases, tarring him with controversy.  Lieutenant Governor Ben Barnes professed 
innocence, but critics questioned how he, as chief presiding officer of the Texas Senate, 
could not be involved.  Kinch and Procter argued that the most troubling aspect of the 
Sharpstown scandal was “the perversion of state government from public service to 
private service, the use of public office for private gain, and the stark reality that, unless 
something is done, the same attitudes and behavior will continue.”45 
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 Years later, Barnes remained convinced that Richard Nixon played a significant 
role in keeping the Sharpstown scandal on the minds of voters, especially since his 
administration controlled the SEC.  Barnes felt that as a rising political star, he especially 
had been a target.  Barnes suggested that despite being innocent, Sharpstown branded 
him with a label of “guilt by association.”  He believed: “Certain forces in the Republican 
Party saw Sharpstown as an opportunity to bring down the most powerful Democratic 
bloc in the South, and they spared nothing—not time nor money nor effort—in trying to 
bring Texas Democrats down.”  Barnes further described the reaction of the Texas GOP 
as the controversy unfolded: “Texas Republicans, left for dead just weeks earlier, were 
overjoyed at the budding scandal. . . .  With a complicated story like this one, they knew 
that the investigation would take a while, and that the stench of it would cling to the 
Democrats for a long time to come, regardless of how everything turned out in the end.”46 
 An Abilene jury convicted Mutscher and two of his key allies of bribery in March 
1972.  Interestingly, Nixon’s Department of Justice granted Frank Sharp immunity in 
exchange for testimony about other conspirators.  To Barnes, this action represented 
Nixonian politics at its worst.  He maintained: “There was only one reason the DOJ could 
possibly have had for granting Sharp full immunity: they wanted his help in going after 
Texas Democrats.”  Anthony Farris, the Nixon-appointed U.S. attorney in Houston, 
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confidently declared to reporters: “I would rather get all the sharks—and not just the 
minnows.”47 
 As the Sharpstown scandal rocked the conservative Democratic establishment in 
Texas, Republicans and liberal Democrats sought to discover the truth about the 
controversy, reform state government, and improve their political positions.  A group of 
legislators, which called themselves the “Dirty Thirty,” vocally pushed for investigation 
into the Sharpstown scandal and Mutscher’s governing processes throughout the 1971 
session.  Kinch and Procter described the Dirty Thirty as a “motley band of malcontents” 
and a “spontaneous, politically unnatural collection of the urban and the rural, the 
Democrat and the Republican, the liberal and the conservative.”  Their greatest 
achievement involved keeping “the public aware that there were unanswered questions 
about the role of state officials in the stock-fraud case and that recurrences of the whole 
mess could only be avoided by thorough reform of both the legislative process and the 
ethical climate in which the laws are made.”48 
 
The Busing Controversy Explodes 
 During the early 1970s busing of children to achieve racial balance in public 
schools became a major political issue.  Federal courts ordered the busing of students 
away from their neighborhood schools in some locales to help desegregate the nation’s 
education system and live up to the landmark 1954 Brown decision.  Busing proved 
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extremely contentious, especially in the Lone Star State.  Texans overwhelmingly 
opposed it, and Bentsen and other public officials received numerous letters, petitions, 
and editorials with this sentiment.  In August 1971, Gib Lewis, a Democratic member of 
the Texas House of Representatives from Fort Worth, wrote Bentsen about the busing 
controversy: “I do not know how your mail is indicating the general public’s stand on 
school busing, but mine has been 99.9% bitterly against the Supreme Court ruling in 
favor of school busing. . . .  I feel personally that the Supreme Court over the past few 
years has shown very poor judgment in many of their decisions whereby they have 
upheld the Constitution for a few and have grossly neglected the freedoms of the vast 
majority.”  In a response, Bentsen noted that his mail also “heavily” illustrated this 
sentiment.49 
 Most Texas elected officials opposed busing.  One Austin man called upon 
Bentsen to work for passage of an antibusing amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  
Illustrating the passion busing invoked, the individual declared: “I believe that the 
importance of this matter is so critical as to have the status of the future freedom of the 
political system in this country at stake.  It has long been known that he who controls the 
education and training of the young, also controls the future of the nation. . . .  I believe 
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that power must remain with the people directly and on the most local level.”50  
Similarly, a San Antonio woman who served as petition chairperson of Concerned Action 
Now sent Bentsen an antibusing resolution with over 2,500 signatures.  She invoked 
Nixonian language, warning the senator: “Remember these signatures are of those 
people, the silent majority, who have civil rights too.”51 
 Texans cautioned their elected officials to oppose busing and other liberal causes.  
In one such example, a self-described “life long conservative Dem” from San Antonio 
reminded Bentsen that “we voted Smilen Ralf [sic smiling Ralph Yarborough] out of 
office because he was . . . in bed with the eastern liberals, T. Kennedy, Muskie, Church, 
etc.  He voted against southern Supreme Court judges, for civil rights legislation that 
forced us to bus.”  The writer called upon Bentsen to support Nixon and not to ally with 
Senate liberals.  He further commented on the approaching presidential election: “I just 
do not feel that any of the front running Demo candidates would be well received in 
Tex.”  In a response, Bentsen maintained his strong disapproval of busing: “Just so there 
will be no question in your mind where I stand, here are my views.  I believe in the 
concept of neighborhood schools.  I am opposed to the use of massive busing solely to 
achieve a racial balance in the schools, for I do not believe the education of children will 
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be enhanced by busing them out of their neighborhoods, just to meet vague standards of 
racial composition.”52 
 John Tower castigated court-ordered busing as “social experimentation.”  He 
decried: “Seldom in modern times have our federal courts evoked such an overwhelming 
outpouring of protest as we have witnessed in the last few years as a result of the 
decisions to require the forced massive cross-town busing of our nation’s school 
children.”53  Busing especially challenged Democratic Party unity, pitting northerners 
against southerners.  One Texan petitioned Bentsen: “I want to go on record as 
Democratic Chairman of Fannin County, Texas, that I am opposed to the busing of any 
form when it is used to achieve racial balance in integration. . . .  I believe that I speak for 
the vast majority of the people in Fannin County.”54  Busing would remain an explosive 
political issue in Texas and across the country throughout the 1970s. 
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The 1972 Presidential Campaign Begins 
During the spring and summer of 1972, Senator George McGovern of South 
Dakota surprisingly won several primaries for the Democratic presidential nomination, 
defeating supposed frontrunners such as Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine and former 
Vice President Hubert Humphrey.  George Wallace also participated in the primaries 
before an assassination attempt in May left him paralyzed and derailed his campaign.  
McGovern, once a longshot for the nomination, inspired followers through his persistent 
and eloquent criticism of the Vietnam War.  Lawrence O’Brien, national Democratic 
chairman at the time, described: “I underestimated McGovern and, also, the impact of the 
new party rules on the nominating process.  McGovern’s primary campaign was smart 
and well organized.  His followers, motivated by their hatred of the war in Vietnam, were 
at that moment the most vital force in the Democratic Party.”  O’Brien observed: “In state 
after state, party leaders pledged to Muskie would be defeated in party caucuses by 
students and housewives pledged to McGovern.  Clearly, something historic was 
happening within our party.”55  Texans mostly remained cool to McGovern’s candidacy, 
but a young couple named Bill Clinton and Hillary Rodham worked hard to win the Lone 
Star State for the liberal senator. 
 Nixon, meanwhile, avoided directly campaigning and attempted to present an 
image of strong presidential leadership, most notably with his historic trip to China in 
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February 1972.  As the Democratic primary became more divisive (in no small part due 
to “dirty tricks” propagated by Nixon forces) and McGovern appeared the likely 
nominee, the president highlighted his conservatism.  John Connally joined the 
president’s reelection effort as leader of Democrats for Nixon.  In April, Nixon traveled 
to the Connally ranch for a meeting where the former governor introduced the president 
to the “movers and shakers of Texas.”  Many were conservative Democrats with rich 
pocketbooks and no love for McGovern.  Guests included Allan Shivers, Fort Worth 
developer Amon Carter, Jr., Houston businessman James Elkins, Jr., and Robert Kleberg, 
Jr., of the King Ranch.  Heirs to the great Texas oil fortunes, such as Perry Bass, Nelson 
Bunker Hunt, and Clint, Jr., and John Murchison, also attended.56 
 Former LBJ aide Jack Valenti recalled Lyndon Johnson’s displeasure with some 
of his old supporters who joined ranks with Nixon for the 1972 election.  Although 
Johnson did not favor McGovern’s nomination due to their longtime feuding about 
Vietnam, Valenti maintained that LBJ “did not lose interest in the affairs of the nation 
and the Democratic Party.  He was peeved when so many of his former colleagues and 
close friends joined Democrats for Nixon.”  Yet Valenti claimed that LBJ did not 
begrudge his longtime protégé and ally: “He did not banish his affection and friendship 
for John Connally for leading this movement, for he knew for some time that Connally . . 
. would choose to cut his moorings to the Democratic Party.  Connally, at heart more 
conservative than LBJ and visibly uncomfortable with the loose ideological abandon of 
the McGovern groupings, had long made it clear that he would find a presidency under 
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Nixon infinitely more palatable than under McGovern.  LBJ understood Connally and his 
incompatibility with the liberal-left element in the party.”  Nevertheless, the former 
president regretted this exodus of the Democratic Party by Connally and others.  
Connally now appeared a Democrat in name only.57 
 In the 1972 Texas Democratic Senate primary, where the winner would challenge 
Tower in the fall, Harold “Barefoot” Sanders upset Ralph Yarborough’s attempted 
comeback.  Bernard Rapoport blamed Yarborough’s micromanagement of the campaign 
and obsession with old enemies for the former senator’s defeat.  Rapoport described 
Yarborough’s campaign speeches as “rambling, off-center, and hard to follow,” and “full 
of irrelevant personal attacks against Lyndon Johnson, John Connally, and Lloyd 
Bentsen.”  Yarborough gave little mention of his actual opponents, Barefoot Sanders and 
John Tower.  Although he remained an admirer of Yarborough, Rapoport regretted: “His 
paranoia was sad and disturbing to us all, and it did more to defeat him than anything his 
opponents ever did.”58  Yarborough’s defeat by Sanders also illustrated Texans’ 
weariness with the liberal former senator and their desire for a conservative alternative. 
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The 1972 Texas Democratic Gubernatorial Primary 
 The Democratic governor’s campaign emerged as the most fascinating race in 
Texas in 1972, as Preston Smith, Ben Barnes, Dolph Briscoe, Jr., and Frances “Sissy” 
Farenthold competed for the gubernatorial nomination.  Smith sough a third term as 
governor, while Barnes, the LBJ-Connally protégé with star potential, hoped to take 
another step toward national prominence.  Both individuals labored to remove the 
controversy of the Sharpstown scandal from their candidacies.  Briscoe, a rancher and 
banker from Uvalde, ran on a pledge of no new taxes for Texas.  A former state 
legislator, Briscoe later observed: “I could see that ordinary Texans were fed up with the 
never-ending growth of government at all levels and the resulting increase in their tax 
burden.  In fact, it was evident that a tax rebellion was spreading across the country.”59  A 
member of the “Dirty Thirty” from Corpus Christi, Farenthold advocated for reform in 
state government and an end to the Vietnam War.  She vocally supported McGovern’s 
presidential candidacy.  Rapoport explained of Farenthold: “Her gubernatorial campaign 
was an open challenge to the conservative good-old-boy state political establishment and 
its candidate, Lieutenant Governor Ben Barnes. . . .  She ran a populist campaign that 
struck a chord with a lot of voters who were thoroughly disenchanted with the corruption 
in Austin.”60   
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 In a shock to the conservative Democratic establishment, Barnes and Smith, 
tainted by the Sharpstown scandal, finished third and fourth, respectively, in the primary.  
Voters rewarded Briscoe and Farenthold for being outsiders and for their perceived 
honesty.  In a competitive runoff, Briscoe defeated Farenthold as conservative Democrats 
rallied to his side.  Farenthold’s liberal views hurt her chances amongst a conservative 
electorate.  Briscoe especially criticized her promise to end the Texas Rangers because of 
past abuses of authority: “I was most appreciative of Mrs. Farenthold’s remark about 
abolishing the Texas Rangers, because I knew that most Texans admire them and cherish 
their legacy as much as I do.  She handed me a wonderful issue to use against her.”61 
 Even though no evidence existed linking Ben Barnes with the Sharpstown 
scandal, voters punished him for being an incumbent office-holder.  Years later Nixon 
administration alumni admitted to Barnes their role in destroying his promising political 
career.  After serving time in prison due to the Watergate scandal, John Mitchell, U.S. 
attorney general at the time of Sharpstown, and H. R. Haldeman, White House chief of 
staff, both separately apologized to Barnes and confirmed Nixon’s determination to ruin 
him.62 
 Barnes discussed the impact Sharpstown had on the Texas Democratic Party: 
The Sharpstown investigations achieved what Republicans had hoped for.  
All three of the state’s top elected Democrats—Governor Preston Smith, House 
Speaker Gus Mutscher, and me—were forced out of politics.  Dozens of House 
members also lost their seats in the voters’ rush to “throw the bums out.”  When 
the man who would go on to win the governorship, Dolph Briscoe, turned out to 
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be not particularly effective in that office, the momentum Texas Democrats had 
sustained throughout the sixties and into the 1970 elections was completely 
destroyed.63 
 
 
 
1972 Democratic National Convention 
 
 Democrats hoped to avoid a repeat of the 1968 national convention chaos and to 
unite the party in 1972.  The upheaval in Chicago during 1968 led to the creation of the 
Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection.  George McGovern chaired the 
commission as it studied how to give all Democrats a voice in the nominating process.  
He became convinced that for its survival the party had to change or face abandonment 
by liberal activists who instead might create a new political organization or possibly 
resort to “the anti-politics of the street.”  The McGovern commission controversially 
proposed that all delegates to the national convention be elected, rather than appointed as 
was common in several states; and mandated “state parties to overcome past 
discrimination” through encouraging participation by minorities, women, and young 
people “in reasonable relationship to their presence in the population of the State.”  The 
reforms led to increased diversity among the delegates at the 1972 national convention in 
Miami but also angered other Democrats who saw their political clout lessened.  Most 
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notably, McGovern backers refused to sit the Illinois delegation led by Chicago Mayor 
Richard Daley, outraging many longtime party loyalists.64  
 Division plagued the Texas Democratic Party at the national convention.  For the 
first time, the unit rule, which gave all of the state’s delegates to one candidate, was not 
in effect, as a result of the McGovern reforms.  Fifty-two Texas delegates supported 
George Wallace, forty-one backed McGovern, and another thirty-two endorsed Henry 
“Scoop” Jackson, a Washington senator.  Briscoe faced the impossible task of attempting 
to unify the Texas delegation.  Adamantly opposed to McGovern, Briscoe first cast his 
ballot for Wallace hoping that a deadlocked convention would choose a moderate like 
Jackson with perhaps a southern running mate.  Once McGovern officially captured the 
nomination, Briscoe and several other Texas delegates changed their votes in favor of the 
South Dakota senator in the name of party unity.  However, Briscoe’s actions had the 
unforeseen consequence of angering both Wallace and McGovern supporters.  He 
recalled: “My attempts to unify this badly split delegation for the upcoming campaign in 
Texas really blew up in my face.  By voting for Wallace on the first ballot, I 
unintentionally alienated some African American and Mexican American voters.  By 
voting for McGovern at the end, I offended the Wallace vote.”  Soon after the 
convention, Briscoe announced that while he would vote the straight Democratic ticket, 
he would not campaign for McGovern, who remained deeply unpopular in Texas.  
Briscoe summarized: 
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Miami was a disastrous convention, and the McGovern campaign was 
even more of a disaster.  It was a complete catastrophe here in Texas.  It was 
really the beginning of the downfall of our Democratic Party in Texas. . . .  It was 
easy to see in 1972 that the Texas Democratic Party was going downhill because 
of what was happening with the national party.  Texas was then, and is today, 
very conservative, and the national party moved too far to the left for most 
Texans.  I had to be sure that whenever George McGovern was in Texas, I was at 
the opposite end of the state, because it was obvious that any association with him 
would be harmful, if not disastrous.65 
 
 Another episode angered many Texans.  Jack Valenti especially expressed 
outrage that most Democrats at the national convention completely ignored Lyndon 
Johnson’s accomplishments.  He described his feelings when watching the convention 
events on television: “That first night I trembled with anger when I saw what was going 
on in the hall.  Pictures of all past Democratic presidents—FDR, Truman, Kennedy—
plus Adlai Stevenson, were hung in a grand sweep over the speaker’s rostrum.  But 
nowhere was LBJ’s portrait to be found. . . .  It was an absurd malignant cut at President 
Johnson, and I raged inside.  I thought, God, what must the president think?”  Valenti 
further noted: “Speaker after speaker rose to invoke all the past glories of the party, and 
not once did anyone mention Lyndon Johnson by name.  It was not until Senator Ted 
Kennedy rose, late in the convention, that anyone dared to speak LBJ’s name.  Senator 
Kennedy was gracious and grateful to the president.  It was almost an act of courage on 
his part.”  The McGovern-led convention wanted nothing to do with the former president, 
largely because of Vietnam.  Following the convention, Valenti wrote a widely-
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disseminated article for the Washington Post criticizing this treatment and praising LBJ’s 
accomplishments in civil rights, education, and health care.66 
McGovern made opposition to the Vietnam War the central theme of his 
presidential campaign.  Many Texans, however, rejected McGovern’s call for an 
immediate withdrawal as an irresponsible admittance of failure, and remained 
uncomfortable with the nominee’s support of protestors against the war.  A Houston man 
illustrated this sentiment when he explained to Bentsen: “I think that the news media and 
the ‘anti-war groups’ are currently acting in a most irresponsible manner.  It is one thing 
to disagree.  However, public demonstration at a critical time is another thing.  These 
demonstrations and publicity given to those opposing our government’s current Viet Nam 
actions can only be termed as aiding and abetting the enemy.  If our government is going 
to successfully negotiate a basis for release of POW’s and return of our military, it will 
need an atmosphere of unity.”67 
 
Nixon’s Landslide Victory 
 Nixon won reelection in a landslide, capturing 49 of 50 states and 60 percent of 
the popular vote.  He garnered the largest percentage (66) of Texas votes by any 
Republican in history.  Party disunity and campaign missteps plagued McGovern.  
Conservative Democrats viewed McGovern as too liberal, and the candidate’s dumping 
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of his original running mate, Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri, for alleged mental 
health problems, branded the nominee as fickle and ill-equipped to handle the nation’s 
complex problems.  Not even a mysterious June break-in at the Democratic National 
Committee Headquarters at Washington’s Watergate complex could give McGovern 
momentum or hurt Nixon’s candidacy.   
Nixon dreamed of creating a novel political coalition, which he termed the “New 
Majority.”  The president described: “The reaction to McGovern’s nomination and 
conduct was little short of exuberant.  He had consciously abandoned conservative and 
moderate Democrats; and the ethnic groups, traditionally a Democratic blue chip, could 
find in him nothing of the hearty patriotism and pride that they had looked for in their 
party in the past.  With these defections we had a chance not just to win the election but 
to create the New Majority we had only dreamed of in 1970.”  Nixon continued: “The 
most exciting aspect of the 1972 election for me was that McGovern’s perverse treatment 
of the traditional Democratic power blocs that had been the basis of every Democratic 
presidential victory for the last forty years had made possible the creation of a New 
Republican Majority as an electoral force in American politics.  I was confident that if we 
could only make a first inroad, we could follow through with these New Majority 
groups.”68   
 
The national Democratic Party seemed as divided as ever.  The Texas Democratic 
Party, beleaguered by the Sharpstown scandal, faced an uncertain future.  Nixon’s New 
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Majority appeared within grasp, and the president believed his new best friend, an old 
Texas governor, still nominally a Democrat, could help change the face of American 
politics permanently. 
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CHAPTER 6 
“The Majority is Still Right of Center”: 
Texas Politics in the Watergate Era, 1972-1976 
 
 Soon after his smashing reelection victory, however, the unraveling Watergate 
scandal beleaguered Richard Nixon and thwarted his hopes for building a New Majority.  
John Connally feared becoming too close to the Nixon White House as it sunk into crisis, 
and quickly faced his own legal problems.  Democrats attempted to rebound from their 
1972 debacle and rebuild the party both in Texas and nationally.  By the mid-seventies, 
many Americans expressed disgust with their elected officials’ inability to cope with the 
major problems of the day.  People longed for a simpler, less tumultuous time, and this 
particularly was true in Texas. 
 
The 1972 Election Autopsy 
 In December 1972 George Christian compiled a memorandum for Lloyd Bentsen 
with his thoughts on the recent election.  He discussed a feeling among some political 
operatives that “the yellow dog Democrat belongs on the endangered species list” given 
an increase in straight-ticket Republican voting.  Christian noted his belief that “a great 
many people may have voted a straight GOP ticket just to make sure of their Presidential 
vote, because of the unusual antagonism toward the Democratic nominee [McGovern].”  
However, he surmised: 
Harry Dent is probably correct when he says the region from the Potomac 
to the Pedernales is now solid Republican country in Presidential elections.  It will 
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be difficult to reverse this new trend now that it has accelerated so greatly, since it 
is unlikely the Democratic Party will moderate enough to offset the gains of 
recent years.  Most Southerners are in effect now independents who vote 
Democratic for conservative and moderate state candidates and Republican (or 
George Wallace) in Presidential elections.  The bell has tolled for left-leaning 
national candidates in this region—Ted Kennedy or anyone else. 
 
Christian admitted that the McGovern nomination hurt all Democrats, including Bentsen.  
Yet liberals and the Texas Observer had criticized the senator for his lukewarm support 
of the Democratic presidential nominee, which Christian contended actually would help 
Bentsen in the long-term.  Texas still possessed a conservative-leaning bent.  Christian 
listed the contemporary state of Texas politics: 
  --the majority is still right of center; 
 --moderate-to-conservative Democrats win statewide contests regardless 
of Republican challenge (affirming the 1970 situation); 
 --liberals in statewide races, if their identity is clear, are long shots at best; 
 --the student vote is probably overrated, because they don’t really vote as 
a bloc except in a few precincts in Austin; 
 --people are rejecting radical change in favor of the status quo, probably 
because they have endured so much change for the past 10 years; 
 --racial conflict is very much alive; 
 --Texans are suspicious of anything that might jeopardize national 
security; 
 --the Wallace viewpoint has more adherents now than it did four years 
ago. 
 
According to Christian, McGovern’s nomination pushed moderate voters toward right-
wing candidates, and “for the time being, then, Texas is more conservative than it was 
before the election—partly because it got a glimpse of real left-wing politics.”  Christian 
concluded by advising Bentsen: “There has been a conservative surge and it is essential 
to preserve your conservative base;” and also: “The most vocal spokesmen of the 
Democratic Party nationally do not fit the Texas mold; it is best not to cast yourself in 
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roles that identify you with those who at best are suspicious characters to most Texans 
right now.”1 
Following McGovern’s crushing defeat, the national Democratic Party itself went 
through a period of soul-searching as many criticized its liberal 1972 standard bearer and 
platform.  Robert Strauss of Dallas became Democratic Chairman, replacing the more 
liberal Jean Westwood.  A longtime ally of Lyndon Johnson and John Connally, Strauss 
hoped to unify the party through promoting political moderation.2 
After his reelection victory Richard Nixon began planning how to make John 
Connally his successor and the face of the New Majority.  Earlier in 1972, the president 
had even flirted with the idea of dropping Spiro Agnew from the ticket and making 
Connally his running mate.  Nixon recalled: “As I began preparing for the 1972 election, 
I also had to look ahead to 1976.  I believed that John Connally was the only man in 
either party who clearly had the potential to be a great President.  He had the necessary 
political ‘fire in the belly,’ the energy to win, and the vision to lead.”  Yet Nixon decided 
against replacing Agnew with Connally.  Such a shocking move would have held 
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immense political risks, potentially angering Agnew supporters and other Republicans 
who did not like Connally, still a Democrat at the time of the election.3 
After securing a second term in the White House, Nixon wanted Harry Dent to 
play a key role in Connally’s transition to the Republican Party.  While Dent supported 
this effort, he believed the former Texas governor would have a difficult task in winning 
over Republican voters, due to his long-held Democratic ties.  Nevertheless, according to 
Dent: “The president was convinced that with his coaching, care, and introductions 
Connally could become the 1976 GOP nominee for president.”4 
Texas Republicans remained wary of Connally.  John Tower and George Bush, 
who had battled the former Texas governor for years, especially resented his close 
relationship with Nixon.  In 1972, Tower defeated conservative Democrat Harold 
“Barefoot” Sanders for another term in the U.S. Senate.  During the contest Tower tied 
Sanders to George McGovern and liberal Democrats and convinced voters to return him 
to Washington as a better representative of conservative Texas values.  Tower won 
victory despite little help from the Nixon team, which focused instead on winning a 
landslide in Texas for the president and admittedly did not want to appear with vulnerable 
candidates.  Tower angrily recalled experiencing tension during the campaign with 
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Connally and his Democrats for Nixon members like Joe Kilgore, who made clear that 
they did not support Tower’s reelection effort and only worked for the president.5     
Although the Texas Democratic Party retained its power in Austin during the 
1972 elections, voters disgusted by the Sharpstown scandal brought in a new group of 
leaders who pledged to return ethics to state government.  In the gubernatorial election, 
Dolph Briscoe, Jr., narrowly defeated Hank Grover, a Republican state senator from 
Houston, and Ramsey Muňiz of the Raza Unida Party.  A younger generation from 
prominent Texas political families came to power, as William P. Hobby, Jr., and Price 
Daniel, Jr., became lieutenant governor and speaker of the house, respectively.  In 
perhaps the most dramatic consequence of Sharpstown, 77 members of the 150-seat 
Texas House took their oath of office for the first time, while 15 new legislators entered 
the 31-seat Texas Senate.  Voters had given the new officeholders orders to clean up the 
mess in Austin, and they acted.  During the 1973 session the legislature passed and the 
governor signed significant reforms into law, including open records legislation, financial 
disclosure policies, ethics requirements, and new regulations of lobbyists.6 
The legacy of various court decisions from the 1960s and early 1970s further 
affected Texas politics in the wake of Sharpstown.  Scholar Charles Deaton, in his 
influential 1973 book The Year They Threw the Rascals Out, argued that the Sharpstown 
scandal, changes in the national Democratic Party’s convention rules, and establishment 
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of single-member legislative districts brought potential for significant change in Texas 
politics.  Prior to court rulings in 1972 and 1973, multi-member districts allowed citizens 
to vote in all elections in their city of residence.  This diluted minority, liberal, and 
Republican voting in Texas, as conservative Democrats could vote for several legislators.  
Rural areas of the state possessed a disproportionate amount of political strength.  Court 
decisions around the time of the Sharpstown scandal guaranteed single-member districts 
in Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio, allowing more political clout for urban areas and 
previously underrepresented voters in Texas.7 
David Richards, a lawyer who supported liberal Democratic causes, explained the 
significance of these court cases, especially Kilgarlin v. Martin (1966): “The court voided 
provisions that prevented any county from having more than one member of the Texas 
Senate, and also required that Senate apportionment be based on population rather than 
on the Texas constitutional standard of ‘qualified electors.’  Finally, the court nullified a 
provision that prevented any county from having more than seven members of the Texas 
House of Representatives.  These rulings, issued under the logic of one person, one vote, 
had dramatic consequences.”  The court decisions provided minorities, liberals, urban 
areas, and even Republicans with stronger political voices in choosing their elected 
representatives.8   
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LBJ Dies 
 On January 22, 1973, Lyndon Johnson died.  The former president had 
experienced serious health problems since leaving the White House.  Ironically, LBJ’s 
death occurred two days after Nixon’s second inauguration and just days before the 
announcement of the end of U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam War.  Johnson’s 
passing seemed to symbolize the end of an age.  Ben Barnes remembered his grief at 
LBJ’s burial on his beloved ranch: “Johnson represented an era when Texans, and 
especially the Democrats, stood tall—and watching that great man being laid to rest 
under gently swaying oak trees was almost too much to bear.  It felt like we were 
grieving not just for the man, but for the ideals he’d stood for.”9  Marvin Watson voiced 
similar sentiments in his eulogy for the former president, proclaiming: “He was ours, and 
we loved him beyond any telling of it.  We shared his victories and his defeats.”10 
  
Roe v. Wade and the Judiciary 
 On the same day Lyndon Johnson died, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered one of 
the most important, and controversial, decisions in its history.  Roe v. Wade held that the 
right to privacy protected a woman’s decision to have an abortion up to the point of 
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viability of the fetus.  The case originated in Texas, as lawyers Sarah Weddington and 
Linda Coffee represented Norma McCorvey (anonymously known as “Jane Roe”), a 
Dallas woman wishing to terminate her pregnancy and challenge the state’s laws 
prohibiting abortion.  Weddington later became a Texas state legislator, representing 
Austin.  Roe v. Wade outraged many Americans who equated abortion with murder, and 
remains contentious to the present day. 
 Following the ruling, Lloyd Bentsen received several messages from alarmed 
constituents who worried Roe represented yet another example of the decline of religious 
piety in the United States.  A Beaumont couple wrote: “We would like to express our 
dismay at the recent Supreme Court decision on abortion.  They abolished capital 
punishment but then give the go-ahead for legal abortions.  This is a Christian society not 
a secular one as the Supreme Court judges seem to feel they represent in this decision.”  
On abortion they maintained, “it is wrong, it’s against nature, it’s murder.”  A Fort Worth 
woman similarly stressed to the Texas senator: “Abortion is taking the life of a human,” 
and proposed: “Also will you please help with bringing prayer back into the Public 
Schools.  I believe our crime rate will be greatly reduced by this act of honoring God.” 11 
 Roe v. Wade, like past cases involving civil rights, busing, and crime, contributed 
to a belief amongst many Americans that the nation’s judiciary had become too liberal.  
During the spring of 1973, several Texans expressed this sentiment to Bentsen.  Some 
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called for Congress to review the qualifications of current judges, especially those on the 
Supreme Court.  Bentsen responded to one such constituent: “I thoroughly agree that the 
courts are being called upon to decide too many cases in which they have little 
competence to adjudicate and, in too many instances, which they are deciding with 
subsequent poor results.  The present national uproar over busing is a perfect example of 
the courts attempting to promulgate formulas for the education of our children with 
minimal resources and chaotic results.”12 
 
Connally Joins the GOP 
 In May 1973, the Nixon-Connally relationship reached its apogee.  Connally 
officially announced that he had joined the Republican Party, declaring that it represented 
his conservative political philosophy better than the Democratic Party.  With Connally 
now a Republican, Nixon’s efforts to make the former Texas governor his presidential 
successor in 1976 fully could begin.  Ben Barnes remembered Connally’s decision: “He 
hadn’t told me he was doing it, but I can’t say I was surprised.  I knew Connally wanted 
to run for President, and I knew he’d reached a peak of disgust with the Democratic Party 
at the 1972 national convention that summer, when the liberal wing of the party pushed 
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through the McGovern rules and the party leaders chose to completely ignore the legacy 
of Lyndon Johnson.”13 
 Although somewhat bitter after years of political battles with the new convert, 
John Tower believed that Connally, with his great popularity in the Lone Star State, could 
help the Texas Republican Party prosper.  In a statement following Connally’s 
announcement, Tower shrewdly declared: “I hope that all like-minded Democrats will 
follow his example and that his action will accelerate the growing trend toward realistic 
political realignment along the lines of national political philosophy.  This is additional 
evidence that it is the Republican Party which now comes closest to representing the 
traditional Texas viewpoint—a viewpoint that John Connally has championed so 
vigorously.”14 
Obviously, Connally’s decision angered many Texas Democrats.  Liz Carpenter, 
who had served as Lady Bird Johnson’s press secretary, caustically remarked: “It’s a 
good thing John Connally wasn’t at the Alamo.  He’d be organizing Texans for Santa 
Anna now.”  Lady Bird Johnson expressed appreciation that at least Connally had waited 
until after LBJ’s death to make the switch.  Other Texas Democrats referenced the 
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exploding Watergate scandal, joking that Connally’s switch represented the “first time in 
history a rat has swum toward a sinking ship.”15 
 
The Watergate Scandal Grows 
The Watergate scandal destroyed Nixon and Connally’s dream of building a New 
Majority.  Nixon discussed his attitude as his second term began: “I felt that the Silent 
Majority of Americans, with its roots mainly in the Midwest, the West, and the South, 
had simply never been encouraged to give the Eastern liberal elite a run for its money for 
control of the nation’s key institutions.”  Buoyed by his landslide reelection victory, 
Nixon hoped to reorganize the federal government by attacking what he viewed as a 
liberal bureaucracy and establish a new conservative political order, which he hoped 
Connally would inherit.  During the spring and summer of 1973, however, as details of 
the sordid Watergate scandal unfolded, Nixon found himself completely on the defensive 
and fighting for his own political survival.16 
 Shortly after his switch to the Republican Party, Connally became special counsel 
to the president.  Determined to protect his own presidential potential, Connally urged 
Nixon to take swift action to rid himself of Watergate and fire anyone involved with the 
controversy.  Upon learning about Nixon’s secret recordings of his conversations as 
president, and when a court subpoenaed seven of the tapes, the former Texas governor 
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had a distinct reaction.  Connally recalled telling H. R. Haldeman, White House chief of 
staff: “For heaven’s sake, tell the president to go on and burn the rest of those tapes.  Get 
rid of them.  He has to preserve those seven, can’t destroy them, but he can burn the rest.  
And don’t be secretive about it.  Have a bonfire on the south lawn.”  Nixon feared that 
such a drastic action only would compound his troubles and refused to follow Connally’s 
questionable advice.  Just six weeks after returning to the Nixon administration, Connally 
left the White House, wary that getting too close to Watergate could threaten his own 
political future.17 
 The Watergate crisis threw a wrench into Nixon and Connally’s plans to create a 
New Majority, especially in supposedly friendly Texas.  Charles Deaton, writing in mid-
1973, noted that few Texas Democrats had joined Connally in the GOP: “That wave of 
Texans that was supposed to follow him over to the other side failed to materialize, 
though.  Not a single current office-holder followed Connally, and when ex-House 
Speaker Rayford Price made the switch, it was in a little-noticed news conference.  
Silver-haired John went back to Washington to seek his fame and fortune while helping 
Nixon out of the Watergate jam, but reports at this time indicate that is not working as 
Connally had hoped.”18  A columnist for the Dallas Morning News affirmed, however, 
that Connally’s decision had the unforeseen consequence of helping one rising star in 
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Texas politics: “Since John Connally left the Democratic Party, Bentsen is the 
unchallenged king of Texas Democrats.”19 
 
The Watergate Scandal and the Mood of Texas 
 Seemingly left for dead following the 1972 elections, the Watergate scandal 
unified Democrats across the country in opposition to the president.  Texas Democrats 
themselves found surprising unity protesting Nixon’s transgressions and failing 
leadership.  At a July 1973 rally of party leaders in Beaumont, Briscoe asserted: “The 
national economy is in flames as a result of the current administration’s game plan.  The 
national conscience is in ashes as a result of Watergate. . . .  The Democratic Party has 
come to the rescue of this country many times before.  It will do so again.”  Bentsen 
discussed the party’s renewal since the devastating 1972 election: “Democrats are raising 
a broad umbrella over all age groups and all segments of the population.”  Lieutenant 
Governor Hobby urged Democrats to “put our differences apart and work together.”  In a 
dig at Republicans, Briscoe predicted that Democrats “will carry the elections all the way 
from the Golden Gate to the Watergate.”20 
 While Democrats remained optimistic about their renewed political fortunes, 
Texans, like many other people across the country, reported a growing disillusionment 
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with the course of the U.S. government and its leaders.  A July 1973 survey 
commissioned by Bentsen examined the current political mood of Texas.  The 
controversies that had engulfed the Johnson and Nixon presidencies had undermined 
Texans’ trust, as 67 percent of respondents supported the statement “Over the past 5 
years, American leaders have failed to tell the country the truth,” while only 24 percent 
disagreed.  Interestingly, 73 percent of African Americans, as opposed to 67 percent of 
whites and 66 percent of Mexican Americans, agreed.  In another sign of racial tensions 
among Texans, by a 56 to 34 percent margin and a 46 to 41 percent difference black and 
Hispanic Texans respectively believed: “Most politicians don’t really care about people 
like me.”  In a striking contrast, 59 percent of whites disagreed with this sentiment.  
Despite a negative attitude toward politicians, Texans generally approved of their own 
elected officials.  Bentsen, Tower, and Briscoe each maintained high approval ratings.  
Texans particularly admired Bentsen’s perceived political independence.  The senator 
had not suffered long term political damage for supporting McGovern, as 66 percent of 
survey participants said it did not change their opinion of him.  Merely 18 percent 
expressed a less favorable view of Bentsen because of his endorsement of the highly 
unpopular 1972 Democratic presidential nominee.  Moreover, only 35 percent of voters 
agreed with the statement “I tend to think less of John Connally because he switched to 
the Republican Party,” while 57 percent disagreed, illustrating the former governor’s 
continued popularity in Texas, despite his close association with Nixon.21 
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 Another survey the following month found that Texans mentioned the Watergate 
scandal and the economy as the two most pressing political issues of the day.  Watergate 
and the weakening economy negatively affected Texans’ moods, as 63 percent of 
respondents stated that the United States was “on the wrong track.”  Only 39 percent of 
Texans gave a positive job performance rating to Nixon, while 58 percent responded 
negatively.  The poll noted that such numbers especially proved dramatic given that the 
president won Texas with 66 percent of the vote less than a year earlier.  In a striking 
statistic, “fully 63 percent indicated that they think less of politics and politicians because 
of Watergate.  The most frequently cited reason was that Watergate has caused voters to 
lose trust and confidence in the government and in politicians.”  Regarding the unstable 
economy: “The inflation and the high cost of living affects voters in their everyday lives.  
Voters want some relief, and the Nixon administration has been unable to provide it.  
Thus, Republican candidates in 1974 could be in serious trouble if the economic situation 
does not improve. . . .  There is no better issue for the Democrats in 1974 than the high 
cost of living.” 
 The August 1973 study noted the current political make-up of the Lone Star State: 
“Despite the progress of the Republicans in Texas, and the fragmentation within both the 
state and the national Democratic Party, the Republicans in Texas are still very much the 
out-party.”  The survey analyzed the political ideologies of Texans: 
In Texas, the electorate would be classified as solidly conservative.  Fully 
50 percent of the voters chose either very conservative (16 percent) or fairly 
conservative (34 percent) to describe themselves; while 28 percent (10 percent 
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very liberal, and 18 percent fairly liberal) would be classified as liberals, and 22 
percent chose a middle-of-the-road label. 
In the Louis, Bowles and Grace Survey of April 1972, 43 percent of the 
voters classified themselves as conservatives, 23 percent as liberals, and 34 
percent as middle-of-the-road.  Thus, the change from the initial survey indicates 
a slight drift to the right, but it is obvious that Texas’s electorate is a firmly 
conservative one.22 
 
 
 In October 1973, Vice President Spiro Agnew resigned following charges of 
bribery and financial impropriety.  Seeing an opportunity to rescue his faltering plans for 
a New Majority, Nixon hoped to appoint Connally as his new vice president and solidify 
him as heir apparent to the presidency.  However, Nixon found little support for Connally 
in Congress, with both Democrats and Republicans opposing his nomination.  Many 
Democrats remained angry at Connally for switching parties and refused to reward him 
with confirmation.  Several Republicans questioned the merits of placing a recent GOP 
convert one heartbeat away from the presidency.  Even if Connally somehow managed to 
win confirmation as vice president, the process would be drawn out and politically 
damaging for the White House.  Already in serious trouble due to Watergate, Nixon 
reluctantly chose Gerald Ford of Michigan, the well-respected House minority leader, as 
his new vice president, instead of Connally, who remained too polarizing nationally.23   
 The Watergate scandal continued to damage Nixon’s quest for a New Majority in 
American politics.  On October 20, 1973, in what became known as the “Saturday Night 
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Massacre,” Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William 
Ruckelshaus both resigned, refusing to obey Nixon’s order to fire Watergate special 
prosecutor Archibald Cox.  Ultimately Solicitor General Robert Bork carried out Nixon’s 
command to remove Cox from his position.  The Saturday Night Massacre outraged most 
Americans and severely damaged Nixon’s credibility.  The Houston Post reported: 
“Texas congressmen are still digging out from beneath an avalanche of telegrams and 
letters from their constituents, the majority of whom wanted President Nixon impeached 
for his firing of special prosecutor Archibald Cox and his initial refusal to obey court 
orders to release the Watergate tape recordings.”  Bentsen estimated that 80 percent of 
the messages he received favored impeachment.  Tower explained that once he agreed to 
release the tapes, sentiment toward Nixon remained 2 to 1 for removal from office, down 
from 10 to 1 initially.  Texas members of the House of Representatives reported similar 
anti-Nixon correspondence.  A congressional aide contemplated: “I’ve never seen such a 
polarization of views.  A lot of the letters were violent.  But I don’t think there was any 
kind of organized letter-writing campaign.  These letters, in a lot of cases, were coming 
from people who had never written their congressman before.”24  George Bush served as 
chairman of the Republican National Committee from January 1973-September 1974, 
throughout the Watergate crisis.  Bush had the unenviable tasks of defending Nixon while 
personally unsure of the president’s innocence and protecting the Republican Party 
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during the worst political crisis in its history.  He too received numerous letters and 
messages decrying Nixon and Watergate.25 
 
Bentsen’s Rising Star 
As the Republican Party wallowed through the Watergate mess, Texas’s 
Democratic senator captured the attention of political observers at home and in 
Washington.  A September 1973 Washington Post article discussed Lloyd Bentsen’s 
growing clout in the Capitol.  Characterizing him as “soft-spoken, hard-working, 
persuasive, extremely well organized and systematic and known as a follow-through 
man,” the newspaper noted that Democratic operatives increasingly mentioned Bentsen 
as a rising political star.  A veteran Senate staffer concluded: “Probably he is the best 
Democratic senator to come into the Senate in the last dozen years.”  An unnamed 
Democratic leader similarly asserted: “He’s the most promising first-term senator in the 
Senate—without question.”  Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott, a Republican from 
Pennsylvania, noted: “He’s a heavyweight.  He has made his mark as a speaker.  He 
carries the ball intelligently and aggressively.  When we’re up against him we know we 
have to work.”  The Washington Post explained that Bentsen possessed adroit skills, 
pursuing “a moderate political stance in which he has supported civil rights, Democratic 
economic programs and end-the-war legislation, while looking after the oil interests of 
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his native state.”  Pundits often mentioned the senator as a potential presidential 
candidate in 1976, which Bentsen and his supporters welcomed.26 
 During 1973 and 1974, in preparation for a possible presidential run, Bentsen 
gave several speeches addressing the nation’s anxious mood.  In April 1974, Bentsen 
characterized the executive branch and its contemporary problems: “The office of the 
presidency has deviated considerably from the original intent.  It has become more 
remote, more exalted, more powerful.  And it has become more distrusted, at home and 
abroad.”27  While speaking at Texas Christian University the same month, Bentsen 
contemplated the negative attitude toward government permeating society as a result of 
the Watergate scandal.  He argued that the “dirty tricks of the 1972 campaign weren’t 
typical of American politics” but instead were “un-Democratic, un-Republican, and un-
American.”  Bentsen maintained that the United States required “a good stiff shot of 
nationalism” and Americans should focus on the word “united” in their country’s 
nomenclature.  He extolled “the inner strength that we once radiated” and called for its 
renewal.  Bentsen’s comments illustrated political leaders’ concern with the profound 
cynicism amongst Americans weary from years of turmoil and scandal at home and 
violence and war abroad.  Democrats such as Bentsen especially hoped that they could 
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turn public dissatisfaction with Nixon and Watergate into a recapture of the White House 
in 1976.28 
 
Nixon’s Resignation 
 Nixon’s credibility crumbled throughout 1973 and 1974.  In July 1974 the U.S. 
Supreme Court unanimously ordered the president to provide all his secret recordings to 
the House Judiciary Committee for its impeachment investigation, and the tapes showed 
that Nixon clearly had been involved in the Watergate cover-up.  Several Texans played 
prominent roles in the impeachment process.  Houston lawyer Leon Jaworski replaced 
Archibald Cox as Watergate special prosecutor and Representative Jack Brooks of 
Beaumont, a key member of the House Judiciary committee, drafted articles of 
impeachment against Nixon.  Representative Barbara Jordan of Houston, the first African 
American woman elected to the House from the South, gave an impassioned address 
before the House Judiciary Committee advocating Nixon’s impeachment that won praise 
from citizens across the country for its persuasiveness.29  Lloyd Bentsen delivered a 
nationwide speech for Democrats attacking the president’s economic and inflation 
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policies that also received widespread acclaim.  By the summer of 1974, most Texans, 
like a majority of Americans, favored Nixon’s removal from office.30 
 John Tower remained a staunch defender of Nixon throughout the Watergate 
scandal.  However, upon the release of the “smoking gun” tape revealing the president’s 
implication in Watergate, Tower recognized Nixon could not escape removal from office.  
Tower reflected: “One of the saddest and most dramatic moments of my career came at a 
Republican Policy Committee lunch when Barry Goldwater proclaimed, ‘This man 
[Nixon] has lied to me for the last time!’”31  On August 9, 1974, Nixon resigned the 
office of president of the United States, his dreams of building a new political majority 
shattered and his own career ruined like no politician before or since.   
Gerald Ford became president under these tumultuous circumstances, but lost 
much of his political goodwill when he issued a full pardon to Nixon for his Watergate 
misdeeds.  Ford hoped the pardon would remove the trauma of Watergate from the 
national consciousness, but many Americans criticized him for saving the disgraced 
Nixon from a public trial while other former White House aides served prison time.  
Because of the Watergate scandal and Nixon pardon, Democrats dominated the 1974 
midterm elections, picking up four Senate and forty-nine House seats to increase their 
strong majority in Congress.  Democrats similarly swept state offices in Texas.  Due to 
changes in the state constitution, 1974 marked the first time elected candidates for 
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statewide office would serve four-year, rather than two-year, terms in Texas.  After again 
defeating Frances Farenthold in the Democratic gubernatorial primary, Briscoe handily 
beat Republican Jim Granberry (a former mayor of Lubbock) and Raza Unida nominee 
Ramsey Muňiz in the general election to win a second term as governor.  William P. 
Hobby similarly coasted to reelection as lieutenant governor. 
Yet even with a chance to express displeasure with Watergate by voting against 
Republicans, Americans retained a cynical view toward their elected officials, regardless 
of party, after the midterms.  The turmoil of the Johnson and Nixon years left many 
Americans disillusioned with the national state of affairs.  In early 1975, Bentsen 
discussed the negative mood plaguing the country before the Port Arthur Chamber of 
Commerce: 
It seems to me that the most urgent work that faces us today as a nation is 
what I call the recovery of confidence. . . . 
Of course I mean economic confidence, for our economic troubles are 
obvious and acute.  But I mean much more: I mean the recovery of confidence in 
ourselves; confidence in our political system; confidence in our own goodness 
and decency as a people—and confidence in our credentials for world leadership. 
. . . 
What seems to me different—and disturbing—about the present moment 
is the note of pessimism and fear that I detect.  We seem not so full of belief in 
ourselves as we once were; not so heedless of danger and difficulty—and not so 
eager to roll up our sleeves and go to work. . . . 
At the present moment we need the lift in morale that can come only from 
getting on with the job.  We need to recapture our sense of being part of great and 
worthwhile efforts that affect the whole world.  We need to restore the confidence 
of the American people in themselves, as well as their institutions of 
government.32 
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La Raza Unida and the Chicano Movement 
 During the 1960s and 1970s, Mexican Americans organized in protest against 
discrimination in Texas, influenced by the larger civil rights movement sweeping the 
nation.  Texas was a unique state, in that in addition to having an oppressed African 
American community, it also consisted of an even larger Mexican American, or 
“Tejano,” population that too had experienced longstanding prejudice.  Mexican 
Americans in Texas had formed groups that worked with the Anglo establishment to aid 
their communities and promote equal rights, such as the League of United Latin 
American Citizens (LULAC) in 1929 and the G.I. Forum in 1948.33  By the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, however, a younger generation of Tejanos, influenced by black 
nationalism and separatist groups across the country, questioned the notion of 
accommodation promoted by older Mexican American civil rights leaders.  They instead 
looked toward the “Chicano Movement,” which promoted individual empowerment, 
community engagement, and celebration of Hispanic, or “Chicano/a” culture.  In Texas, 
La Raza Unida Party (RUP) served as the home for Chicano activism, achieving 
impressive results and transforming politics in the Lone Star State. 
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In the early 1960s, the small town of Crystal City, located in the Winter Garden 
area of South Texas, became the focal point for Tejano militancy.  Three-fourths of 
Crystal City’s 9,500 residents were Mexican American, and most lived in poverty.  The 
town’s white minority forcefully maintained political and economic power over Tejanos.  
In the spring of 1963, five Mexican American candidates shocked the entire state by 
winning the town council elections in Crystal City.  Aided by the Political Association of 
Spanish-speaking Organizations (PASO) and the teamsters union, “Los Cinco 
Candidatos” foreshadowed growing Mexican American activism in South Texas, the 
state, and the rest of the nation.  Lawrence Goodwyn of the Texas Observer commented 
following the election of “Los Cinco”: “One is conscious of the pain of poverty, the 
tragedy of a town in which decent people are diminished by feelings they cannot 
suppress, and the fact that in South Texas, the vanguard of a million Mexicanos has 
begun to make their voices heard, as a cry, a plea, or a demand.”34 
Although whites recaptured the city council from “Los Cinco” two years later, 
Mexican Americans in Crystal City and throughout Texas continued to labor for equality 
throughout the sixties, inspired by the national civil rights movement.  As previously 
discussed, during the summer of 1966 a group of protestors marched from the Rio 
Grande Valley to Austin to raise awareness of the plight of migrant workers in rural 
South Texas.  When John Connally, Ben Barnes, and Waggoner Carr callously attempted 
to thwart the march by meeting the group in New Braunfels, this public relations disaster 
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for Texas Democrats only encouraged Mexican Americans to look toward other political 
parties for leadership.  In 1967, five young activists founded the Mexican American 
Youth Organization (MAYO) in San Antonio, and chapters spread across the state.  
MAYO advocated economic empowerment, local educational control, and an end to law 
enforcement harassment in the Hispanic community.  MAYO especially appealed to 
younger Tejanos, who extolled Chicano nationalism through adopting indigenous 
methods of dress, decoration, and art that highlighted a distinct ethnic identity.  As 
MAYO grew, many members began calling for a separate Chicano political party.35 
Crystal City again became the center of Mexican American protest during the late 
1960s and early 1970s, as the birthplace of such a political party.  In December 1969, 
angered by policies designed to ensure the selection of a white homecoming queen, 
Hispanic students at Crystal City High School began a “walkout” in protest that lasted a 
month before school officials relented to their demands.  José Angel Gutiérrez, a native 
of Crystal City and one of the five founders of MAYO, helped the students and their 
parents strategize during the course of the walkout.  Charismatic and brilliant, Gutiérrez 
had returned to his hometown upon earning a graduate degree in political science, 
determined to labor for equal rights for Mexican Americans.36  Following the success of 
the walkout, in January 1970 at Campestre Hall in Crystal City, Gutiérrez and MAYO 
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supporters formed a new Chicano political party they called “La Raza Unida” (RUP), or 
“the United People.” 
La Raza Unida grew rapidly during the ensuing years.  MAYO members directed 
much of their energy toward the new party.  Gutiérrez especially labored to organize the 
RUP in Crystal City, and by the spring of 1971, the party captured every seat on the city 
council and school board.  Raza Unida elected officials pursued federal dollars for city 
improvements and established a free lunch program, bilingual education, and Chicano 
history courses in the local schools.  Encouraged by success in Crystal City, RUP leaders 
sought to expand the party’s influence.  Within the year, La Raza Unida won several 
local elections in nearby Carrizo Springs, Cotulla, Pearsall, and Eagle Pass.  The party 
also achieved victories in cities further away, such as Kingsville, Robstown, and San 
Marcos, illustrating its growing strength in Texas politics.  As the 1972 elections 
approached, La Raza Unida decided to run a slate of statewide candidates for office.  The 
party nominated Ramsey Muňiz, a Baylor University-educated lawyer and administrator 
with the Waco Model Cities program, for governor, and Alma Canales, a farm worker 
and former journalism student at Pan American University, for lieutenant governor.  
Young and attractive, Muňiz and Canales represented for many Chicanos the party’s 
commitment to youth and women’s empowerment.  Muňiz’s candidacy pulled votes 
away from the Democratic Party and made Briscoe’s margin of victory over his 
Republican opponent narrow.  La Raza Unida’s influence spread to other states as well, 
and in the fall of 1972, the party held its first national conference in El Paso, where it 
elected Gutiérrez national chairperson.  The Chicano movement, with La Raza Unida at 
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the forefront, emerged as a critical aspect of political life in the southwest during the 
1970s.37 
 
The ERA Controversy and the Rise of the Culture Wars 
In 1972, the United States Congress overwhelmingly passed the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA) and submitted it to the states for ratification to the Constitution.  
Designed to ensure equality for women, the Equal Rights Amendment prohibited gender 
discrimination and initially won widespread acclaim.  The legislatures of Texas and 
twenty-nine other states approved the ERA in 1973.  By the mid-1970s, however, 
reaching the necessary three-fourths of states needed for ratification became difficult, and 
many Americans began questioning the merits of the ERA, even in those states which 
already had voted on the measure.  A backlash against the feminist movement led by 
Phyllis Schlafly, a housewife and longtime conservative activist, threatened the potential 
ratification of the ERA.  Schlafly and her supporters argued that the ERA represented a 
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feminist plot designed to undermine families, create a gender-neutral society, and further 
damage the moral fabric of an already troubled United States.38   
Many Texans paid notice to the warnings of anti-ERA advocates.  A Farmers 
Branch lady argued that women already enjoyed equal pay protection and pleaded with 
the Texas governor: “There are too many undesirable side effects that could come about 
from this Amendment—a few are: loss of privacy in public restrooms, hospitals, 
dormitories, and public schools. . . .  I do not want my sons’ wives to be drafted and my 
sons left to raise their children.  I do not want my daughters to be drafted and sent into 
combat.”39  Several individuals employed religious imagery in their opposition to the 
proposed amendment.  A Carrollton woman declared: “Our country is deteriorating fast 
enough without voting trash such as this into our constitution.  I feel this amendment 
denies me my rights as a woman and a Christian, and I have no desire to bring my child 
up in a unisex society.  If God had meant for us to be the same, he would have made us 
the same.”  A school administrator from Dalhart wrote Briscoe: “On the surface, it 
sounds like a good piece of legislation, but I am afraid that it will lead to further 
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deterioration of the home as the basic unit of our society, and will undermine the role of 
the father as head of the household.  In my opinion, this is non-Christian.”40 
Opponents of the ERA often linked their criticism to other controversial issues of 
the “culture wars” raging in the country, including welfare and taxes, civil rights, the 
courts, feminism, abortion, and homosexuality.  The same Carrollton woman worried that 
“the ERA completely breaks down the family unit.”  She angrily complained to the 
governor: “It seems the lawmakers and courts of this country are so involved in giving 
the minorities and welfare majorities their rights, that they forget they are taking away the 
rights of the middle class, hard-working, tax-paying citizens, whose taxes keep the 
welfare majority in beer and cigarettes.”  A doctor from El Paso labeled the ERA “one of 
the most decadent pieces of legislation in our history in trying to legalize homosexualism 
[sic] and lesbianism.”41 
Taxes and welfare programs remained controversial in the 1970s, and many 
Texans perceived the Democratic Party as holding much of the blame for the nation’s 
allegedly reckless fiscal policies.  In 1975 a Houston man mailed Lloyd Bentsen an 
editorial decrying federal spending on food stamp programs.  He commented: “The 
enclosed editorial on the latest government give-away at the expense of the middle class 
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taxpayers is gross financial recklessness.  Does this represent the thinking of Democratic 
intelligence or is it a case of a bureaucracy gone berserk?  Many more programs like this 
and the U.S. will be bankrupt, financially, morally and every other way.”  In a postscript 
the Texan warned his senator: “Perhaps George Wallace may save this country from 
brainless liberal do-gooders.”42  A Garland likewise woman complained: “Without 
exception, the food stamp recipients I have observed buy large quantities of soft drinks, 
snack foods (chips, pretzels, etc.), pastries (pies, Twinkies, etc.), and sugared cereals.”  
She called for stricter nutritional requirements for food stamp purchases.43  An Austin 
man injected race into the argument and similarly declared: “I am one of the ‘Silent 
Majority’ that will remain silent no longer.  I have paid income taxes since I was 16 years 
old and am tired of paying people who are capable of working not to work.  If you 
gentlemen in the Congress would wake up you’d find that by representing minorities and 
being concerned about their particular desires you have estranged the group of citizens 
who pay the bills for such giveaway programs.”44 
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Religious Americans experienced divisions over the culture wars of the 1970s, 
especially with issues relating to abortion, feminism, homosexuality, and the place of 
religion in public life.  Disunity particularly plagued the Southern Baptist Convention, the 
largest Protestant denomination in Texas and the South, as conservative members 
increasingly lamented the group’s moderation on social issues and Biblical interpretation.  
Since the Supreme Court’s 1962 ruling in Engel v. Vitale prohibiting prayer in public 
schools, many Christian conservatives had sought a constitutional amendment protecting 
what they viewed as a cherished right of religious expression.  Bentsen supported such an 
amendment, and had made it an issue in his campaign against Ralph Yarborough.  In the 
fall of 1971, however, the House of Representatives defeated a change to the U.S. 
Constitution that would allow prayer in public schools.  The Southern Baptist Convention 
and the Baptist General Convention of Texas, controlled by moderates during the early 
1970s, went on record against the proposed amendment, believing it would violate the 
separation of church and state, a historic Baptist doctrine.  This outraged many 
conservative Baptists and contributed to a sense of unease within the denomination, as its 
different wings wrestled for control of the Southern Baptist Convention.45 
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Turmoil in mid-Seventies Texas Politics 
As Texans wrestled with the ERA and culture wars, several dramatic headlines 
grabbed the attention of the state’s politics during the mid-seventies.  In July 1974, just 
days before Nixon’s resignation, a Washington, D.C., grand jury indicted John Connally 
on charges of bribery and obstruction of justice.  Jake Jacobsen, a Texas lawyer and 
former LBJ aide besieged by bankruptcy and his own legal problems, alleged that he had 
given Connally 10,000 dollars in bribes from Associated Milk Producers, Incorporated 
(AMPI), to influence milk prices during his time as treasury secretary.  In the context of 
the Watergate scandal, when so many Nixon administration officials faced prison time, 
Jacobsen’s claims seemed plausible.  Connally denied such crimes and hired the best 
legal defense team in the country, not only to win acquittal, but to salvage his political 
career.  Connally’s chief defense lawyer brilliantly discredited Jacobsen as a corrupt 
snitch attempting to save his own skin and called in an all-star cast of character witnesses 
who defended the former Texas governor, including Lady Bird Johnson, Robert 
McNamara, Dean Rusk, Billy Graham, and Barbara Jordan.  Most Texans remained 
steadfast in their support of Connally and viewed the ordeal as an attack on one of their 
own by liberal Washington bureaucrats.  A dark joke making the rounds in Texas held 
that Connally must be innocent, as 10,000 dollars was too little an amount needed to 
bribe the former governor.  Upon his acquittal of all charges in April 1975, Connally 
received a hero’s welcome in his native state, including a standing ovation before the 
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Texas Legislature.  The national perception of Connally, who still harbored ambition for 
the presidency, remained in question, however.46 
The failure of Texas to ratify a new state constitution during the fall of 1975 also 
garnered headlines and divided Democrats.  For years reformers had hoped to modernize 
Texas’s constitution, a cumbersome document of the post-Reconstruction era that 
provided a weak state government and frequently required amending to meet the needs of 
a booming twentieth-century state.  Following an earlier effort during the summer of 
1974 that just missed the required number of delegate votes, Texas lawmakers submitted 
for voters’ consideration eight propositions that would create a new constitution.  The 
provisions for annual sessions of the Legislature and reorganization of the state judiciary 
proved most controversial.  Although many prominent state officials, such as Bill Hobby, 
House Speaker Billy Clayton, and Attorney General John Hill supported the propositions, 
Briscoe announced his opposition to the new constitution, arguing it would create a larger 
government and interfere with the private sector.  He especially criticized its provision 
for annual sessions of the legislature, and urged Texans to reject all eight propositions on 
the November 4 ballot.  Texans responded accordingly, defeating each proposal and 
thereby preventing the creation of a new state constitution.  While Briscoe and his 
conservative supporters prevailed in thwarting what they perceived as an unnecessary 
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expansion of government, the governor’s vocal opposition angered many voters and 
decreased his popularity in the state.47 
By the mid-1970s, multiple problems, both external and internal, troubled the 
Raza Unida Party.  In addition to the typical opposition from the white political 
establishment in Texas, the RUP experienced significant antagonism from Congressman 
Henry B. Gonzalez of San Antonio, the state’s most prominent Hispanic elected official.  
Gonzalez fervently expressed his displeasure with the group and characterized its 
members as racial extremists.  José Angel Gutiérrez later argued that Gonzalez felt 
threatened by the rise of La Raza Unida: “Henry B. had made it a lifetime goal to nip 
incipient Mexican American leadership in the bud.”  He contended: “During the rise of 
MAYO, Gonzalez took it upon himself to attack and vilify those of us involved.  From 
the floor of Congress, he openly denounced MAYO leaders as ‘Brown Bilbos,’ as hate 
mongers in the tradition of the racist U.S. senator from Mississippi (1936-1946) by the 
name of Theodore Bilbo.”  Gonzalez opposed school walkouts, political organizing, and 
other efforts of the Raza Unida Party.  Gutiérrez decried that “Henry B. made it safe for 
the gringo racist to be against us.  He was their couch to sit on.  If Henry B. was against 
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us, so were they.  Now the gringo racists did not have to be overtly racist; they could 
simply state that they were supporting Henry B. Gonzalez.”48   
The Raza Unida Party further suffered from disunity within its own ranks.  
Gutiérrez himself became increasingly controversial.  He clashed with other national 
leaders such as Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzales of Colorado over the direction of the 
organization.  Back home in Crystal City, a local faction within the RUP criticized 
Gutiérrez as dictatorial and labored to undermine his leadership.  The party particularly 
divided on the merits of a well-publicized trip taken by Gutiérrez to Cuba in 1975 to 
study the country’s programs in health care, education, and farming.  Texas newspapers 
and Anglo politicians vocally denounced the RUP leader’s visit to the communist state as 
bordering on treason.  Perhaps most damaging was the arrest and conviction of Ramsey 
Muňiz, the party’s former gubernatorial nominee, for drug trafficking in 1976.  The 
downfall of Muňiz, arguably its most popular member, became a public relations disaster 
for the party.49 
The Raza Unida Party worried many white Texans.  John Lott, the mayor of 
Lytle, wrote his congressman, Abraham Kazen, Jr., a Democrat from Laredo, to express 
his anxiety about the financial management capabilities of certain municipalities.  He 
especially criticized the Raza Unida leadership of Crystal City.  Lott decried: “The Mayor 
of Crystal City has stated in the paper that the city is broke and are [sic] looking to the 
Federal Government or the State Government or the Red Cross to help.  They are broke 
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because of fiscal irresponsibility and in spite of the millions of dollars the Federal 
Government has poured in there [sic] support [of] a communist block which is against 
our country and everything we stand for.”  He further warned: “If the Federal 
Government does help out Crystal City, there will be some new faces in Washington.”  
Lott continued: “The voters in the United States are getting very upset with the fiscal 
irresponsibility of the Federal Government.  At the rate it is going, it will soon be in the 
same condition as New York City and Crystal City.”50 
Jim Hightower of the Texas Observer reflected upon the contemporary state of the 
Raza Unida Party.  He argued that despite divisions and attacks from establishment Texas 
politicians, the RUP persisted, albeit it under great pressures.  As had been the case 
throughout its existence, “There has been a difference of opinion within the party over 
strategy; whether to campaign in statewide elections or to develop power in regional 
enclaves using that power to demonstrate the virtue of government by La Raza and 
expanding from there.”  According to Hightower, supporters of the former position won 
control of the party at its recent state convention, and therefore the RUP looked toward 
the 1978 state elections as its next major challenge.  The party also had begun organizing 
Mexican Americans in Texas cities, but this proved difficult, as besides the expensive 
costs, “urban Chicanos have not been shut out of participating in the Democratic Party, as 
they were in rural South Texas, so there is less inclination to jump at the lure of a 
Chicano party.”  Hightower further noted recent attempts by prominent Texas officials to 
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undermine the organization.  Attorney General John Hill and the Texas Rangers had 
conducted a corruption investigation in Crystal City for much of 1975 and 1976, 
seemingly intent on finding information with which to discredit the party.  At the same 
time, “Gov. Dolph Briscoe has been whipping up on Crystal City, La Raza Unida, and 
[José Angel] Gutiérrez, assailing them for ‘establishing a Little Cuba in Texas’ through 
their effort to develop a community-owned farm.”  Hightower noted: “This amounts to a 
heavy dose of demagoguery, but again the impact of the publicity is to hang a hardcore 
radical tag on La Raza, making its organizing job that much more difficult.”51 
 
The 1976 Elections 
The 1976 presidential election allowed voters the opportunity to select a chief 
executive for the first time since the Watergate scandal.  Feeling bullish about their 
party’s chances, a number of prominent Democrats entered the race, including 
Washington Senator Henry Jackson, California Governor Jerry Brown, and Alabama 
Governor George Wallace.  Lloyd Bentsen also declared his candidacy, presenting 
himself as a moderate.  A September 1975 article in Time described: “Bentsen has tried to 
hug the middle of the road more closely than any other candidate.  A wobble either to the 
left or the right makes him distinctly uneasy.  ‘Others are trying to move toward the 
middle of the party,’ he says.  ‘But I don’t have to move.  I’m already there.’”  Time 
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noted that Bentsen hoped to emerge as a compromise choice if the national convention 
deadlocked.52 
However, Bentsen faced the first serious setback of his political career when his 
presidential campaign foundered.  He could not garner much excitement amongst 
Democratic voters, many of whom wanted a candidate from outside Washington in the 
post-Watergate climate.  Bentsen dropped out of the race in February 1976 following 
poor showings in the Mississippi and Oklahoma primaries, states he believed he should 
win.  He faced additional problems when Phil Gramm, an economics professor at Texas 
A&M University, challenged him in the Texas Democratic Senate primary.  Gramm 
portrayed himself as more conservative than Bentsen, and thus more in line with Texans’ 
political views.  He attacked Bentsen for supporting the renewal of the Voting Rights 
Act, which had been amended to include more oversight of Texas in an effort to combat 
discrimination toward Mexican Americans.  Gramm also claimed the senator had made 
little progress in fighting against busing because he was more concerned about running 
for president and did not want to offend more liberal voters.53 
Ultimately the power of incumbency and his popularity across the state helped 
Bentsen defeat Gramm in the primary.  Yet Bentsen’s failed presidential campaign and 
Gramm’s negative attacks exposed vulnerabilities for the heretofore powerful senator.  
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The Congressional Quarterly, in its preview of the 1976 Senate race in Texas, analyzed 
Bentsen’s recent political endeavors: 
It has not been a good year for Bentsen.  His national presidential 
candidacy collapsed in February after a poor start in the caucuses, and his 
favorite-son candidacy was embarrassed in the May 1 Texas primary when he 
won only six out of 98 delegates.  Bentsen won renomination by a 2-1 margin, but 
his opponent received more than 400,000 votes and peppered Bentsen throughout 
the campaign with charges that the incumbent had forsaken his conservative 
Texas heritage in an unsuccessful attempt to establish a national constituency.   
 
Ironically, Bentsen, who had challenged Ralph Yarborough from the right in 1970, now 
faced criticism from some conservatives.  Nonetheless, the Congressional Quarterly 
maintained that Bentsen held a lead over his general election opponent Alan Steelman, a 
Republican congressman from Mesquite.  Although fiscally conservative, Steelman’s 
moderate views on abortion and support of the Equal Rights Amendment made many 
Texas Republicans wary of their Senate nominee.54 
Texas became a crucial state in the 1976 Republican presidential primary.  
Former California Governor Ronald Reagan challenged President Gerald Ford for the 
GOP nomination.  Exuding charm and utilizing a gift for public speaking, Reagan, 
previously a Hollywood actor, became very popular among Texas conservatives.  He 
attacked Ford as an irresponsible leader who failed to live up to conservative values.  
James Baker of Houston, who worked in the Ford White House, believed that Henry 
Kissinger and the foreign policy of détente hurt the president in Texas.  Baker recalled: 
“Reagan repeatedly accused the secretary of state of taking a defeatist posture toward the 
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Soviet Union, of believing that the ‘day of the U.S. is past and today is the day of the 
Soviet Union,’ of ‘giving away our own freedoms.’  Real peace, Reagan argued, ‘does 
not come from weakness or retreat.  It comes from the restoration of American military 
superiority.’”  According to Baker, “Texas Republicans ate it up.”  He further described 
one notorious Ford campaign mishap: “It also didn’t help that the president had tried to 
eat a tamale in San Antonio without first removing its corn-husk wrapper—a 
gastronomical gaffe that won headlines across the state.”55  Harry Dent discussed the 
unpopularity of Ford in the South.  He criticized his selection of Nelson Rockefeller, the 
liberal governor of New York, for vice president.  Many Texans had hoped the president 
would choose George Bush or John Connally as his second in command.  Ford’s 
willingness to give some Vietnam protestors amnesty became equally problematic.  Such 
actions were unpopular with conservative southerners, whom Ford needed to win both 
the GOP nomination and the general election.56 
Ford himself recalled: “Texas was basically conservative and receptive to the 
Reagan line.  It was almost impossible to defuse his emotional appeals.”  George 
Wallace, still popular among many conservatives, continued as a candidate in the 
Democratic primary, even though his chances of victory were slim.  The Reagan 
campaign urged Wallace supporters to vote instead in the GOP primary, and encouraged 
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Texas Democrats dissatisfied with the liberal drift of their national party to move toward 
Republicans.  One particularly effective commercial featured a Texan who soberly 
declared: “I’ve been a Democrat all my life.  A conservative Democrat.  As much as I 
hate to admit it, George Wallace can’t be nominated.  Ronald Reagan can.  He’s right on 
the issues.  So for the first time in my life I’m going to vote in the Republican primary.  
I’m going to vote for Ronald Reagan.”57 
Texas law allows voters to select their party on primary day, a marked difference 
from many other states.  In a record turnout, some 419,000 Texans voted in the 1976 
Republican presidential primary, almost triple the amount who had voted in 1964 for 
Goldwater.  In a stunning rejection of a sitting president, Reagan won two-thirds of votes 
cast, illustrating his tremendous appeal in the Lone Star State.  Ford’s loss particularly 
damaged John Tower, who vocally had endorsed the president for reelection.  Years later 
Tower reflected: “To this day, some Texas Reaganites—many of them Democrats who 
switched to the Republican Party for the primary and stayed on—still have not forgiven 
me for supporting Ford.”58  The contest for the GOP presidential nomination continued 
all the way to the national convention later that summer in Kansas City, where Ford 
narrowly triumphed over Reagan, much to the chagrin of many conservatives.   
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Over 1.5 million Texans participated in the 1976 Democratic primary.  Many 
conservative Democrats, anxious to support Reagan, voted in the Republican primary, 
disqualifying them from participating in the state Democratic convention that summer.  
This strengthened liberal Democrats’ political clout and allowed them to gain significant 
control of the state party machinery in 1976.59  By the time of the Texas primary, former 
Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter had separated himself from the crowded field of 
Democrats to become the party’s presumptive nominee, and he easily carried the Lone 
Star State.  A peanut farmer from rural Plains, Georgia, Carter’s outsider status and 
unassuming demeanor appealed to many Americans.  He described himself as a “born 
again” Christian, and promised he would never lie to the American people, a refreshing 
statement in the wake of Watergate.60   
Thus the 1976 presidential election pitted President Ford against Jimmy Carter.  
Both candidates identified Texas as a crucial electoral state.  To secure his support, Carter 
promised Dolph Briscoe, as well as the governors of Oklahoma and Louisiana, that if 
elected president, he would remove price controls and deregulate the natural gas industry.  
Eager to obtain this economic benefit for Texas and see a Democrat back in the White 
House, Briscoe campaigned extensively for Carter across the state.61  Furthermore, with 
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great skill Texas’s own Barbara Jordan delivered the keynote address at the Democratic 
National Convention in New York.62  However, Carter later committed a major blunder 
in an interview with Playboy magazine.  In an attempt to discuss his religious views, 
Carter admitted to the controversial magazine that he had “looked on a lot of women with 
lust,” a surprising gaffe that caused Christian conservatives and many women to reassess 
his candidacy.  Carter additionally asserted: “I don’t think I would ever take on the same 
frame of mind that Nixon or Johnson did—lying, cheating, and distorting the truth.”  
Many Texans disliked Carter’s perceived insult toward LBJ.  Ford himself thought such 
comments would hurt Carter in Texas and help him win the state.63   
Although such missteps helped Ford cut into the former Georgia governor’s large 
post-convention polling lead, ultimately Carter won a narrow election.  The controversial 
pardon of Nixon and a struggling economy proved too much for Ford to overcome.64  
Carter carried Texas with 51 percent of the state’s vote.  However, an election analysis by 
Bentsen’s staff illustrated that Carter owed his victory in the Lone Star State to minority 
voters.  In a particularly telling development, the Carter-Mondale ticket attracted 
overwhelming support among Texas minorities but struggled with whites.  “Of the 
600,000 Mexican Americans who voted, eight out of ten voted for Carter,” and “of the 
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373,000 Blacks who voted, nine out of ten voted for Carter.”  However, “only four out of 
ten Anglos voted for Carter.”65 
Bentsen himself won a strong reelection, with approximately 57 percent of the 
vote.  In April 1977, a Bentsen aide completed an analysis of the 1976 Senate race in 
Texas.  The report concluded that the race “was unique in that its outcome was apparent 
before it began.  At the end of July, Senator Bentsen held a commanding lead in the polls 
and the Democrats had emerged from a unified convention with a highly popular 
candidate for President.  The Republicans in Texas were in disarray from a hotly divisive 
primary in which Reagan had won decisively and they had nominated a Senate candidate 
with no statewide political base.”  Bentsen held an advantage as “an incumbent with a 
wide base of support, whose ideology was thoughtful, moderate and pragmatic.”  
Furthermore, “all factions of the Democratic Party participated actively in the campaign,” 
and “the major effect of the Bentsen candidacy was that it held the Party together and 
kept ticket splitting to a minimum.”  Such unity in the state party, often absent in 
previous elections, was critical for the Democratic victory in 1976.  Moreover, the aide 
argued that Bentsen’s presence on the ticket helped Carter carry Texas in the presidential 
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contest.  Bentsen appeared to have rebounded from his poor showing in the presidential 
primary earlier that year.66 
 
Thus by the end of 1976, the Democratic Party had recaptured the White House, 
and had retained its strong majorities in Congress as well as dominance over Texas 
politics.  The country faced many issues pertaining to the economy, culture wars, and 
foreign policy, and divisions persisted between the party’s conservative and liberal wings 
underneath the glory of electoral victory.  How Jimmy Carter and other Democratic 
leaders responded to such challenges would be critical for the future success of the party, 
both in Texas and nationally.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
“We’ve Finally Come of Age in State Politics”: 
Booming Texas, Democratic Struggles, and Republican Triumph, 1977-
1984 
 
 
 Texas’s path to becoming a two-party state, and to eventual Republican 
dominance, accelerated during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  During these years, new 
immigrants came to the state in search of economic opportunity and a better quality of 
life, contributing to Texas’s increasing urbanization and suburbanization.  Many of these 
new Texans brought Republican loyalties with them, and had little use for the state’s 
historic ties to Democrats.  Even more crucial for Texas’s political transformation, 
President Carter and the Democratic Party struggled to solve the nation’s daunting 
domestic and international problems.  Their perceived weaknesses and leftward drift 
opened the door for Republicans to contend for political supremacy, at both the state and 
national levels.  More than any other individual, Ronald Reagan convinced voters that his 
brand of conservatism for the Republican Party best represented the aspirations of Texans 
and Americans during the 1980s.   
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Texas, the Sun Belt, and Demographics in the 1970s 
 Texas’s economy and demographics changed dramatically with the post-World 
War II national economic boom.  Like other Sun Belt states, Texas received massive 
federal funding for investments in defense and technology, especially in the 1950s and 
1960s, in no small part because of the influence of native sons like Lyndon Johnson and 
Sam Rayburn.  John Connally claimed that as governor: “I foresaw the coming of the 
Sunbelt boom, and I knew Texas wasn’t ready to take advantage of it.”  Therefore he 
took an activist approach while serving as the state’s chief executive, supporting 
education initiatives, bureaucratic reforms, and a long-term water management plan.  He 
called for revising the state constitution, and especially promoted investment in higher 
education.  Texas provided incentives for businesses across the United States to relocate 
to the Lone Star State.1 
High-paying jobs, a low tax rate, and warm weather brought millions of 
Americans to Texas during these years.  They primarily settled in the Houston, Dallas, 
and San Antonio metropolitan areas, further increasing the urbanization of the state.  
These new Texans both adopted and changed the state’s culture.  The heirs to Texas oil 
and ranching fortunes continued to possess great wealth, and many still flaunted it with 
the excess most famously described in John Bainbridge’s 1961 classic The Super-
Americans.  Yet by the 1970s Texas’s economy and society was much more diversified.  
Journalist William Broyles, Jr., reflected upon this transition: “The cowboys all moved to 
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Arlington and Pasadena and became John Travolta.  We were supposed to be country 
folk, but we were instead an urban and suburban culture, with world-class medical 
centers, universities, and NASA.  We spent more time in shopping malls than on the 
ranch.  ‘Texas Republican’ no longer was an oxymoron.”2 
Urbanization represented perhaps the most consequential development for the 
historically rural state.  In February 1967, Walter B. Moore, editor of the Texas Almanac, 
wrote: “That is the biggest thing that is happening in Texas and the United States—this 
flocking to urban and suburban counties.  As late as 1940, rural Texans outnumbered city 
residents.  By 1960, the state was 75 percent urban.  Now, the 22 urban areas alone 
contain about three-fourths of all Texans and many more are in cities outside that 
classification.”3 
In 1971 Rollin King and Herb Kelleher founded Southwest Airlines, which 
provided commuter flights between Texas cities.  Southwest marketed its convenience 
and attractive stewardesses to Texans, and eventually grew into a major national airline.  
Catherine Chadwick of Texas Monthly described the significance of this prosperous 
enterprise: “With every planeload that Southwest Airlines flew out of Hobby Airport [in 
Houston] and Love Field [in Dallas], Texas became more and more an urban state.  The 
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airline helped make possible the growth of new institutions like bank holding companies 
and the diversification of countless small businesses.  Equally as important, it reinforced 
the Texan’s natural feeling that the whole state was his home.  Southwest Airlines 
managed to shrink Texas without making it seem smaller.”4 
Texas’s largest city, Houston, exploded in growth from a population of 385,000 in 
1945 to 1,400,000 by 1975.  Kirkpatrick Sale, a writer who studied the Sun Belt, or as he 
termed it, the Southern Rim, declared in 1975: “In the last thirty years the city of Houston 
has become not only the oil capital of the country but also without question the energy 
center of the world.”  Sale argued that Houston also served as the dominant city of the 
Southern Rim region: “Houston sits in the very center of the Southern Rim, the pluperfect 
mid-century metropolis, the fastest-growing city in the nation in population, employment, 
and personal income.”  The author proposed that Houston had become synonymous with 
business and wealth, attracting hundreds of corporations each decade.  In 1962, in large 
part because of LBJ’s influence, the federal government named the city as the 
headquarters of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), ensuring 
that Houston would be at the center of President John F. Kennedy’s quest to place a 
human being on the moon by the end of the decade.  Furthermore, in 1969, Shell Oil 
relocated its main offices from New York to Houston, and became the largest company in 
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the oil-rich Lone Star State.  The city further benefited from the presence of Rice 
University, tourism, and professional sports teams.5   
The growth of Texas’s cities brought new opportunities for leisure and recreation 
to the state’s citizens.  Heralded as “the Eighth Wonder of the World,” the Houston 
Astrodome opened in 1965 as the first indoor and air-conditioned baseball stadium, 
complete with artificial “Astroturf” replacing the grass field.  The venue served as the 
home for the state’s first Major League Baseball team, the appropriately-named Houston 
Astros, and later housed the Houston Oilers of the National Football League, suitably 
termed to pay homage to the city’s major economic industry.  That same year Six Flags 
Over Texas, an amusement park in Arlington that utilized Texas history for entertainment 
purposes, began its successful quest to become one of the most popular vacation 
destinations for families.  The next year businessman Gerald Hines created an elegant 
multistory shopping center filled with upscale stores overlooking an ice skating rink 
called the Galleria, located in uptown Houston.  In 1968, San Antonio held the 
HemisFair, a widely attended event to celebrate the city’s 250th birthday and showcase its 
growth.  The Alamo City attracted its own professional sports franchise with basketball’s 
San Antonio Spurs in 1973.6 
Texas became prominent on the national popular culture scene.  The city of 
Dallas, reviled and blamed for John F. Kennedy’s death during the 1960s, experienced a 
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renewed image in the 1970s as a result of its professional football team and a celebrated 
television series bearing its name.  The Dallas Cowboys won two Super Bowls, and with 
iconic coach Tom Landry and talented players Roger Staubach and Tony Dorsett, 
cheered on by beautiful cheerleaders, became known as “America’s Team.”  With their 
famous silver helmets decorated by large blue stars, the Cowboys inspired fan loyalties 
across the country.  Even more popular, the drama Dallas followed the turmoil of a 
wealthy ranching and oil dynasty.  Audiences tuned-in with record numbers to watch the 
fictional Ewing family endure greed, lust, and betrayal at their South Fork Ranch.   
The 1980 film Urban Cowboy explored the theme of Texas’s urbanization and 
became a hit nationwide.  John Travolta played a small town Texan who moved to the 
Houston area to earn his fortune by working in an oil refinery.  By night he chased 
women and drank beer, danced to country music, and rode a mechanical bull at Gilley’s, 
a real honky tonk in Pasadena.  Aaron Latham, who wrote Urban Cowboy, described the 
significance of the mechanical bull for this film about the changing Texas: “It became a 
symbol for the plight of the urban cowboy, imprisoned in a mechanized world, a small 
cog in a vast urban machine, trying to recapture the unreachable past.”7 
Austin, the state capital and most liberal city in Texas, experienced a cultural 
awakening in the 1970s.  Austin benefitted from the growth of the University of Texas 
into a premier, world-class research university, the constant presence of state politicians 
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and their controversies, and a vibrant nightlife filled with music.  David Richards 
recalled: “The ingredients for this moment were suddenly all in place.  The 
radical/student movement had been around for a few years.  The UT faculty had become 
chock full of aggressive intellects. . . .  Then the music scene began to explode.  Willie 
Nelson left Nashville, grew a beard, and fell right amidst the counterculture.  Somehow it 
became all right for the shit kickers and the freaks to listen to music without getting into 
fistfights.  Eddie Wilson conceived of Armadillo World Headquarters and got it up and 
running. . . .  Everything was possible.”  He continued: “The rise of redneck rock and the 
outlaw image was intimately associated with the Armadillo.  Its opening somewhat 
coincided with Willie Nelson’s return to Texas and the emergence of an anti-Nashville 
movement led by Nelson, Waylon Jennings, and Jerry Jeff Walker, among others.”  
Richards discussed the uniqueness of this scene in Austin: “Although the state abhorred 
the lifestyles presented by the Armadillo and these musicians, the ‘don’t give a shit’ 
attitude they personified hit a responsive chord in the Texas psyche.”8 
As Texas grew, its new residents often adopted the state’s culture, but not 
necessarily its historic political ties to the Democratic Party.  Two October 1979 articles 
in the San Angelo and Corpus Christi newspapers analyzed this trend.  Roughly one 
million people moved to Texas from other states during the 1970s.  These new Texans 
tended to be younger, well-educated, and politically conservative.  Texas’s economic 
growth and warm climate attracted such immigrants.  “California, itself a top magnet for 
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mobile Americans, was Texas’s No. 1 source of new citizens, contributing more than 12 
percent.”  They also typically came from New York, Illinois, Ohio, Florida, and Georgia, 
plus the states bordering Texas.  The cities of the Lone Star State boomed as a result of 
this migration.  Austin pollster John Henson studied these demographic shifts and found 
that “new Texans quickly adopt Texas’s ‘color’ instead of trying to brand the state with 
eastern or northern ways.  The newcomer . . . ‘is relocating for the very reason he doesn’t 
like it where he came from.’”  The articles also discovered that more new Texans were 
Republicans than Democrats.  They brought their GOP loyalties from their home state 
with them and contributed to a growing Republican Party in Texas.9 
 
Carter’s Energy Policy and Texas 
 Despite election victory in 1976, longstanding divisions persisted within the 
Democratic Party.  Jimmy Carter recalled in his memoirs that upon going to Washington 
in early 1977: “Press interviews and other statements made it obvious that the 
overwhelming Democratic majority in both Houses was not about to embrace me as a 
long-awaited ally in the Executive Branch.  Several of the top leaders thought they should 
have been President, and the Democratic political campaigns of the last decade had 
engendered splits in our party between the liberals and conservatives that would prove 
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impossible to heal.  Neither group was confident that I was a member of its faction.”  
American voters had found Jimmy Carter appealing due to his outsider status and 
apparent honesty.  However, Carter’s election margin “had been a narrow one; it was 
generally doubted that I had a broad public mandate to carry out the programs I had 
espoused.”  The country’s complicated economic and social problems, as well as foreign 
policy challenges, would test the new president’s leadership and his party’s ability to 
govern.10 
In early February 1977, Carter delivered his version of a “fireside chat” to the 
American people, dressed in a cardigan sweater, and promised to develop a 
comprehensive national energy plan by later in the spring.  Since the 1973 embargo by 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Americans had worried 
about their country’s dependence on foreign nations for a large segment of its oil supply.  
The new president determined to tackle this issue head on.  However, Carter’s energy 
policy became controversial, especially in Texas.  During the campaign of 1976, Carter 
had promised Dolph Briscoe and other conservative Democrats from oil-producing states 
that if elected he would deregulate the natural gas industry.  Upon entering the White 
House, however, the president found this pledge difficult to keep.  In April 1977, as his 
administration developed energy legislation, Briscoe lobbied Carter to support 
deregulation of oil and natural gas.  Briscoe discussed: “As the nation’s largest energy 
producer and consumer, Texas has a keen interest in developing a National Energy Policy 
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that will encourage, not discourage, the production of oil and gas.”  He asserted: “The 
State of Texas maintains that the cornerstone of any national policy must be the free 
market system and not government control.  Governmental actions which are needed, as 
in the area of environmental protection and anti-trust law enforcement, should be applied 
equally to all levels and types of industry and should always stimulate, not discourage, 
competition.”  The Texas governor urged the president not to endorse “punitive taxes, 
competition standards, or price regulations” for the oil and gas industry.11 
In April 1977, Carter released his plan and dramatically declared the quest for 
sound energy policy “the moral equivalent of war.”  However, Carter’s program received 
an unfavorable response from across the political spectrum.  Its sheer density, with 113 
separate proposals related to tax credits for solar power and new fuel efficiency standards 
perplexed most Americans.  Carter called for a gradual deregulation of natural gas prices, 
which angered conservatives who expected an immediate removal of price controls and 
liberals who wanted none at all.  Carter spent much political capital over the next two 
years fighting for ultimate passage of the measure, which he himself later described as 
indeed “extremely complicated, but far-reaching in its beneficial effect on our nation.”12 
The Carter energy legislation was deeply unpopular in Texas, largely due to new 
petroleum taxes and its failure to deregulate natural gas immediately.  Briscoe termed it 
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“basically unfair to Texas,” and felt betrayed by Carter.  In a newsletter, the Office of 
State-Federal Relations for Texas described: “Carter’s proposal for natural gas will have 
a very significant impact on Texas because it will extend government controls to the 
intrastate market, that is, to gas produced and sold solely within the state.”  The report 
continued: “This intervention by the federal bureaucracy into a market previously free of 
controls has been criticized by Governor Briscoe as the first step toward federal 
allocation of Texas gas supplies.”  Briscoe maintained: “I think it would be disastrous as 
far as Texas industry is concerned, as far as Texas jobs are concerned, and it is a 
complete departure from the trust in our free enterprise system.”  A member of Briscoe’s 
energy advisory council calculated that Texas would pay 15 percent of the total energy 
taxes in the Carter plan, amounting to 4.1 billion dollars, approximately 3 to 4 times more 
per capita than other states.13 
In a May 1977 newsletter, Briscoe evaluated current policy issues facing Texas.  
He repeated his pledge that his administration would not raise taxes in the state.  The 
governor again critiqued the White House energy plan, arguing: 
Some of the energy proposals advanced by the President would cripple the 
Texas economy.  The plan to extend federal control to intrastate gas would 
compound a federal failure, because federal regulation of interstate gas for the 
past 22 years is one of the major causes of the energy crisis.  I have called parts of 
the President’s plan “a bureaucrat’s dream for a bigger bureaucracy.”  It relies on 
federal intervention, regulation, and taxation rather than mechanism of the free 
market system to bring us out of our energy problems and make us more self-
sufficient. 
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Be assured I will continue to speak out against this plan.  Our Texas 
congressional delegation and other delegations from the producing states need our 
firm support in changing those parts of the Administration’s policy which 
severely discriminate against the states which have been carrying the burden of 
energy production for years.  It’s time other states contributed their fair share.14 
 
Disagreement over energy policy caused division within the Texas Democratic 
Party, as conservatives supported Briscoe and liberals backed Carter.  Both politicians 
suffered politically and saw their approval ratings decrease in the state.  Briscoe recalled 
his great disappointment with Carter: “Once he was in the White House he forgot his 
promise.  I traveled throughout Texas . . . telling the voters that they could trust Jimmy 
Carter to keep his promise to deregulate natural gas production.  I walked out on a limb 
only to have him cut it off.”15 
 
The IWY Conference and Counter-Conference 
In November 1977, some 20,000 activists from across the United States met in 
Houston to celebrate International Women’s Year (IWY).  Feminists gathered to rally 
support for the Equal Rights Amendment, more opportunity in the workforce, and an 
overall better quality of life for women and children.  Prominent national leaders such as 
Lady Bird Johnson, Betty Ford, Rosalynn Carter, and Coretta Scott King attended.  
Barbara Jordan delivered the keynote address.  Ann Richards, who spoke on behalf of the 
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Equal Rights Amendment at the conference, recalled her excitement at the gathering: 
“We were saying that our lives would be improved and enriched by a support system, by 
talking out loud and helping to solve the needs of older women, who are the poorest of 
the poor; the problems of the single-parent woman raising children; the awful problems 
of poor and disadvantaged children themselves; the double stigma and difficulties of 
minority women.  This was International Women’s Year; we were saying that these 
problems were universal in the world.”16 
However, the IWY conference was not without controversy.  Many conservatives 
balked at the feminists’ endorsement of the ERA and abortion rights.  Phyllis Schlafly 
organized a concurrent counter-conference in Houston she called the “Pro-Family Rally” 
that received much conservative support.  This meeting of antifeminists assailed the ERA 
and hearkened women to return to their more traditional roles as wives, mothers, and 
caretakers of the home.  Schlafly declared the IWY a failure and asserted: “Houston will 
finish off the women’s movement.  It will show them off for the radical, anti-family, pro-
lesbian people they are.”17 
Indeed, many Texans shared Schlafly’s disgust with the IWY conference.  A 
woman from Dimmitt, who had just returned from the meeting “outraged,” wrote Texas 
first lady Janey Briscoe, claiming to speak for “the majority of the American men and 
women.”  She declared: “I do not support ERA in any way. . . .  I am against my tax 
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dollars being used for federal supported day care centers, abortion, and conventions such 
as the one just held in Houston.  Also, I object strongly to lesbians and homosexuals 
being placed in positions of influence over my children.”  The Panhandle woman further 
called for returning to prayer to public schools and asserted: “This country cannot survive 
without God on its side.”  She concluded with a hand-written plea to Mrs. Briscoe: “I had 
really hoped to see you and the Governor at the Pro-Life [Pro-Family] Rally in Houston 
but at least I could take pride in not seeing you at the IWY Convention and endorsing it.  
Please take pride in your Christian heritage and stand with me against ERA and all that it 
and IWY stands for.”18 
Dolph Briscoe likewise received numerous messages critical of the International 
Women’s Year Conference.  Attendees of the opposing Pro-Family Rally claimed to 
speak for the majority of women and regretted that Texas had served as the location for 
the IWY meeting.  One mass-produced petition listed the group’s opposition to: “ERA, 
federally funded day care centers, legalization of homosexuals and lesbians and 
placement of homosexuals in position of influence over my children, federally funded 
abortions, federally funded IWY conventions, and humanism and socialism replacing the 
democratic principles upon which America was founded.”  The group supported: “rapists 
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being denied bond, capital punishment, classification of child abuse as a capital offense, 
and equal rights for women (i.e. equal pay) but not the ERA.”19 
 
The 1978 Elections 
The 1978 Texas gubernatorial election became a watershed moment in the state’s 
political history, as a Republican won the governor’s mansion for the first time since 
Reconstruction.  Congressional elections that year provided Texans an opportunity to 
express their strong displeasure with the Carter administration’s policies, and furthered 
the development of a truly two-party state.   
Briscoe, state Attorney General John Hill, and former Governor Preston Smith all 
sought the Democratic Party nomination for governor.  Briscoe and Hill had possessed an 
uneasy working relationship for years, each suspicious of the other’s motives.  Hill had 
run for governor in 1968, and made no secret of his long-held desire for the office.  A 
trial lawyer, Hill presented himself as a liberal alternative to the more conservative 
Briscoe, who had suffered declining popularity because of his opposition to the proposed 
state constitution and tenuous relationship with Carter.  Smith, although disgraced by the 
Sharpstown scandal that ruined his governorship, characterized his candidacy as a 
conservative alternative to Briscoe.  The race became exceedingly bitter, particularly 
between Briscoe and Hill.  The Hill campaign criticized Briscoe’s leadership capabilities 
and labeled him a “do-nothing” governor, while the Briscoe camp painted Hill as too 
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liberal for Texas and driven primarily by vain ambition.  In the May primary, Hill 
triumphed with 52.4 percent of the vote to Briscoe’s 42.4 percent and Smith’s 5.2 
percent.  Many observers, including Briscoe himself, believed Texas voters felt 
uncomfortable with the incumbent governor’s desire to serve beyond six years, which 
would have made him the longest serving chief executive up to that point in the state’s 
history.20 
Assuming that victory in the Democratic primary essentially meant that he had 
won the governorship, Hill misjudged his general election opponent, William P. 
Clements, Jr.  An oil billionaire from Dallas, Clements had served as a deputy secretary 
of defense in the Nixon and Ford White Houses.  Knowing that Carter’s popularity was 
plunging in Texas by the day, Clements linked Hill to the president at every opportunity 
he had.  In one of the more memorable moments of the campaign, as the two candidates 
spoke at a dinner in Amarillo, Clements brought out a toy rubber chicken he named 
Jimmy Carter and vowed to hang “this dead chicken around Hill’s neck.”  Conservative 
voters loved the chicken gag, which received wide press coverage across the state.  The 
GOP nominee also benefited from the endorsements of Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, and 
John Connally, who spoke on his behalf at rallies in Texas.  The support of Ronald 
Reagan, who retained immense popularity in Texas following the 1976 election, 
particularly aided Clements.21  The divisive Democratic primary also hurt Hill.  Briscoe 
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supporters deeply resented Hill’s past attacks on the governor, and many conservative 
Democrats held little love for Hill, both politically and personally.  Although most would 
not use such language publically, some held the sentiments of the ever-colorful 
Comptroller Bob Bullock, who had stated during the primary, to great media attention: 
“Texas voters have a choice between a proven governor and a son of a bitch.”22  
Clements actively encouraged former Briscoe backers to support his conservative 
candidacy.   
The 1978 midterms in Texas represented a rebuke to the Carter presidency.  In a 
stunning upset, Clements narrowly defeated Hill by approximately 17,000 votes to give 
the GOP the Texas governorship for the first time in a hundred years.  Hill’s association 
with Carter and the acrimonious primary proved lethal to his candidacy.  Many Texans 
voted against Hill in a signal of displeasure with the White House, while a large segment 
of Briscoe Democrats similarly refused to support their party’s gubernatorial nominee.  
John Tower again won reelection to the U.S. Senate, this time over Democratic 
Congressman Robert Krueger of New Braunfels in an extraordinarily vicious campaign.  
Beyond highlighting their political differences, the two candidates regularly traded insults 
about each other’s personal lives, and Tower refused to shake Krueger’s hand at a 
Houston Press Club luncheon shortly before the election.  Carter’s disapproval ratings 
and Clements’s surging candidacy helped return Tower to Washington by less than one 
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percentage point.23  In two notable U.S. House races that illustrated the growing strength 
of the GOP in Texas, physician Ron Paul defeated Congressman Robert Gammage, a 
former member of the “Dirty 30,” for a Houston area seat, and George W. Bush, the son 
of the longtime Republican, almost beat conservative Democrat Kent Hance in a 
Panhandle district race.  Nationally, Democrats lost three Senate and fifteen House seats, 
although the party retained control of Congress.  Carter’s weak approval ratings, the 
troubled economy, and the controversial Panama Canal treaties that had passed earlier in 
the year proved liabilities for Democrats.24 
 
Stagflation and Malaise 
No domestic issue plagued Americans, and the political fortunes of Jimmy Carter, 
more than the economy during the late 1970s.  Throughout the decade, signs, such as the 
1973 energy crisis, pointed to the end of the long post-World War II economic boom that 
had allowed the American middle-class to prosper and presidents such as Lyndon 
Johnson the opportunity to build a national safety-net in the form of the welfare state.  
During Carter’s presidency, this period of economic prosperity finally ran its course as 
stagflation and a second energy crunch tormented the country.  A new term for a 
development that violated previous theories of economics, stagflation described the 
soaring inflation rate combined with the simultaneously rising unemployment numbers 
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menacing the United States during the Carter years.  A weak economy, Carter’s muddled 
energy policies, and tensions in the Middle East caused another fuel crisis, with gas 
shortages and long lines at service stations across the country.  (Ironically, the presence 
of oil in Texas helped the state weather much of the economic storm and continue its 
growth.  Texans remained concerned, however, that their state could not be insulated 
from the national crisis perpetually.)  The Carter administration’s initial efforts to combat 
these problems were futile and contributed to a growing belief across the country that the 
president, however well-intentioned, was in over his head.25 
By the summer of 1979, facing low approval ratings, Carter knew that drastic 
measures must be taken to save his presidency.  The country was in a depressed mood, its 
trust in government shaken by the tragedy of the Vietnam War and sordidness of 
Watergate, and its hope for the future besieged by anxiety over the economy and divisive 
social issues.  Carter retreated to Camp David to reflect upon the nation’s problems and 
prepare a major address.  He welcomed over a hundred political, social, and business 
leaders and sought their opinions and inputs.  On July 15, 1979, the president spoke to the 
nation from the White House and delivered what became known as the “Malaise 
Speech.”  Carter argued that despite his belief in a strong government, “all the legislation 
in the world can’t fix what’s wrong with America,” and that the country faced “a 
fundamental threat to American democracy.”  He explained: “The threat is nearly 
invisible in ordinary ways.  It is a crisis of confidence.  It is a crisis that strikes at the very 
heart and soul and spirit of our national will.  We can see this crisis in the growing doubt 
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about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a unity of purpose for our Nation.  
The erosion of our confidence in the future is threatening to destroy the social and the 
political fabric of America.”  Carter noted that the turmoil of the 1960s, failure in 
Vietnam, corruption with Watergate, and declining economic power had shaken the 
national conscience.  However, he stressed his “belief in the decency and the strength and 
the wisdom of the American people,” and urged “a rebirth of the American spirit.”26 
Although the president’s sobering speech at first won commendation, such praise 
quickly evaporated.  As the message of Carter’s address set in over the next several days, 
many citizens came to believe he placed too much blame on the American people 
themselves for the country’s ills.  What good will Carter had garnered further dissipated 
when, only days later, he asked all his cabinet secretaries to offer letters of resignation in 
an attempt to reorganize the government.  Carter’s firing of several members of his 
cabinet appeared to the public as an act of panicked desperation.  After this drastic move, 
the president’s malaise speech seemed a haughty rebuke by a disorganized parent angry 
at a citizenry he perceived as children.27 
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The Religious Right 
During the late 1970s, Christian conservatives, distraught by what they perceived 
as moral and spiritual decay in the United States, organized for political change and 
became a potent force.  Many on the so-called “religious right” originally supported 
Jimmy Carter, who frequently and vocally extolled his Christian faith on the campaign 
trail in 1976.  However, they soon found Carter’s policies as president too liberal and 
hostile toward their goals.  In 1979, a group of prominent religious conservatives founded 
what they termed the “Moral Majority” to rally voters and speak for political change.   
Jerry Falwell, a Southern Baptist pastor from Virginia, was one of the main 
creators of the Moral Majority.  In 1980 he wrote a book lamenting the state of affairs in 
the country and pleading for Christians to become politically motivated, which he 
appropriately titled Listen, America!  Staunchly conservative, Falwell declared: “Through 
the ballot box Americans must provide for strong moral leadership at every level. . . .  We 
must stand against the Equal Rights Amendment, the feminist revolution, and the 
homosexual revolution.”  In addition to castigating the women’s and gay rights 
movements as threats to American families, Falwell condemned the U.S.’s alleged lax 
abortion, alcohol, drug, and indecency laws.  He criticized the Carter administration for 
cuts in defense spending and its adherence to détente with the Soviet Union.  Falwell 
suggested that “Communists know that in order to take over a country they must first see 
to it that a nation’s military strength is weakened and that its morals are corrupted so that 
its people have no will to resist wrong.”  For the pastor, the United States faced the 
prospect of serious decline as a world power if it did not address these issues.  With 
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religious rhetoric and a dosage of Nixonian language he urged readers to become 
politically engaged: “I am convinced that God is calling millions of Americans in the so-
often silent majority to join in the moral majority crusade to turn America around in our 
lifetime.  Won’t you begin now to pray with us for revival in America?”28 
Many Texans supported the religious right.  W. A. Criswell, pastor of the First 
Baptist Church of Dallas, and James Robison, a televangelist from Pasadena, vocally 
echoed the sentiments of the Moral Majority to large audiences across the state.  Criswell, 
his protégé Paige Patterson, and Houston Judge Paul Pressler became major figures in the 
fundamentalist takeover of the Southern Baptist Convention, the largest Protestant group 
in both Texas and the U.S., during the late 1970s and 1980s, when conservatives forced 
out moderates and liberals in the denomination who did not adhere to strict orthodoxy in 
theology and politics.29  Many religious conservatives in Texas simply became concerned 
that the United States had abandoned what they saw as its religious foundations.  In 
December 1977, Madalyn Murray O’Hair, an atheist activist who lived in Austin, 
angered numerous Texans by calling for the removal of religious Christmas decorations 
from the state Capitol.  An Austin couple wrote Governor Briscoe: “It is a sad state of 
affairs when a ridiculously few try to change the centuries-old customs of the world and 
also denounce the existence of the Supreme Being.”  A Denton woman similarly 
complained: “We are supposed to be a Christian Nation, and I trust that we still are.  
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However, with all these things that Madalyn and the Women’s Lib Movement has [sic] 
done to cause our morals to drop, I sometimes wonder.”30 
 
Foreign Policy Problems 
 Carter’s struggles were not limited to the domestic front.  A series of international 
crises occurred during the later years of his presidency that further damaged his and the 
Democratic Party’s political fortunes.  Many Texans believed Carter appeared indecisive 
and powerless on the world stage.  Carter largely continued the controversial Nixon-
Kissinger policy of détente with the Soviet Union, and added a commitment to pursuing 
human rights in American foreign affairs.  Events in 1979 and 1980 called such methods 
into question.  In July 1979, the Sandinista National Liberation Front overthrew the 
Somoza family dictatorship, long supported by the U.S., in Nicaragua.  The Sandinistas 
created a leftist regime and allied themselves with Cuba, which troubled Americans.  In 
December 1979, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in a shocking disruption of détente.  
In response, Carter announced that the United States would boycott the 1980 Olympic 
Games in Moscow, a difficult decision that angered many Americans, especially athletes 
who had trained years for the contests.  A school of foreign policy thought known as 
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neoconservatism gained adherents during these years.  Consisting of former Cold War 
liberals, neoconservatives had long criticized détente and called for the United States 
aggressively to confront the Soviet Union and its influence and to promote democracy 
around the globe.  For them, the USSR invasion of Afghanistan and rise of the 
Sandinistas proved the failure of détente.31 
 The Iranian Revolution of 1979 especially haunted Carter and gave fodder for 
neoconservative claims about America’s declining world power and failure to support its 
allies.  In January Ayatollah Khomeini and militant Muslims overthrew the shah of Iran 
and established a theocracy.  In October Carter allowed the exiled shah, a longtime 
American ally in ill health, into the United States for a surgical procedure.  
Demonstrations broke out in Iran, Khomeini condemned the U.S. government, and on 
November 4, protestors sacked the American embassy in Tehran and took 53 Americans 
as prisoners.  Throughout 1979 and 1980, Carter unsuccessfully sought to win the 
hostages’ freedom.  A rescue mission in April 1980 ended in disaster when American 
helicopters crashed and killed crew members.  The Iran hostage crisis gripped the 
nation’s attention and, more than any other foreign policy issue, illustrated Carter’s 
weakness and the decline of American power abroad. 
  
 
 
                                                 
31For more information, see H. W. Brands, What America Owes the World: The 
Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
263-87. 
  267 
The 1980 Campaign 
Ronald Reagan, who had crushed Gerald Ford in the Texas Republican primary 
and came within a breath of winning the GOP nomination in 1976, remained 
conservatives’ top choice to replace Carter in 1980.  The charismatic Hollywood actor 
and former California governor retained great popularity in Texas, especially amongst 
conservatives weary of high taxes and social unrest.  A former Democrat who had 
supported Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, Reagan converted to a Republican during 
the early 1960s.  He contended, in a sentiment echoed by many conservative Democrats 
who moved to the Republican Party during the 1970s and 1980s, “I’m not so sure I 
changed as much as the parties changed.”  Reagan further explained: “I had been 
disturbed by the expansion of the federal government and its encroachment on our 
freedoms for a long time, but the problems increased dramatically during the years I was 
governor with the start of Lyndon Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ and ‘War on Poverty.’”  
Reagan especially decried the growth of the federal budget and deficit during the 1960s 
and 1970s, as well as the increased power of government bureaucrats over administrative 
decisions in Washington.32 
Millions of Americans shared Reagan’s views, constituting what he termed a 
“quieter revolution sweeping across the land.”  Reagan described this conservative 
backlash: 
It was a rebellion of ordinary people.  A generation of middle-class 
Americans who had worked hard to make something of their lives was growing 
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mistrustful of a government that took an average of thirty-seven cents of every 
dollar they earned and still plunged deeper into debt every day. 
There was a growing sense of helplessness and frustration across the 
country over a government that was becoming a separate force of its own, a 
master of the people, not the other way around. 
People . . . were losing respect for politicians who kept voting for open-
ended welfare programs riddled with fraud and inefficiency that kept generation 
after generation of families dependent on the dole. . . . 
There was unrest in the country and it was spreading across the land like a 
prairie fire.33 
 
Reagan entered the race for the 1980 Republican presidential nomination as the 
heavy favorite.  His main two competitors were both Texans.  John Connally believed 
enough time had passed since his 1975 bribery trial and longed to complete the scheme 
he once had hatched with Richard Nixon to win the White House.  Yet Connally’s 
candidacy completely flopped.  Too many voters associated him with Nixon and 
Watergate, and he found his Texas “wheeler-dealer” image impossible to overcome.  He 
seemed a relic of an earlier, tumultuous time, and later bemoaned: “I reminded everybody 
of Lyndon.”  He drew only 2 percent of the New Hampshire primary and handily lost to 
Reagan in the South Carolina contest, after which he announced his withdrawal from the 
race.  Spending over 11 million dollars, Connally’s campaign won only one supporter for 
the convention, who was ridiculed widely as “the 11 million dollar delegate.”34  George 
Bush gave Reagan a more serious challenge before the former California governor 
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clinched the Republican nomination.  To balance the ticket with a moderate candidate 
and heal minor wounds from the primary, Reagan named Bush as his running mate. 
On the Democratic side, in a rare occurrence for a sitting president, Carter faced a 
strong primary challenge in 1980.  Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, the 
youngest brother of the slain liberal heroes, attempted to wrestle the nomination away 
from the deeply unpopular president.  The Democratic Party remained terribly divided 
over Carter’s failed leadership on the economy and in foreign affairs.  Yet many 
Democrats questioned the wisdom of Kennedy’s campaign, fearing it only would weaken 
the party in the general election.  Conservative Democrats for years had criticized 
Kennedy as too liberal for the presidency.  Indeed, Texas voters only gave the 
Massachusetts senator 23 percent of the vote in the primary, despite Carter’s low 
approval ratings in the state.  Although Carter won the majority of the nation’s primaries, 
Kennedy continued his quest all the way to the Democratic National Convention in New 
York in August 1980, lobbying committed Carter delegates to change their votes, to no 
avail.  Once Carter won the nomination, the two candidates awkwardly appeared on stage 
together in a supposed show of unity.  However, audience members and viewers on 
television could sense the palpable hostility between Carter and Kennedy.35 
 As the general election campaign began, the Republican ticket possessed a wide 
lead in the polls over its Democratic counterpart.  Reagan criticized Carter’s domestic 
initiatives as wasteful and ineffective and foreign policies as misguided and dangerous.  
He especially rejected the widespread sentiment that the country was in a period of 
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malaise, and condemned the president’s attitude toward the nation, as most notably 
shown in the “crisis of confidence” speech.  A key theme for his campaign, Reagan 
hoped “to bring about a spiritual revival in America.”  Reagan recalled in his memoirs: 
“We had to recapture our dreams, our pride in ourselves and our country, and regain that 
unique sense of destiny and optimism that had always made America different from any 
other country in the world.”  As a candidate Reagan repeatedly declared “that America’s 
greatest years were ahead of it.”  Such optimism, coupled with Reagan’s incredible 
speaking skills, widely appealed to Texans and other Americans weary of Carter’s 
negative moral preaching.  Reagan seemed a breath of fresh air in comparison to the 
president, and gave voters hope that indeed the future could be better than the uncertain 
present.36 
 The critics and problems that had plagued Carter throughout his presidency 
continued to besiege him during the 1980 campaign.  Carter recalled the disparagement 
directed toward him by the religious right: “They accused me of being ‘soft on 
Communism,’ betraying America by ‘giving away the Panama Canal,’ subverting the 
teaching of children by organizing a new Department of Education, encouraging abortion 
and homosexuality, trying to destroy families by supporting the Equal Rights 
Amendment, and lowering America’s guard against the Soviet threat by negotiating the 
SALT treaty. . . .  The Reverend Jerry Falwell, the leader of Moral Majority, was one of 
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the worst, in that he had a large audience and was quite careless with the truth.”37  
Reagan, however, made a concerted effort to appeal to the religious right through 
denouncing abortion and calling for a strengthening of traditional moral values in the 
United States.  In August 1980, he traveled to Dallas to address some 15,000 attendees at 
the Religious Roundtable’s National Affairs Briefing, and declared: “I know you can’t 
endorse me, but I want you to know that I endorse you and what you are doing.”  
Reagan’s vocal support of its goals won him the allegiance of the religious right.38 
 The economy and foreign policy especially dogged the president in the 1980 
campaign.  To combat stagflation, Paul Volcker, Carter’s choice to lead the Federal 
Reserve Board, retracted currency from the nation’s monetary supply.  This action by the 
Fed, coupled with Carter’s admonition toward Americans to avoid credit card debt, 
produced a recession in 1980, a terrible development for any president seeking reelection.  
Although the U.S. dollar did stabilize, unemployment and interest rates remained high, of 
which Reagan repeatedly reminded voters.  The Iran hostage crisis and Soviet Union war 
with Afghanistan continued unabatedly throughout the year, illustrating Carter’s 
perceived powerlessness in foreign policy.  Reagan vowed to get the economy back on 
track through cutting taxes and to secure the United States’s position as the world’s 
preeminent power by dramatically increasing defense spending.  Such rhetoric 
emphasizing less government involvement in the economy coupled with a strong foreign 
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policy asserting American strength in the world particularly appealed to conservative 
Texans.  The Carter campaign attempted to portray Reagan as too militaristic and 
reactionary, but the GOP nominee dismissed such allegations with his charming presence 
and optimistic tone.  In the only debate of the campaign, just days before the election, 
Reagan concluded by looking into the television camera and asking the American people 
a sobering question: “Are you better off than you were four years ago?”39 
 
The Reagan Revolution 
Americans answered by expelling Carter from the White House and electing 
Reagan in a landslide.  The Reagan-Bush ticket won 44 states, including Texas, where it 
defeated the Carter-Mondale team 55 to 41 percent.  The Republican Party won control 
of the U.S. Senate for the first time in 28 years, and vanquished several prominent liberal 
Democratic incumbents, including George McGovern of South Dakota, Frank Church of 
Idaho, and Birch Bayh of Indiana.  Although the Democratic Party retained control of the 
House of Representatives, it lost 35 seats, including that of Robert Eckhardt, a longtime 
liberal from Houston.  In the Texas Legislature, the GOP picked up 3 senate and 14 house 
seats to increase its growing minority.  Voters in Texas and across the United States 
soundly rejected Jimmy Carter’s policies and found Ronald Reagan’s vision for the 
country more attractive.  Up and down the ticket, citizens punished the Democratic Party 
for its inability to solve the nation’s numerous domestic and international problems. 
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 Reagan’s inaugural address demonstrated that a new political era indeed had 
arrived.  Upon taking the presidential oath of office on January 20, 1981, Reagan 
declared in the most memorable line from his speech: “In the present crisis, government 
is not the solution to our problems; government is the problem.”  He explained: “It is my 
intention to curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment and to demand 
recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal Government and 
those reserved to the States or to the people.  All of us need to be reminded that the 
Federal Government did not create the States; the States created the Federal 
Government.”  The new president further continued: “It is time to reawaken this 
industrial giant, to get government back within its means, and to lighten our punitive tax 
burden.  And these will be our first priorities, and on these principles there will be no 
compromise.”40  A sharp departure from his predecessors, Reagan’s pronouncement 
portended a new age of conservatism in the United States.  The New Deal coalition and 
approach to governing that began under Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman and 
reached its zenith during the presidencies of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, 
appeared in disarray.  After the tumultuous years of the 1960s and 1970s, many 
Americans had grown weary and skeptical of politicians’ promises that government could 
ameliorate society’s ills.  Reagan’s soothing demeanor and rejection of such claims 
provided hope, especially for conservatives, that the 1980s could be a time of renewed 
tranquility at home and reassertion of American strength abroad. 
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 The new president moved quickly to implement his policies.  Reagan’s first 
official act as chief executive held special importance for Texas.  After his inaugural 
address, Reagan signed an executive order at the Capitol before the ceremonial lunch 
removing price controls on oil and natural gas, a move that thrilled most Texans.41  The 
same day, Iran finally freed the 53 American hostages it had held captive for over a year.  
Carter’s intense and furious efforts in the closing hours of his presidency to end the crisis 
produced this relieving result.   
 The resolution of the Iran hostage drama on the day of Reagan’s inauguration 
gave Americans hope that better days lay ahead.  In the early days of the Reagan 
presidency, Time magazine published an issue on what it termed “American Renewal,” 
and applauded the optimistic tone of the new chief executive.  George Bush wrote the 
chairman of Time to commend the article.  The vice president discussed: “I believe a new 
national consensus is forming that says, okay, we tried the sackcloth and ashes routine 
and we’re worse off than before.  America is a great country and should act like it.  This 
was the clear message I got on the campaign trail for two years, and it’s certainly the 
message with which President Reagan won the 1980 election.”42 
 Stabilizing the economy and reducing taxes remained Reagan’s top priority as he 
entered the White House, and his proposed budget reflected this goal.  Conservative 
Democrats in the House of Representatives, termed “Boll Weevils,” were crucial in the 
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ultimate passage of the Reagan economic plan.  Phil Gramm, the staunch conservative 
who unsuccessfully challenged Lloyd Bentsen in the 1976 Democratic Senate campaign, 
became a key Reagan ally, and simultaneously aided in the growth of the Republican 
Party in Texas.  Gramm covertly fed the White House secret Democratic budget strategy 
and co-sponsored Reagan’s fiscal policy in the House.  The Economic Recovery Tax Act 
of 1981 cut income tax rates by 25 percent and especially benefitted the rich through 
reducing capital gains and inheritance taxes.  Over 60 House Democrats, or Boll Weevils, 
supported the legislation, despite the pleading of their party’s leadership.  The Gramm-
Latta Budget, besides incorporating these tax changes, also reduced funds for food 
stamps, job training, welfare, and other Great Society programs.  However, it 
dramatically increased defense spending from 24 to 32 percent of the total budget, 
fulfilling a key Reagan campaign pledge.  The president determined to strengthen the 
nation’s military capabilities and maintain its supremacy over the Soviet Union, which he 
termed “the evil empire.”43 
Many Democrats decried the Boll Weevils’ abandonment of their party on the 
budget.  In mid-1981, Mickey Leland, a liberal representative from Houston, lambasted 
“the traitors in our Party, the ‘boll weevils’ who have taken our help, and our votes, and 
our trust, and have deserted us and have embraced Ronald Reagan and the Republican 
Party.”  He particularly condemned Representatives Phil Gramm and Kent Hance “who 
have crossed the line of acceptable political conduct by actually sponsoring the Reagan 
budget and tax programs,” and argued they “deserve a forceful, immediate response from 
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the Democratic Party—they ought to get punished.”  Leland pondered: “Do you think 
that Sam Rayburn or Lyndon Johnson would have stood for this violation of party 
loyalty?  I can assure they would not.  So I am carrying on the best of traditions.”  Leland 
exclaimed: “We must have the moral courage to speak out and say no to any attempts to 
move the Democratic Party any further to the right: It has already gone too far.”44 
And respond the national party did, although it did not produce the desired effect.  
Following the 1982 midterm elections, the House Democratic leadership expelled 
Gramm from the powerful Budget Committee.  In protest, Gramm resigned his seat and 
joined the Republican Party.  Just a couple of months later, in February 1983, he ran for 
his old seat touting his new GOP credentials and support for the Reagan budget, and won 
reelection convincingly.  Reagan possessed great popularity amongst conservative 
Texans, many of whom began to consider themselves more politically in line with the 
Republican Party. 
 
Texas Politics in the Early 1980s 
By the early 1980s, the Raza Unida Party ceased to exist in Texas.  The 1978 
elections especially had been difficult for the party, as its candidate for governor, Mario 
C. Compean, received only around 15,000 votes, far less than the amount required for 
state primary funds in the next election.  Many activists grew weary of internal strife 
within the party and the constant pressure of battling a hostile white political 
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establishment.  By the late seventies, the polarizing José Angel Gutiérrez and his 
supporters lost control of Crystal City and Zavala County to a coalition of more moderate 
Mexican Americans allied with local whites.  In 1981, the group forced Gutiérrez to 
resign as county judge, and he left the community to move to Oregon, signaling the end 
of the Raza Unida Party in the Lone Star State.45 
As the RUP declined, many Mexican Americans returned to the Democratic 
Party.  Indeed, a large number of Tejanos had never left and had viewed the Raza Unida 
Party as too militant and dangerous for the Hispanic community.  During the 1980s, as it 
lost conservative whites to the GOP, the Texas Democratic Party recruited Mexican 
Americans to its ranks, finally realizing that they represented an important constituency 
for the party’s future.  Elected mayor of San Antonio in 1981 at the age of 33, Henry 
Cisneros became one of the Democratic Party’s rising stars.  A tireless worker with good 
looks and an engaging personality, Cisneros advocated Tejano cooperation with white 
business interests. Political pragmatism, Cisneros stressed, could bring the most good for 
the Hispanic community.  The mayor’s arguments did not impress some older activists.  
José Angel Gutiérrez claimed: “Cisneros was recruited to blunt the growing militancy on 
the part of the Mexican American electorate and blunt it he did.  Young Henry was 
always a handy person to use in situations requiring a Mexican to step forward, very 
much in the fashion of Henry B. Gonzalez.”  Yet Cisneros held enormous popularity 
amongst Mexican Americans in San Antonio and across Texas, and became well-
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respected with white political and business leaders in the state.  Pundits began predicting 
that Cisneros would be the Lone Star State’s first Hispanic governor or senator.  Even 
Gutiérrez recognized that by the 1980s politics in the Tejano community had changed 
significantly from the previous decade, as older Chicano leaders “were eclipsed by the 
increasing political clout of Mexican American elected officials, overwhelmingly 
members of the Democratic Party.”46 
Strong support from the Hispanic community helped the Texas Democratic Party 
win impressive victories in the 1982 state elections.  Texas Attorney General Mark White 
defeated Clements by over 200,000 votes in the gubernatorial election.  Clements’s 
acerbic rhetoric and muddled policies as governor had alienated many Texans, especially 
minorities.  Although some voters blamed the Republican Party, now in control of the 
White House and the U.S. Senate, for failing to end the economic recession, Reagan 
himself remained popular in Texas.  More than any other factor, Lloyd Bentsen’s 
impressive campaign made the difference in these elections, skillfully using media and 
resources to turnout voters and win contests for Texas Democrats up and down the ballot.  
The election clearly illustrated that Bentsen remained the most powerful Democrat in 
Texas.  Bentsen and Lieutenant Governor Hobby easily won reelection, and their 
popularity significantly helped Mark White’s ultimate success.  Notable liberals won 
election, including Ann Richards as state treasurer, former editor of the Texas Observer 
Jim Hightower to the post of agriculture commissioner, Jim Mattox as attorney general, 
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and Garry Mauro to the office of land commissioner.  Although the more moderate 
Bentsen, White, and Hobby might disagree, longtime liberal lawyer David Richards 
considered this election the “triumph of the Yarborough Democrats,” as Richards, 
Mattox, Hightower, and Mauro had been supporters of the former senator for years.  For 
liberal Texas Democrats, the 1982 elections marked the fruition of their longtime goal of 
having a “balanced, truly Democratic ticket.”47 
 
The Reagan Revolution Solidified 
 The Democratic Party’s success did not last long, however—either in Texas or 
nationally.  As the 1984 elections approached, the country’s economy improved and 
Reagan’s popularity grew.  Reagan’s attacks on government waste at home and forceful 
condemnation of communism abroad, all given in his characteristic showman’s 
demeanor, appealed to voters.  Republican operatives plotted to utilize Reagan’s 
popularity in Texas to strengthen the GOP in the state.  Not coincidentally, the 
Republican Party chose the city of Dallas to host its 1984 national convention where it 
would re-nominate the Reagan-Bush team.  David Richards described another key feature 
in the decline of Texas and southern Democrats during the 1980s:  
During the Reagan/Bush years, the Justice Department played politics 
with a vengeance.  At the top, they understood full well that one way to destroy 
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the Democratic Party of the South was to have it be perceived as the party of 
minorities.  This was essentially an extension of Nixon’s southern strategy.  It was 
simple to achieve this goal by forcing the southern states, under cover of the 
Voting Rights Act, to maximize minority electoral districts at every opportunity.  
The strategy produced a three-pronged result.  It tended to eliminate white liberal 
Democrats who had depended on minority support; it created conflicts within the 
party, as white liberals and minorities were forced to battle over line drawing; 
and, finally, the resulting districts began to foster an image among white 
southerners that the party had been taken away from them.  None of these are 
necessarily bad, but the benefit to Republican strategists was obvious.48 
 
 
The Reagan-Bush ticket sought reelection in 1984 by touting its record in 
improving the economy and rebuilding American military strength in the dangerous Cold 
War.  Reagan again promoted a tone of optimism for the future, with his campaign 
emphasizing the theme “Morning in America,” suggesting that the country had escaped 
the turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s.  “Morning in America” especially contrasted Reagan 
with the Democratic nominee, Carter’s vice president, Walter Mondale, whom 
Republicans portrayed as another big government and high taxes liberal.  Down in the 
polls and seeking a jolt to his candidacy, Mondale named Representative Geraldine 
Ferraro of New York as his running mate, making her the first female vice presidential 
nominee of a major political party in U.S. history.   
Nonetheless, many Democrats criticized the Mondale-Ferraro team as too liberal.  
Bill Hobby reflected on his frequent disappointment with his party’s presidential and vice 
presidential candidates during this time period, and how this harmed the state party: “The 
Democratic Party contributed amply to its own demise.  Certainly at the national level 
and to a lesser degree at the state level the party has shot itself in the foot a few times.  
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During some disastrous political conventions in the 1970s and 1980s, party rules on 
delegate selection and other matters moved the party to the left of the mainstream of 
American political thought.  I objected to the delegate quota system, which specified that 
you have to have so many minorities, so many women, and so forth.”49 
Most Texans never warmed up to Mondale and Ferraro.  The Democratic ticket 
reminded voters of the unhappy Carter years, and Reagan just possessed too much 
popularity in the Lone Star State.  An old Democrat again helping a Republican 
presidential candidate, Allan Shivers served as chairman of Texans for Reagan during the 
1984 campaign.  During the weeks before election day, Shivers’s group issued several 
press releases detailing Democratic endorsements of the Reagan-Bush campaign from 
around the state.  Bo Pilgrim, a businessman from Pittsburg, discussed: “Many traditional 
East Texas Democrats are disenchanted with our Party’s national leadership and its 
presidential ticket.  We feel the Reagan administration represents the things we’ve always 
believed in, such as lower taxes, responsible government spending, and a strong national 
defense that is able to keep the peace and earn us respect abroad.  I’ve been a Democrat 
all my life, but this year I’ll vote to re-elect President Reagan.”  Roy Orr, a former Dallas 
County commissioner, similarly described: “I am a life-long conservative Democrat.  It is 
never easy for a strong Democrat to vote Republican, but I feel the conservative 
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philosophy of President Reagan and Vice President Bush best represents my political 
views, and the views of most Texans.”50   
Indeed, the Reagan-Bush ticket best represented the political views of most 
Americans in 1984.  Reagan won reelection in a historic landslide, carrying 49 out of 50 
states.  He barely lost Minnesota, Mondale’s home state, by just under 4,000 votes.  
Texas voters provided the president with a strong commendation, giving him 63 percent 
of the state’s ballots.  Texans also supported Reagan’s party down the ballot.  The GOP 
gained 4 new House seats in the Texas Congressional delegation.  Although Democrats 
continued to hold 17 Texas seats in the U.S. Congress, the Republican Party reached its 
highest total yet with 10 Texas representatives.  Notable GOP politicos elected in 1984 
included Tom DeLay of Sugar Land, Richard Armey of Denton, and Joe Barton of Ennis.  
Furthermore, Republicans captured 16 seats in the Texas House, for a total of 53 
legislators, and won 84 additional county offices across the state, most remarkably all 
judicial posts in Harris and Dallas counties.  And in the most important statewide race, 
the U.S. Senate seat of John Tower, who had announced his retirement, stayed in 
Republican control.  In an especially pleasing development for Texas and national 
Republicans, Phil Gramm, Reagan’s dedicated ally who had switched parties, easily 
triumphed over Democrat Lloyd Doggett, a liberal state senator from Austin, with 58 
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percent of the vote to become the state’s second Republican U.S. senator since 
Reconstruction.51   
In December 1984, during his final days in the Senate, John Tower received a 
detailed memorandum from his longtime aide John Knaggs, who described the November 
balloting as “a landmark election in Texas.”  Knaggs reflected: “We [the Republican 
Party] finally achieved a victory in depth, up and down the ballot, and that will have a 
profound effect in the power equations of Texas politics.  That’s the real story of this 
election, and President Reagan’s tremendous campaign opened the door.”  Republicans 
made impressive gains in the Texas legislature and elected judgeships across the state, in 
large part due to the Reagan-Bush campaign’s efforts to register voters and turn them out 
on election day.  Knaggs continued: “The pivotal nature of this election should be further 
borne out by a process of conservative Democrat alliance and amalgamation with the 
GOP. . . .  Conservative Democrat officeholders should be encouraged to change parties 
or possibly face strong opposition.”  Knaggs hoped this transition ultimately would make 
the state Democratic Party more liberal, and thus less appealing to most Texans.  
Ironically, as noted previously, liberals themselves long had employed a similar strategy 
in their desire to build a truly two-party state.  Tower’s old friend also noted that 
Governor Mark White faced a difficult reelection battle in two years and had not been 
helped by supporting the unpopular Mondale-Ferraro ticket in Texas.  Knaggs declared: 
“We’ve finally come of age in state politics—we’ve established the two-party system.  
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Throughout urban Texas and in more parts of rural Texas than ever before, no longer will 
there be lingering doubts about the party’s ability to contest marginal races at any level of 
government.  The muscle is there.”52 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
Epilogue and Conclusions 
 
 
Indeed, John Knaggs’s assessment proved correct.  Following the Republican 
Party’s smashing victory in 1984, it continued to prosper in the Lone Star State, while 
Democrats’ fortunes declined.  The Texas Democratic Party won only one gubernatorial 
and one U.S. Senate election during the ensuing years.  No Democratic presidential 
candidate has carried Texas in a general election since Jimmy Carter in 1976.  In 1998, 
the GOP captured all statewide elected offices in Texas, and has held them ever since.  
Republicans finally obtained control of the Texas Legislature in 2002, and the next year 
utilized a controversial redistricting scheme to ensure their party also would hold a 
majority of Texas seats in the U.S. Congressional delegation.  Today, in 2014, the 
Republican Party maintains a powerful grip on Texas politics, while Democrats struggle 
to compete statewide. 
What role did the previously discussed major players have in these developments?  
In 1986, William Clements won back the governorship from Mark White, who had 
become unpopular due to instituting the laudable yet much-maligned “no pass, no play” 
rule for high school student-athletes.  An economic downturn in Texas due to a tough oil 
bust and growing problems in the banking industry further hurt White.  However, 
Clements’s involvement in one of the worst scandals in college sports history, where as 
chairman of the Southern Methodist University Board of Governors he allowed boosters 
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to pay football players outlandish amounts of money, seriously hurt his administration.  
The Mustangs football team received the so-called “death penalty” and suspended its 
activities for two years, which, along with a myriad of sanctions, decimated the program.  
The news of Clements’s actions in the sordid affair broke only two months after his 
inauguration and took much of the air out of his second term.  Nevertheless, his 
reelection to the Governor’s Mansion proved that Republicans surely could compete in 
statewide races. 
In 1988, George Bush, who had labored for years building the GOP in Texas, won 
election to the presidency.  The Democratic nominee, Governor Michael Dukakis of 
Massachusetts, named Lloyd Bentsen as his running mate, and although a strong 
selection, the popular Texan could not help him carry either the Lone Star State or the 
Electoral College majority.  Ronald Reagan’s popularity helped Bush win the White 
House, as did campaign missteps by Dukakis.  Republicans again painted the Democratic 
nominee as a tax and spend liberal out of touch with most Americans, lethal in a 
conservative era.   
Texas Democrats achieved some success during the Bush years, however.  
Bentsen performed brilliantly in the vice presidential debate against the Republican 
nominee, Dan Quayle of Indiana, and easily won reelection to fourth term in the U.S. 
Senate, despite Bush taking Texas.  Ann Richards delivered a roaring keynote address at 
the 1988 Democratic National Convention in Atlanta, and employed her instant celebrity 
to win the Governor’s Mansion in 1990.  However, these races marked the last time the 
Democratic Party won either a U.S. Senate seat or governorship in Texas.  Furthermore, 
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Richards’s victory owed much to the incompetence of her Republican opponent Clayton 
Williams, Jr., who made a disturbing joke about rape during his campaign and refused to 
shake Richards’s hand at a public debate, offending many voters, especially women.  
Republicans contended that a better nominee would have trounced Richards in the 
election. 
John Tower experienced unhappy later years.  After winning election to the White 
House, Bush nominated Tower as secretary of defense.  Following several contentious 
weeks, the U.S. Senate rejected Tower’s nomination in a stunning rebuke to a former 
member of that prestigious institution.  Allegations of past problems with alcoholism and 
adultery ruined Tower’s candidacy.  Tower remained deeply bitter over his treatment by 
his old colleagues, and died in a tragic plane crash, that also killed one of his daughters, 
in 1991. 
John Connally never ran for elected office again after his failed campaign in the 
1980 presidential election.  He partnered with Ben Barnes in a series of real estate 
investments during the 1980s, but a sharp mid-decade downturn in the Texas economy 
caused the state’s housing bubble to burst.  Both men declared bankruptcy, and in 1988, 
Connally and his wife oversaw an emotional and much-publicized auction in Houston of 
many of their personal items.  Although Connally remained a Republican for the rest of 
his life, old tensions with George Bush persisted, and he vocally criticized the president’s 
decision process leading up to the 1991 Gulf War.  Connally died in 1993.  While Barnes 
did not seek public office again either, he remains actively involved in the Democratic 
Party as a well-respected fundraiser and spokesperson. 
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After his gubernatorial term ended in early 1979, Dolph Briscoe, Jr., retired to 
Uvalde, where he continued his ranching and banking business interests.  During their 
later years, Briscoe and his wife contributed to many philanthropic endeavors in 
education, medicine, and art across the state.  Although Republicans often encouraged 
him to switch parties, Briscoe remained a devoted Democrat for the rest of his life.  He 
especially enjoyed supporting Bill Clinton’s 1992 and 1996 presidential campaigns, and 
Hillary Clinton’s run for the White House in 2008. 
In 1992, George Bush lost his quest for reelection to Governor Bill Clinton of 
Arkansas.  Despite winning praise for his conduction of foreign policy, especially as the 
Cold War ended, breaking a promise not to raise taxes paired with an election year 
recession made the president seem out of touch with ordinary Americans and doomed his 
campaign.  The third-party candidacy of the eccentric Dallas billionaire Ross Perot 
further hurt Bush by siphoning away voters weary of high taxes.  Exuding a youthful 
charisma and empathy for suffering Americans, Clinton modeled himself as a “New 
Democrat,” rejecting liberalism in favor of centrism and pragmatism.  He only lost Texas 
by 3 percentage points, and for a time seemed Democrats’ best hope for holding on to 
power in the Lone Star State.  Clinton named Lloyd Bentsen his treasury secretary and 
former San Antonio Mayor Henry Cisneros leader of housing and urban development, 
pleasing Texans.  While Cisneros earned praise for his work in improving the nation’s 
public housing facilities and home ownership rate, a scandal involving payment of funds 
to his mistress overshadowed much of his time as secretary, and he resigned in 1997.  
Cisneros remains an active ambassador for San Antonio, working to recruit businesses 
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and improve the quality of life in the Alamo City today.  Bentsen served as an especially 
critical member of the Clinton administration, helping develop budget policy to combat 
the economic recession and win approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in the Senate.  He retired at the end of 1994, receiving much acclaim for his 
many years in government.   
Although Democrats hoped Clinton could improve their fortunes in Texas, the 
president found the Lone Star State more difficult than he had imagined.  Clinton and his 
wife, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, became increasingly controversial in Texas, 
especially as the White House wrestled with raising taxes and pursued healthcare reform.  
When Bentsen resigned his Senate seat to become treasury secretary, Governor Ann 
Richards named Robert Krueger his temporary successor.  When Texas, as required by 
state law, held a special election for the remainder of Bentsen’s term, the combination of 
Clinton’s growing unpopularity and Krueger’s poor campaign led Republican Kay Bailey 
Hutchison, the state treasurer, to win, giving the GOP control of both of Texas’s U.S. 
Senate seats, which it enjoys to the present day.  In 1994, Republicans rode a wave of 
voter discontent with Clinton and the Democratic Party to capture control of the House of 
Representatives for the first time in 40 years, and also regain the Senate.  Jack Brooks, 
LBJ’s old ally who had carried much Great Society legislation in the House to passage, 
was swept out of the Beaumont area seat he had held for 40 years.  In this historic GOP 
election night, Ann Richards also lost the Texas governorship to George W. Bush, the 
son of the former president.  For the remainder of his presidency, Clinton found some of 
his chief antagonists in Congress to be Texas Republicans.  Richard Armey and Tom 
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DeLay, originally elected in the 1984 Reagan landslide, assumed top positions in the 
House Republican leadership and relentlessly investigated the Clinton White House for 
wrongdoing, either real or imagined.  Phil Gramm remained a powerful U.S. senator 
during the 1980s and 1990s, and arduously recruited conservative Democrats to the 
Republican fold.  Gramm briefly ran for the GOP presidential nomination in 1996 before 
bowing out of the campaign.  Although Clinton regained popularity and handily won 
reelection in 1996, he could not carry Texas in either of his campaigns for the White 
House. 
George W. Bush received widespread commendation for his performance as 
Texas governor.  Bush worked ably with Democrats in the Legislature, and won a strong 
reelection victory in 1998 over Garry Mauro, in a race that saw Republican candidates 
sweep all statewide offices in Texas.  Bush’s high approval ratings in the Lone Star State 
and famous name propelled him to the 2000 Republican presidential nomination.  Bush 
defeated Vice President Al Gore in an immensely controversial election that saw the U.S. 
Supreme Court step in to stop a voting recount in Florida, which gave the Texan the 
White House.  Bush easily carried Texas in 2000 and in his reelection victory in 2004, 
and remained well-liked in the state, even as his national approval ratings declined 
throughout his presidency.  His popularity in Texas solidified Republican control in the 
Lone Star State, and helped the GOP finally win the Legislature in 2002.  Once in full 
power, Republicans in the Texas House and Senate launched a redistricting scheme in 
2003 that guaranteed their party’s majority in the Texas delegation to the U.S. Congress.  
Despite the vehement protests of Democrats, Tom DeLay, the U.S. House Majority 
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Leader, viciously and successfully pushed the redistricting plan, with the help of Bush’s 
heir, Governor Rick Perry, himself a former Democrat who had converted to the GOP in 
1989.   
Even Bush’s low approval ratings during his second term and a historic and 
dynamic presidential candidate in 2008 could not help Democrats break Republicans’ 
solid hold on Texas politics.  Voters elected Senator Barack Obama of Illinois as the 
nation’s first African American president in 2008 by a strong national margin.  Yet 
Obama only could win 44 percent of the Texas vote, and received 3 points fewer in the 
state in his successful reelection bid of 2012.  Indeed, as in the Clinton years, some of 
Obama’s harshest critics have been Texas Republicans, such the stridently conservative 
U.S. Senator Ted Cruz.  Most notably, since 1994, no Democrat has won a statewide 
election in Texas.  Although states across of the South experienced declining Democratic 
fortunes during the latter decades of the twentieth century, the party’s dearth of victories 
in Texas since 1994 remains the longest streak for any member of the old Confederacy.   
 
Conclusions 
 As this dissertation demonstrates, from the 1960s to the 1980s, the power of the 
Texas Democratic Party declined as the national party took stances on issues such as civil 
rights, the role of government, culture, and foreign policy that alienated many Texans and 
contributed to the growth of the Texas Republican Party.  The national Democratic 
Party’s leftward shift became too much to bear for most conservative Texans, who found 
the Republican Party, especially when led by the charming Ronald Reagan, more 
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appealing.  Constant division within the state Democratic Party further weakened its 
electoral success and led many conservatives to convert to the GOP. 
 Lyndon Johnson’s prediction upon signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that as 
the Democratic Party fully embraced racial equality white southerners would flock to 
Republicans, proved accurate in Texas.  Although most white Texans eventually 
supported voting rights for African Americans and the end of legal segregation, they 
came to identify Democrats as the party of minorities.  As the civil rights movement took 
a more militant turn in the late 1960s with black nationalism and several large cities 
literally burned in racial unrest, conservative Texans blamed LBJ and Democrats.  During 
the 1970s, busing and affirmative action became extremely contentious, and Texans 
again associated these issues with Democrats.  Although Texas is a unique state with both 
southern and western characteristics and a smaller African American population, there 
can be no doubt that racism, the most tragic flaw in American life, played a critical role 
in the state’s political transformation and led many Texans to leave the Democratic Party.  
In this development, Texas acted like other states of the South.  Republicans, such as 
Richard Nixon with his southern strategy, actively and successfully courted disillusioned 
conservatives to the GOP and painted Democrats as the party of racial minorities. 
 The national Democratic Party’s endorsement of a strong federal government 
further alienated Texans.  Lyndon Johnson considered himself the political heir to 
Franklin Roosevelt, and dedicated his Great Society to completing the New Deal, 
especially in matters of civil rights, poverty, education, and healthcare.  It is ironic that, 
much like his prediction about civil rights, LBJ’s Great Society policies also caused 
  293 
Texans to abandon his party.  During the 1970s and 1980s, conservatives vocally 
criticized the size of government, especially federal expenditures on poverty programs 
initiated during the Johnson administration.  Even though Medicare and aid to education 
remained popular legacies of the LBJ years, the programs’ costs contributed to a heavy 
tax burden and large impersonal bureaucracy that large numbers of Americans resented.   
Many Texans also decried the Democratic Party’s leftward shift in the polarizing 
culture wars of the late twentieth century.  Although the party remained divided on 
abortion, feminism, gay rights, crime and punishment, and the role of religion in public 
life, Republicans took more conservative stances on these issues, which appealed to many 
Texans.  By the late 1970s, and certainly with Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, the 
religious right became an important constituency of the GOP and loudly voiced its 
conservative views.  Republicans such as Nixon and Reagan lambasted the liberal slant of 
many of the country’s courts, and promised to appoint strict constructionists who would 
take a more traditional view on the questions of family life and religion.  For many 
Texans, the liberal social views of northeastern Democrats like Edward Kennedy carried 
too much weight in the party. 
The national Democratic Party’s foreign policy equally disturbed Texans.  Most 
in the Lone Star State supported LBJ’s conduct of the divisive Vietnam War.  Indeed, 
many Texans urged him to use even greater force against communist North Vietnam and 
the Vietcong, and denounced protests of the war as unpatriotic.  Texans continued this 
sentiment when Nixon succeeded Johnson in the White House, and often expressed alarm 
at the growing number of Democrats calling for withdrawal from Southeast Asia.  Most 
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in Texas shared Nixon’s conviction that the United States must fervently combat the 
communist threat in Vietnam and throughout the world.  Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy 
blunders further made the Democratic Party appear weak and inept in the dangerous Cold 
War, while Ronald Reagan’s determination to maintain U.S. military supremacy and 
aggressively confront the Soviet Union met with enthusiastic approval from Texans.  The 
Republican Party seemed to possess a more realistic understanding of international affairs 
in an uncertain world. 
Beyond such ideological battles, the bitter fights between the conservative and 
liberal wings of the Texas Democratic Party over the years hurt its prospects for electoral 
victory.  Democratic infighting largely caused the election of John Tower to the U.S. 
Senate in 1961 and William Clements to the governorship in 1978, and opened the door 
for continued Republican victories in these offices.  Once the liberal wing won control of 
the state party machinery in 1976, many conservatives perceived Texas Democrats as too 
similar to the national party.  The immense popularity of the charismatic Ronald Reagan 
with Texas conservatives during the 1970s and 1980s further hastened this party switch. 
Texas itself changed dramatically during the second half of the twentieth century, 
and this development altered the course of state politics.  A post-World War II flurry of 
government contracts procured by powerful Texas politicians like LBJ and Sam Rayburn 
caused the state to diversify its economy and its cities to boom.  State officials such as 
John Connally recruited businesses to Texas with tax incentives.  Job opportunities and 
warm weather attracted Americans from all parts of the country to the Sun Belt, of which 
Texas became an integral part.  Many of these new Texans brought Republican loyalties 
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and had no historic ties to the Democratic Party.  By the 1980s, the formerly rural, 
Democratic-dominated Texas had become an urbanized, two-party super-state, on its way 
to becoming a bastion of Republican political power.   
 
Hope for Texas Democrats? 
Although Lyndon Johnson’s commitment to civil rights allowed the Republican 
Party to capture Texas “for a long time to come,” it proved a worthy sacrifice.  The Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Voting Rights Act of 1965, and Fair Housing Act of 1968 
transformed the United States and helped it more adequately live up to its professed 
ideals of equality for all citizens.  Johnson’s Great Society attacked poverty, improved 
the country’s education and healthcare systems, and opened the doors for people of all 
nationalities and racial backgrounds to seek the American dream.  A long overdue act of 
political courage, LBJ and the Democratic Party’s decision to embrace the civil rights 
movement helped ameliorate the scourge of racism that continues to plague American 
society today.  And while this action drove many whites away from the party, it secured 
the allegiance of African Americans and other minorities to the Democrats.  Today, 
blacks, Hispanics, Asian Americans, and women remain key constituencies and leaders 
of the Democratic Party, both in Texas and nationally. 
Is there hope that the Democratic Party may one day regain electoral supremacy 
in Texas?  Ben Barnes, who remains a strong advocate for Democrats, offered this 
advice: “If there was one thing that Texas Democrats did well in the ‘60s . . . it was 
creating this bridge between conservative business interests and progressive 
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constituencies. . . .  We made it possible to enact progressive legislation while ensuring it 
was politically and socially acceptable for the business community to support the 
Democratic Party.  As a political formula, it was—and still is—a sure winner.”  The 
business world serves as the “money base” for political parties.  He continued: “The 
[Texas] Democratic Party let the business community slip away.  If there was one truth 
that I’d learned above all others during my time in politics, it was that the party could 
only be strong with the support of business, and by keeping it socially acceptable to be a 
Democrat.” 
Barnes summarized: 
In Texas following the difficult years of 1968-73, the Democratic Party 
lost its hold on the middle when moderates began shifting in large numbers to the 
Republican Party.  This happened partly because of the fallout from LBJ’s civil 
rights efforts, partly as a backlash against the Democratic moderates who’d been 
caught up in Sharpstown, and partly as a backlash against the continuing Vietnam 
War.  We need to reclaim that middle ground, and to learn again how to speak to 
the ordinary folks who make up that vast middle.  Too often, I’ve heard 
conservative or moderate former Democrats say, “I didn’t leave the party; the 
party left me.” 1 
 
Shortly after Barack Obama’s reelection in 2012, Jeremy Bird, a key strategist 
from the president’s campaign, announced the creation of a new group called 
“Battleground Texas” that would build an infrastructure for turning Texas “blue,” or back 
to the Democratic Party.  Bird and other Democratic analysts hoped the state’s rapidly 
growing Latino population paired with a more progressive younger generation could once 
                                                 
1Ben Barnes, Barn Burning, Barn Building: Tales of a Political Life, from LBJ 
through George W. Bush and Beyond (Albany, Tex.: Bright Sky Press, 2006), 94, 198, 
232, 235. 
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again win Texas for the party.  Battleground Texas presently works to register new 
voters, support campaigns of Democratic candidates, and fundraise in the Lone Star 
State.  National Democrats believe that returning Texas to their fold could give the party 
a huge electoral advantage over Republicans in both presidential and congressional 
elections.  The August 2013 lead story of Texas Monthly analyzed the efforts of 
Battleground Texas, and profiled a new generation of Texas Democratic rising stars.  On 
its cover, the magazine featured State Senator Wendy Davis of Fort Worth with Mayor 
Julián Castro and U.S. Representative Joaquín Castro, twin brothers from San Antonio.  
Pundits viewed Davis and the Castro brothers as skilled politicians with the potential to 
make waves for Democrats among the state’s diversifying population.2  The next month’s 
Texas Monthly included a lively sample of letters to the editor both praising and 
ridiculing Democrats’ hope to win Texas back.  One critic succinctly wrote: “The thing 
Texas never was, and never will be, is a liberal state.  The reason Texas has become a 
Republican state is that Democrats are leaning so far left.”  However, one sympathizer 
confessed that the quest “gives one hope that there might be an alternative to moving out 
of the state.”3  The future course of Texas politics will prove interesting to observe.  
Democrats have much work ahead of them in their attempt to reverse Lyndon Johnson’s 
all-too accurate prediction.   
                                                 
2Robert Draper, “The Life and Death (and Life?) of the Party,” Texas Monthly, 
August 2013, 84-89, 138-43. 
 
3“Roar of the Crowd,” Texas Monthly, September 2013, 14. 
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